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ABSTRACT
Under the 1991 NHS reforms some GPs have, for the first time, been 
given the opportunity to manage their own practice funds which 
includes an amount set for prescription drugs. This new budgetary 
scheme puts a ceiling on spending and gives practices the incentive 
to save on drugs and spend the money elsewhere. This study seeks to 
determine whether a series of measures, including the latter, have 
had any impact on prescribing trends. Prescribing trends of eight 
firstwave GP fundholding practices were compared with Family Health 
Service Authority (FHSA) averages. The study examines quarterly 
Prescribing, Analysis and CosT (PACT) data provided by the 
Prescription Pricing Authority (PPA) and sent to practices and FHSAs 
for at least one year prior to fundholding and two years post.
From this data measurements for overall expenditure, number of items 
prescribed, average cost per patient, generic percentages and 
practice list size were recorded. Trends in national data were 
reviewed including overall net ingredient costs, total number of 
items prescribed and average cost per patient from 1975 to 1992 
inclusive. Interviews with practices and FHSAs were conducted to 
determine what policies had been implemented to manage the drugs 
budget more effectively.
The data indicates fundholding is broadly more successful than non- 
fundholding in restraining the drugs budget. Disaggregated data 
found the Indicative Prescribing Amount Scheme had not had the same
impact as the GP Fundholding Scheme. GP fundholders did exceed their
drugs budgets but, these overspends were less than for non-
fundholding practices. Prior to fundholding few practices had 
implemented cost-containment strategies. Most had a general policy 
of generic prescribing but, pursued this more rigorously and
introduced a whole range of other cost-containment strategies after 
fundholding. Cash limited budgets and financial incentives appear to 
have been sufficient to encourage GPs to seriously consider their 
prescribing costs.
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Introduction
What is this thesis about ?
This is a study of government attempts to control the growth 
in expenditure on general practitioner (GP) generated
prescription drugs, particularly in the UK and especially 
since 1975. Particular attention is focused on the most 
recently implemented methods of cost-containment under the 
1991 National Health Service (NHS) Reforms.
Chapter 1 examines the reasons behind government attempts to 
curb expenditure on prescription drugs. We see that primary 
health care is one of the fastest growing elements of the NHS 
and that within primary health care, prescription drugs are 
rising the fastest. This rapid growth in drug expenditure
resulted from a combination of factors. These include an
'explosion' in the pharmaceutical industry's output brought 
about by the scientific revolution at about the same time the 
demand for health care increased rapidly as a result of the 
introduction of the NHS. In addition, changes in social and 
demographic trends, patterns of illness and attitudes towards 
therapeutic delivery have contributed to the expansion of the 
industry.
The problem is further complicated by the unique structure of 
the pharmaceutical market which is dominated by a three 
tiered system. Within this market structure both the primary 
and secondary consumers are not accountable for the cost of 
their actions. This responsibility is attached to a third 
party payer who ha[El]s little or no input about the type of 
purchase or its cost. The market is therefore relatively 
inelastic to price. This rapid growth in drug expenditure
was sustainable whilst the economic boom of the 1950s/60s 
continued. However, with the economic crisis of the mid 
1970s the government had to seek ways to cut back on public 
spending.
Chapter 2 examines three ways in which the government tried 
to contain drug costs : regulating industry prices and
profits, curbing patient demand by the use of prescription 
charges and, influencing prescribers' attitudes and choices 
through persuasive mechanisms. The role of the government in 
the pharmaceutical industry is twofold. On the one hand, as 
the monopsonist purchaser of a privately produced product it 
seeks to keep prices down. Conflicting with this need is the 
need to maintain a lucrative UK export industry which 
requires prices to be kept at a profitable level. To 
circumvent this problem, the government seeks to regulate 
industry profits rather than product prices thereby safe­
guarding its dual role. Each year companies have to 
negotiate with the government the amount of profit they will 
be permitted to keep. They are however, allowed to set their 
own prices for new products but require official approval for 
any subsequent price increases.
Attempts to curb patient demand have proved relatively 
unsuccessful despite a policy of regular increases in 
prescription charges. This results from increases in the 
number of exempt categories which have severely restricted 
prescription charges' ability to restrain volume demand. 
Attempts to influence prescribers' attitudes have also failed 
to produce the hoped for result. Given the lack of any real 
incentive to encourage GPs to prescribe more cost- 
effectively, the results are perhaps not surprising. Thus, 
this failure by successive governments to satisfactorily 
contain drug expenditure led to the revision of the existing 
methods of regulation and the subsequent reforms.
Chapter 3 discusses the different types of methodology 
employed in the study and outlines the study's aims and 
objectives. A brief description of each of the sample 
practices is provided and a description given of the type of 
analysis undertaken.
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Chapter 4 illustrates how the focus of government regulation 
moved from the industry and patient to the profession. Up 
until 1985 the government had concentrated on regulating 
industry prices and curbing patient demand. GPs had 
experienced very few constraints on their 'freedom' to 
prescribe. Those controls that did exist proved largely 
ineffectual in encouraging GPs to prescribe more cost- 
effectively. Thus, the government reassessed the mechanisms 
employed to influence GPs' choice of drug therapy based on 
cost. The outcome of the NHS Review of the late 1980s was, a 
redistribution of NHS funds away from central provision to 
the grassroots level and, a restructuring of the main element 
of NHS primary health care services. GPs who met a fixed set 
of criteria were offered the opportunity to manage their own 
practice budget, which included an allowance for drugs.
The 'carrot' used to entice GPs to become fundholders was the 
opportunity to keep any savings they made within the practice 
budget to re-invest in other areas of the practice. However, 
this also meant practices were faced with immediate penalties 
should they overspend on any element of their budget. Thus, 
faced with a cash limited budget practices were forced to 
make choices and agree priorities about the use of financial 
resources they had at their disposal. Those practices who 
were not fundholders remained essentially uncash limited and, 
although they were notified of a target budget (Indicative 
Prescribing Amount (IPA)), they faced few 'real' sanctions 
should they exceed their IPAs. With the introduction of this 
new system regulation is moving away from the use of 
persuasion to actual cash limits.
Chapter 5 examines the approaches adopted by eight GP 
fundholding practices in their attempts to adapt to the 
Reforms and manage their own budgets. It also looks at the 
problems they face in respect of prescribing. GPs are faced 
with a range of intractable problems which makes the task of
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developing and implementing a strategy to counteract their 
effects very difficult. Some of these problems have a long 
history and relate to the social and demographic factors 
which practices can do little about. Others are of a more 
recent making and appear to relate directly to the NHS 
Reforms. Most practices cited examples of hospitals shifting 
some of their prescribing costs over to them; new 
requirements in the GP contract to screen patients were 
identifying more and more patients requiring expensive and 
long-term treatments.
Despite these problems, practices were tackling them head on. 
The majority of fundholding practices sought to increase 
their rate of generic prescribing in conjunction with a range 
of other strategies and, to review their progress at regular 
practice meetings. Despite the small sample size and absence 
of a matched control group, the evidence presented suggests 
this group of fundholding practices is indicative of others 
and, their intensity of action is not being matched by non­
fundholders .
Chapter 6 describes the impact of cost-containment mechanisms 
instituted between 1975 and 1992 on national prescribing 
trends. 1983 appeared to be the turning point both in terms 
of expenditure growth and government's approach to policy. 
Government regulation of industry profits brought about the 
most change in expenditure growth up to 1983. Since then the 
government embarked on a policy of regularly reviewing drug 
expenditure in respect of the industry, profession and the
patient. This had the effect of slowing the rise in drug
expenditure at a time when the rate of inflation was 
increasing. Although these policies have failed to reduce 
GPs' overall rate of prescribing, they have successfully 
changed the nature of that prescribing. GPs are now
employing a greater number of generic preparations. Patient 
demand has however continued to prove more difficult to
control mainly because of, the disproportionate increase in
12
the number of exempt prescriptions compared with those where 
a charge is levied.
In Chapter 7 the prescribing trends of three Family Health 
Service Authorities (FHSAs) are examined for the period 
immediately before and after the reforms. The chapter 
endeavours to determine whether these FHSAs have managed to 
contain their drug spend within a firm budget (ie. cash 
limited) and, what impact the two GP schemes had on overall 
FHSA drug spend. In terms of total drug spend, the reforms 
appear to have done little curb expenditure. Only one FHSA 
demonstrated an ability to contain spend within its firm 
budget. The other two FHSAs overspent on their budgets 
annually and, both increased their percentage overspend in 
the second year of the reforms. However, the disaggregated 
data revealed that the IPA Scheme was responsible for the 
level of overspend displayed by the FHSA. The GP Fundholding 
Schemes did overspend on their budgets but, these were nearer 
to their budget limits compared to the IPA Schemes. This 
result supported the government’s contentions that direct 
incentives and cash limits would motivate GPs to modify their 
behaviour.
Chapter 8 analyzes the prescribing trends of the eight GP 
fundholding practices in an attempt to understand the process 
by which they achieved their levels of prescribing. 
Practices had introduced a range of cost-containment 
strategies mostly after they had become fundholders. In 
combination these measures seemed to have reduced the rate of 
expansion below that found in the FHSA as a whole. The 
research method could not indicate which of these measures 
proved the most successful.
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the study and its findings. It 
examines the proposed amendments to certain areas of the 
reforms in respect of GP fundholding. At the moment the 
system is unfair to fundholders who are constrained by
13
financial boundaries which non-fundholders are not. To 
secure the future success of fundholding requires cash 
limited budget to be extended to all practices. However, the 
question we should be asking is : 'should we be putting a
cash limit on drugs at all and, what are the implications for 
patient health ?'. There is little or no research evidence 
on this and without it, we cannot make a final judgement on 
fundholding and cash limits.
14
Chapter 1
Why Is the social market for 
pharmaceuticals so problematic ?
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Introduction
During the 30 years prior to the mid 1980s expenditure on 
health care rose faster than Gross National Product (GNP) in 
most industrialised countries. Rapid economic growth made it 
possible for real disposable income to increase rapidly 
despite parallel growth of public expenditure in many social 
programmes. However, the oil crises of the 1970s, rising 
unemployment and inflation, nil or low growth at a time of 
declining GNP resulted in social security schemes facing a 
crisis in financing. Many countries showed clear signs of 
tax resistance which brought about political response. 
Income was no longer growing in real terms and at the same 
time, provision had to be made for the growing number of 
unemployed as well as the rising numbers of pensioners. 
Thus, within this wider context a search for a means to 
contain the cost of health care had to be sought.
This chapter describes the factors which have contributed to 
the expansion of the pharmaceutical industry and its output 
and, why these subsequently led to the government seeking 
ways to curb drug expenditure. The chapter begins by looking 
at the size of the problem and how the 'scientific* 
revolution, demographic and therapeutic changes have 
contributed to the growth in output of the industry. The 
second part of the chapter focuses on the nature of the 
problem and examines the demand for and supply of 
pharmaceuticals and discusses how these have influenced the 
market.
The size of the problem
Primary health care is one of the fastest growing elements of 
the UK National Health Service (NHS) spending and, until 
recently it was not cash limited unlike hospital and 
community services. Within primary health care.
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pharmaceutical C  ) costs were rising the fastest. Since the 
introduction of the NHS, the pharmaceutical bill rose nearly 
fivefold from £40m to £180m or £3.25 per capita per annum 
(Dunlop 1971). This escalation of costs has continued and 
between 1978 and 1988 for example, UK spending on 
pharmaceuticals at manufacturers' prices was in excess of £3 
billion. £2.4 billion of this bill was accounted for by 
sales to the NHS of which, GPs* prescribed medicines 
accounted for 82% of this figure compared to hospital 
prescribing at 18%. The rise in real terms was £696 million 
with an average annual rate of increase of nearly 5%. Less 
than one-quarter of this was due to the increase in the 
number of prescriptions ie. in the number of individual items 
prescribed, and about three-quarters to the increase in their 
unit price (ie. cost per item) relative to other prices.
During the same period sales of over the counter drugs (OTC) 
amounted to £650 million (Burstall 1990a). However, within 
the context of total NHS spending expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals this is only marginal. As a proportion of 
the total NHS budget, expenditure on medicines by GPs rose 
from 6.8 % to 7.9% between 1978 and 1988 (Table 1.1). This 
trend has been moving steadily upwards throughout the decade.
Moreover, during this period spending on this account 
increased in real terms from 0.36% to 0.4 6% of Gross Domestic 
Product ((GDP) (Table 1.1)).
 ^Pharmaceuticals in the context of this discussion are 
defined as drugs prescribed by the general practitioner.
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Real Expenditure by UK General Practitioners 
on Pharmaceuticals 1978-88
Year Prescrip­
tions (m)
Unit Cost 
(1988 £) Total eacp. 
(m)
Excpendi ture
Per
capita
in 1988 prices 
As % NHS As % 
budget GDP
1978 378.1 3.09 1167 20.80 6.8 0.36
1979 375.1 3.14 1178 20.90 6.7 0.36
1980 374.0 3.32 1241 22.00 6.5 0.39
1981 369.9 3.38 1289 22.90 6.6 0.41
1982 383.3 3.61 1385 24.60 7.3 0.44
1983 389.1 3.85 1497 26.60 7.2 0.45
1984 395.6 3.85 1525 27.00 7.4 0.45
1985 393.1 3.86 1517 26.80 7.3 0.44
1986 397.6 4.03 1601 28.20 7.5 0.44
1987 413.6 4.18 1728 30.40 7.7 0.45
1988 427.2 4.36 1863 32.60 7.9 0.46
% growth 
1978-88 13.0 41.1 59.6 56.7 16.2 30.6
TABLE 1.1
Source; Compendium of Health Statistics, HMSO, Economic
Trends 198 9, Annual Supplement table 25, 128) 
Reference: (Taken from Burstall 1990a)
Notes: All figures are at manufacturers’ prices and
exclude dispensing doctors and have been 
deflated using the retail price index.
Other countries have also witnessed an increase in government 
and third party payer expenditure for drug reimbursement over 
the years even where total drug consumption relative to GNP 
and total health care costs have been decreasing. In the 
Nordic countries for example, the scale of drug subsidies in 
relation to total drug expenditure rose, between 1965 and 
1989 from 27% to 34% (Denmark), 17% to 38% (Finland) and 13% 
to 33% (Table 1.2). In comparison, UK spending on 
pharmaceuticals in relation to its European colleagues is 
less, with the exception of Spain (Table 1.3)
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Share of drug reimbursement e^enditures to total drug 
consumption costs in Denmark, Finland and Norway 1965 - 
1980 (with VAT)
Year Denmark Per Finland Per Norway Per
(%) Capita (%) Capita (%) Capita
1965 27.0 73 17.0 90 13.2 54
1966 - 18.3 15.3
1967 30.9 20.3 17.0
1968 31.8 22.7 18.2
1969_ 32.5 22.7 19.2
1970 34.0 128 25.0 118 19.3 103
1971 34.7 28.3 20.9
1972 35.5 31.9 22.0
1973 33.5 33.9 23.6
1974 33.7 37.1 26.3
1975 32.0 237 38.0 229 38.3 216
1976 31.6 39.1 29.5
1977 32.8 39.8 30.8
1978_ 31.2 38.8 32.0
1979_ 33.1 38.9 33.2
1980_ 34.0 452 38.0 384 33.0 382
TABLE 1.2
Source : See reference
Reference : Lindgren & Silverberg (1985) ^
In 1980 the conversion rates of the nordic currencies 
pounds were as follows :
£
Danish crown (DKK) 13.110
Finnish mark (FM) 9.216
Norwegian crown (NOK) 11.513
Swedish crown (SEK) 9.850
to UK
 ^Drug reimbursement here refers only to refunds made by the 
national health insurance of the respective countries and does not 
refer to the total public expenditure on drugs.
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European comparison of 1988 prescription drug consumption
Country Per capita drug spending
£
Belgium 73
France 80
FRG 87
Italy 74
Netherlands 47
Spain 38
UK 42
USA 75
Table 1.3
Source : BEUC, Glaxo, national sources
Adapted from Burstall (1990 Table 4)
Expenditure and price levels at manufacturers' prices 
The pharmacological revolution
Prior to the 1950s the drug industry was virtually non­
existent. Pre 1935 manufacturers of medicines were still 
mainly concerned with the manufacture and sale of galenical 
medicines derived from naturally occurring animal and 
vegetable ingredients such as, vitamins, quinine, digitalis, 
ipecacuanha, mercury and salvarsan; of which salvarsan was 
the only truly modern preparation 'capable of attacking 
causes'. However, 1935 heralded the start of the 'scientific 
and therapeutic revolution' of medicine and pharmacology with 
the discovery of the antimicrobial qualities of Prontosil (a 
red dye) and, the subsequent establishment a few years later 
that sulphonilamide, the active constituent of the dye, was 
the active therapy. Following the discovery of Prontosil a 
new generation of medicines derived from specific active 
chemical ingredients synthesized by new large-scale 
industrial pharmaceutical research laboratories started to 
emerge.
Although penicillin was originally discovered in 1928 it only 
first became available for practical purposes after 1940.
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This was followed three years later (ie. 1943) by the 
discovery of a new and effective drug, known as streptomycin, 
used in the treatment of tuberculosis. By 1949 the first of 
a broad spectrum of antibiotics (chloramphenicol) had been 
introduced and by 1950 corticosteroids, antihistamines, anti­
depressants, diuretics and many other preparations had been 
discovered. Finally, 1953 saw the first antibiotic whose 
chemical formula was already known prior to the drug itself 
being produced (ie. tetracycline) (Reekie & Weber 1979).
Patent activity data on pharmaceuticals in London from 1900 
shows a tremendous upsurge of patenting after 1935 reflecting 
the dynamic discoveries of the 1940/50s (Figure 1.1). As a 
consequence of this scientific revolution combined with an 
increasing demand for the benefits of good health brought 
about by the NHS, there was a steady expansion in the output 
of the industry by existing companies, by entrants from other 
industries and by immigrant subsidiaries bringing with them 
discoveries and products unique to themselves. The
implications for the medical profession were significant. 
The pre 1940s restrained commercial atmosphere and the modest 
sales promotion activities of the small traditional 'ethical 
galenical houses' changed. Suddenly full force of the 
professional marketing activities of the new large-scale 
international pharmaceutical manufacturers bore down on GPs.
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Chemico-pharmaceutical patents in five-yearly 
periods, 1910-1966
7000
6000
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4000
3000
2000
1000
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
Source
Figure 1.1
'Patent Data as a Guide to Industrial Activity',
Research Policy, 2 (1973) p.249
Reference: Reekie WD. Weber MH. (1979)
Notes : The 1910 observation is based on ten years
preceding data
Demographic and therapeutic changes
Other predisposing factors were at work creating a potential 
demand for the new products, notably demographic trends. UK 
figures during the ten year period 1978-88 show a rise in the 
population of just over 1% with a 9% (Burstall in Culyer
1990) rise in those of pensionable age ie. men over 65 and
women over 60, and a 30% rise in the over 75s. Even within
this group a sub-group exists with more acute needs. It is
estimated that 80-85 year olds consume between five and ten 
times the value of pharmaceuticals as the 60-64 year old age 
group. This implies that, not only do the elderly need more
health care of all kinds but, that this need increases 
exponentially with age. Indeed, 41% of the total
prescriptions written by GPs ie. more than half the rise in 
the GP drugs bill during this decade, can be accounted for by
22
the elderly. This shows that on average this section of the 
population received nearly four times as many prescriptions 
per capita as other adults in comparison to a slight drop 
during the decade for other age-groups.
These figures imply that changes in the national age 
structure influence patterns of prescribing and reveal a 
change in attitude towards therapeutic delivery which now 
favours more intensive forms of treatment. During 1978-88 
for example, there was an increase in the number of 
prescriptions written for the cardiovascular system, anti­
asthma drugs, anti-inflammatories and for H-2 antagonists to 
treat peptic ulcers. All of these account for 90% of the net 
increase in prescriptions (Table 1.4) (Burstall 1990a).
Prescriptions by UK General Practitioners 1978-88
Category Prescriptions
(m)
1978 1988
Unit Cost 
(1988)
1978 1988
Ehq>endi ture 
(1988 £m) 
1978 1988
Central Nervous System
- sedatives &
94 84 2.07 2.18 195 183
tranquillisers 26 12 1.65 1.34 43 16
- hypnotics 18 17 1.71 1.23 31 21
- minor analgesics 24 26 1.71 1.20 41 31
- major analgesics 4 6 2.31 4.10 10 25
Cardiovascular system 53 73 4.98 5.70 264 416
- heart drugs 18 32 5.72 6.47 103 207
- diuretics 21 26 3.23 2.58 68 67
- antihypertensives 7 10 7.63 10.13 53 101
Gastrointestinal system 28 33 3.11 6.84 87 226
- H-2 antagonists 2 10 14.22 16.02 33 159
Respiratory system 41 38 2.47 4.94 101 188
- asthma preparations 14 28 4.53 6.37 63 172
- cough suppressants 21 8 1.14 0.73 24 6
Rheumatic preparations 18 25 6.72 8.44 118 211
Anti-inflammatories 16 23 6.52 8.41 104 192
TOTAL 234 253 3.27 4.84 765 1224
Table 1.4
Source : Author's estimates based on own study
Reference :Adapted from Burstall 1990a p70 
Notes : Excluding dispensing doctors, costs and
expenditures at manufacturers' prices
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This growth appears to be related more to the wider use of 
expensive drugs than increases in unit prices (ie. cost per 
item). Where unit prices have risen substantially (anti­
asthma and antihypertensive drugs) the cause is the 
replacement of older, cheaper products by newer, more 
expensive and much more effective alternatives. Indications 
are that some of these changes are the result of the impact 
of an ageing population in particular need of treatment for 
circulatory problems and arthritis and, is reflected by the 
increase in prescriptions written for cardiovascular 
medicines and anti-inflammatories. However, it must be said 
that some conditions are increasing in the population as a 
whole such as diabetes and asthma. In the latter case for 
example, consultations doubled between 1971/2 and 1981/2.
It is important to note that the growth in prescriptions is 
not due to an increase in what might be considered 'comfort' 
drugs. Evidence shows a sharp fall in prescriptions of 
tranquillisers, vitamins and gastro-intestinal sedatives with 
most of the drugs listed in Table 1.4 being used to treat 
conditions which are an actual or potential threat to life 
or, which cause considerable suffering (Burstall 1990a).
The nature of the problem 
A demand model for pharmaceuticals
In many respects the pharmaceutical industry is unique. 
Ideally a market model is determined by the process of 
competition and the economic interplay between the forces of 
demand and supply. Price is determined by the consumer's 
willingness to pay for the final product supplied. The 
desire for prescription drugs may be perceived as a desire 
for a 'normal good' ie. health stock (Grossman in Cullis & 
West 197 9) . In an event, such as sickness or accident, a 
consumer's health stock is reduced below his desired level he 
will seek to increase his health status by combining health
24
care inputs, such as doctor visits, prescription drugs and 
his own time according to a health production function. 
Economic theory also predicts that if the price of one health 
care input increases relative to others demand for that input 
will fall. Thus, as the price of substitute medical care 
inputs, such as over the counter medicines (OTC) purchased 
without prescription increases (falls) the demand for 
prescription drugs will also increases (falls) ie. substitute 
inputs display a positive cross-price elasticity.
This conventional demand model is seen to work for everyday 
goods and services. The consumer has full sovereignty and is 
able to assess the quality of goods and/or services he/she is 
purchasing by referring to a number of media such as, 
promotional and sales literature, previous purchases, family, 
friends, sales assistants and professionals. By pooling 
these sources of information the consumer is able to make a 
choice about the purchase. However, characteristics of the 
health care market make it difficult for the consumer to 
purchase for himself. The first problem the consumer faces 
is information failure. The complexities of medical science 
and medical care make it impossible for a consumer, with no 
or little training, to have full knowledge of the situation 
and be able to make a rational decision about diagnoses and 
treatments. In addition, for reasons of safety, time and 
economy the practice of medicine is restricted to those able 
by law to practice.
The role of professional advisers in the UK is taken by the 
general practitioner (GP). The GP is the best qualified 
person to advise on whether or not the patient needs to go to 
hospital, which hospitals can offer the best service and who 
are the best specialists to consult. In instances where 
patients require hospital treatment it is more often than not 
the GP who refers the patients. The GP is the patient's key 
adviser and, acting on his/her behalf the GP is the 
gatekeeper to the NHS as a whole. Thus, the consumer's 
sovereignty is displaced to this agent who institutes demands
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on his/her behalf. The demand for pharmaceuticals, although 
in the first instance initiated by the consumer, is primarily 
determined by the GP unless the consumer is demanding non­
prescription, over the counter (OTC) drugs. Hence, we have 
moved from the traditional market with a single sovereign 
consumer to a two consumer market, that of the consumer and 
the agent (Figure 1.2).
This model is further complicated by the addition of a third 
party that of the purchaser (Figure 1.2). This purchaser is 
unlike any other. It is responsible for paying for other 
peoples' choices but has little or no influence over the type 
of purchase or the cost. It isolates both the primary and 
secondary consumer from the source of payment thus removing 
any direct interest in either economy or cost of their 
actions. The industry is therefore relatively insensitive to 
price (Teeling-Smith 1987).
Consumer ignorance is further compounded by uncertainty; 
uncertainty about the irregularity and unpredictability of 
illness episodes and, the amount of health care and drug 
treatment likely to be demanded (Layard 1972) . The market 
solution to uncertainty is insurance but insurance schemes, 
like other third party payment systems such as the NHS (UK) 
and Health Maintenance Organizations (USA), are isolated from 
the demander and are subject to inefficiency. The
probabilities relevant to health care insurance are generally 
estimatable. Problems such as adverse selection and moral 
hazard can lead to the market either providing an inefficient 
quantity of insurance or, failing to provide it at all. 
Devices like coinsurance, deductors and inspection are used 
to counteract the worst effects of moral hazard. They are at 
best however, only partial solutions and are generally 
insufficient to curtail demand to an efficient level as they 
focus on the consumer rather than the secondary demander.
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The Market for Prescription Drugs
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The supply of pharmaceuticals
It is not only the demand model for pharmaceuticals which is 
unusual, the supply side model of the market has its own 
'peculiarities'. Firstly, unlike other industries the
pharmaceutical industry has a rather unique relationship with 
the consumers and purchasers of its products. As a result of 
information failure most medicines, with the exception of OTC 
drugs, are 'sold' not to those who take them but to the 
doctors who prescribe them. Therefore, special and often 
expensive forms of marketing are necessary and as a result, 
the industry spends heavily on research and marketing.
Secondly, it has a unique relationship with a purchaser who 
is not the consumer (Figure 1.2). In the UK this
relationship is further complicated by the purchaser's, ie. 
government, dual role within the industry. As a monopsonist 
purchaser of a privately produced product the government 
wants to keep prices and subsequently costs down. On the 
other hand, it is responsible for maintaining a lucrative UK 
export industry requiring prices to be kept at a profitable
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level. Consequently, the industry is subject to quite an 
unusual degree of government regulation.
Despite these differences, the pharmaceutical industry is 
nevertheless like other industries in many ways. For 
example, its companies seek to maximise profits through 
increased sales turnover and achieve maximum market share. 
Moreover, they endeavour to introduce new products quickly in 
order to obtain rapid returns on heavy research investment 
via the development of multinational markets. However, the 
'necessity' value of drugs lead many^see an industry selling tz>/ 
drugs for profit as unethical. The industry is frequently 
accused of selling its products at highly inflated prices 
thereby making unacceptably high profits. This perception is 
in contrast to that of other types of markets where price 
competition is regarded as important and virtuous.
When economists examine the structure of any industry they 
measure the size of the competition within the markets by the 
concentration ratio ie. number of competing firms. A high 
concentration ratio suggests the market is controlled by a 
single (monopoly) or few (oligopoly) members. Consequently, 
there will be little competition and a greater opportunity 
for firms to collude with each other to set prices (Scherer 
in Feldstein 1988) . In contrast, a low concentration ratio 
implies smaller market shares and thus greater competition.
During the mid 1960s a committee commissioned by the then 
government to examine the relationship of the pharmaceutical 
industry in Great Britain with the NHS estimated that, 120 
firms were engaged in the manufacture and distribution of 
ethical, ie. prescription, drugs. Of these, 60 accounted for 
more than 95% of all sales to the NHS whilst 53 supplied 
approximately 90% (Sainsbury Committee 1967). Six years 
later (1973) it had been estimated that the leading 20 firms 
accounted for 75% (Blum 1981).
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USA research findings during the early 1970s noted the 
existence of approximately 1,000 drug firms with a four firm 
concentration ratio of 28% with no one firm accounting for 
more than 8% of the total drug sales. When these figures are 
compared to those for cars (99%), cigarettes (84%), soaps and 
detergents (62%) it seems that the pharmaceutical industry is 
highly competitive by comparison. However, the studies cited 
examine concentration ratios with respect to total 
pharmaceutical sales as though they reflect a single product 
market like steel, cars and chemicals. In fact, the 
pharmaceutical industry comprises a number of individual sub- 
markets with higher concentration ratios than is shown in the 
overall pharmaceutical market as Walter S Measday (Blum 1981) 
illustrates :
"the overall drug market is fragmented into a number of 
separate, non-competing therapeutic markets; antibiotics are 
not substitutes for anti-diabetic drugs, and tranquilizers 
are not substitutes for vitamins. Manufacturers do not 
compete on an industry wise basis and hence, concentration 
must be evaluated within the various therapeutic groups of 
drugs in which competition does occur".
Measday's observations illustrate the need for caution in 
measuring competition within the industry. However, he fails 
to define the criteria for determining a therapeutic market. 
A number of researchers have directed their attention to this 
issue focusing primarily on demand side substitutability 
ranging from, the therapeutic effects of drugs on specific 
illnesses to, physicians' prescribing habits ((Hornbrook C )  
in Blum 1981; Schwartzman 1976 (*)). In comparison, supply
sided criterion, as defined by Stigler (1955 (^ ) in Blum
1981) are more likely to result in lower concentration
 ^Hornbrook*s criteria centred on whether drugs produced had 
essentially the same therapeutic effects
 ^Schwartzman's definition of therapeutic markets was 
evaluated by examining physicians' prescribing habits.
 ^Stigler - when a producer in a market shifts, on a large 
scale, to producing another product both should then be 
combined into a single market. For example, if a firm 
producing antibiotics can quickly shift and produce anti- 
arthritics they should be included in a single market 
definition.
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ratios. Thus giving rise to a possible misrepresentation of
the size of the market and the number of competitors.
The use of concentration ratios as a measurement tool of
competition and market power within the pharmaceutical 
industry is questionable. It is a * static' measure of market 
power and, although therapeutic markets may show a high 
concentration ratio at a given point in time, there is a high 
turnover rate in market shares indicating fairly 'dynamic' 
competition (Blum 1981). Nevertheless, concentration ratios
are perhaps the most comprehensive measurement tool available 
to determine market power and competition. The evidence put 
forward suggests that competition for particular products is 
less than it seems at first sight. Where competition is 
dynamic is in the production of established drugs. This has 
however led to the pharmaceutical industry developing 
strategies to limit that form of competition.
Patents and promotional e3q>endlture
There are natural and man made reasons for limited 
competition in any market. Economies of scale for example, 
are a national feature of the any industry. However, 
industries deliberately employ a number of strategies aimed 
at preventing new entrants into the market place. Patents 
and expenditure on advertising are for example, often seen as 
the most restrictive. The issue of patent rights in any 
industry is shrouded by controversy. On the one hand, 
industries argue patents are a necessary protection against 
the loss of large stakes invested in research and development 
of new products. Once in the market place these new products 
are easily copied. Thus, without patent protection the 
necessary outlay of resources could not be justifiably 
invested in inventive activity unless, the potential returns 
were commensurate with the technical risk and effort 
involved.
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others argue that patents are an unnecessary incentive for 
innovation because innovators are already protected by other 
barriers. These include, lack of appropriate technology and 
service organizations and, customers' dependence on the 
technical services supplied with the products which other 
companies may find difficult to match in quality of services 
(Schwartzman 197 6). A major criticism of the patent system 
however is, it is effective in creating monopoly power within 
an industry and thus restricts competition. Lack of 
competition is achieved by guaranteeing the innovator the 
exclusive legal right to the invention for a specified number 
of years. Thereby inhibiting free competition and promoting 
monopolistic pricing by discouraging innovation and 
encouraging only minor modifications in order to provide 
patentability. Contrary to this view Davis (1976) argued, 
patents actually stimulate rather than hinder competition. 
Patents are published and are therefore publicly available. 
This results in competitors frequently adopting applied 
research into new compounds in order to develop significantly 
more advanced products by 'inventing' round the basic patent.
The pharmaceutical industry perhaps receives more criticism 
of its use of the patent system than any other industry. 
Critics argue the industry exploits patents and/or high 
promotional expenditures to differentiate brand name drugs in 
the mind of physicians. This in turn acts as to prevent new 
entrants entering into the market place. Walker (1971) 
observed for example, the seemingly indiscriminate patenting 
by large firms of single chemical entities over a given 
period of time. During 1950-60 the mean number of single 
chemical entities introduced per year in the US was 41.8. In 
1961, of the 970 patents granted on medicines, 67.8% or 658 
were granted on single entities ie. single chemical 
compounds, vaccines, serums, and extracts from plant and 
animal sources. The fact that 15.7 times more patents were 
granted on these single entities during one year led him to 
suspect that patents were being used as a vehicle for
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excluding smaller firms from the second-best products and 
processes.
Whilst many of these patents were undoubtedly granted to 
individuals unconnected with the drug industry, such 
recipients would most likely eventually turn to the drug 
industry for profitable use of their products. Therefore, 
the assumption is that most of these patents were eventually 
assigned to large firms. More importantly, once in the hands 
of a large firm product patents restrict entry into the 
market by forcing a potentially smaller competitor to either 
remain out of the market, seek a license from the holder to 
produce the product or, produce the product without a license 
under the threat of legal action.
Reekie (1975) noted that 72% of the market is accounted for 
by patented products. Hence, given the high degree of 
concentration in therapeutic sub-markets, it is likely that 
the market will adhere more to a theory of oligopoly which 
predicts price inflexibility. Thus, for the industry to 
maintain its profits firms are more likely to adjust their 
pricing strategies according to the actions of those rivals 
whose products are close substitutes (Feldstein 1988) and, 
that price competition could effectively be precluded because 
licenses are usually only granted at royalty rates ensuring 
almost equivalent pricing (Reekie 1975). Although, it must 
be noted that where the concentration ratio is low, as in the 
overall market, this situation may not necessarily apply.
Critics argue that these favourable market conditions are 
ripe for exploitation by the pharmaceutical companies who 
have little or no incentive to engage in price competition in 
order to gain a larger share of the market (Taylor & Maynard 
1990). The industry counter claims these accusations of 
collusion and price setting and argues that, prices must be 
viewed in the context of uncertainty about how well a product 
will do in the market and, whether this will be sufficient to 
cover fully allocated average costs. Original prices of
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drugs tend to be fixed on the basis of / uncertain sales 
forecasts and competitive product prices already available. 
Firms therefore fix prices at a level which is more or less 
equal to those of competitive products and, if the product is 
to be one of several in the same therapeutic class then 
prices may be marginally less than those of earlier products.
Price reduction of an original drug is unlikely after the 
entry of small generic producers because smaller competitors 
have little chance of increasing their market share. 
Therefore, larger manufacturers realise it is not worth 
risking immediate loss of income by cutting price when 
reduction in quantity sold owing to new entry is gradual. In 
contrast however, the entry of major firms producing a 
generically similar drug and selling it at a lower price will 
have a greater impact on the price of the original product 
and will usually force the original firm to cut its own 
price.
A patented product usually exhibits only a limited monopoly 
power over production and price as close substitutes enter 
the market and subsequently introduce competition pushing 
prices down. In other cases, improvements occurring in 
competing drugs selling at similar prices to existing drugs 
mean in essence that their quality-adjusted prices decline. 
It therefore appears that, over time both the number and 
closeness of substitutes within a therapeutic market increase 
thereby changing the price elasticity of demand. This change 
in price elasticity reveals greater price competition and 
historically it has been shown that no leading product has 
maintained its market share position for more than a limited 
number of years. 'In essence, preeminence is temporary'. 
Again therefore, the capacity of the industry to restrict 
competition is real but time is limited (Feldstein 1988).
33
Innovation and the patent system
More than two-thirds of prescription drugs have patent 
protection making entry into therapeutic markets dependent 
upon some kind of chemical product differentiation. Indeed, 
unless a firm pursues an innovative strategy it must cut 
prices in an attempt to gain a significant share of a market.
Patent protection and restricted price opportunities ) 
and, sales of old unpatented drugs which have usually been 
too small to be attractive, has led most large pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to rely on innovation (Schwartzman 1976).
Innovation is perceived as an effective entry barrier 
because, it places a great financial burden on the 
manufacturer to invest heavily in research and development 
programmes in order to discover and develop new products 
which may or may not win large sales. Research and 
development innovation however, effectively sows the seeds of 
its own destruction by alerting potential competitors, via 
the patent system, to the potential profitability of a new or 
improved method of therapy offered by a new drug. This 
exposes the 'product' company to an increased risk of pre­
emption to the market by a similar or more advanced compound.
Even after years of resource input and empirical research a 
product may not pass the legal and safety requirements which 
allow it to be marketed. Thus, for firms without large 
budgets and resources to invest in the risk and uncertainty 
stakes this strategy may not be feasible and consequently may 
result in there being fewer competitors.
The pharmaceutical industry is characterized by a high level 
of innovation of highly differentiated products. New product 
competition through product innovation is one of the dominant 
forms of competition within the pharmaceutical industry 
(James 1977). In fact, an indication of the importance of 
product competition and innovation in the drug industry is
® Few important drugs have been unprotected by patents during 
most of the period since World War Two.
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its expenditures on research and development. Estimates of 
research and development expenditure are the around 15% of 
sales with the percentage varying between 10.5% and 15.0% 
since 1965. At 15% of sales, the pharmaceutical industry's 
research and development expenditure is exceeded by only two 
other industries, information processing and semiconductors 
(Feldstein 1988).
Research and development in the pharmaceutical industry is no 
different from research and development in any other kind of 
discipline in that it possesses a record of absolute
successes, failures and 'non-successes'. Furthermore, the 
very existence of even minor modifications, such as the 
removal of some side-effects of toxicity from existing drugs 
or, the modification of an injectable drug to permit oral 
self-administration has an important role to play in economic 
as well as medical advancement. This gives some
justification for the existence at least, of the much 
disparaged technique of molecular manipulation. Historical 
advancement of biological and technical research and 
development in the 1940s and early 1950s has meant that most 
diseases and illnesses can now be treated effectively in some 
way. Thus, current technology may have reached a point where 
only marginal improvements will be made in areas such as 
delivery systems and formulations. Parallels exist in the 
automotive industry where marginal changes are being made 
constantly although major innovations, such as the Wankel 
engine and fuel injection, come at infrequent intervals.
Research and development may be viewed as the cornerstone of 
the pharmaceutical industry since the extent and success of a 
company's research and development activities largely 
determine the future pattern of corporate earnings and
growth. For this reason pharmaceutical companies often have 
large research and development efforts enabling them to 
produce streams of new products and engage in innovatory 
competition. But this form of competition exposes the
company to the perils of constant innovative rivalry which
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ensures that large market shares do not necessarily give rise 
to market dominance. Successful competition is not just 
about cheaper prices or newer and better products but is also 
about influencing the consumer. Therefore, we need to 
address the issue of how companies influence consumer
demander choice.
The interaction of supply and demand : 
Sales promotion and the demander
The normal model of a consumer market assumes the consumer is 
sovereign. He/she uses product information and personal
preferences to make a choice about which product to buy.
Information failure (Barr 1992) is a major drawback in many
markets, health being an example. Suppliers in such a market 
therefore have considerable power. Drugs are namely a 
special case. The sale of OTC drugs is straightforward.
They are freely available and can subsequently be advertised 
in the usual media and sold like other consumer products. In 
the case of prescription drugs however, the situation is very 
different. The doctor rather than the patient is the
consumer thus, the objective of marketing becomes to 
influence the doctor.
In a market where there is a multiplicity of choice and where 
new drugs, modifications, and changes in dosage are 
constantly entering the market doctors are faced with a
formidable task of familiarizing themselves with an 
appropriate and reliable pharmaceutical armamentarium. 
Therefore, they require a great deal of specific information.
There are a number of ways in which this can be done.
Advertising for example, has a vital role to play in 
informing physicians about the properties and uses of the 
different therapies, especially since little can be learnt 
about the quality of a tablet simply from its appearance. 
Peltzman for example, illustrated this point using his
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examination of the consequences of delayed use of the drugs 
used to counteract the effects of Tuberculosis C  ) .
A doctor's prescription for a drug may increase with the 
quantity of information he receives about a drug and, its 
range of alternatives for any given level of quality and 
price. Thereby manufacturers are provided with an incentive 
to supply information. With a good outcome and the 
favourable opinions of colleagues and other sources, a doctor 
will be more likely to respond to an advertisement by 
prescribing the advertised drug than if his observations have 
been unfavourable. Although physicians differ in what 
sources of information they rely upon they are able to 
distinguish between claims for the various drugs (Sainsbury 
197 6). The demand for information concerning the quality of 
drugs is much greater than the demand for information from 
consumers concerning the quality of other products 
(Schwartzman 1976). Consequently, drug companies have to 
provide a good deal of quality information.
Another method of marketing prescription drugs is via company 
representatives (ie. drug reps). They will visit a doctor 
regularly to up-date him/her on the latest current trends in 
therapy. Drug reps must be well educated, well informed and 
able to interact with doctors on more or less equal terms. 
Consequently, they require extensive training and can command 
good salaries. Doctors come to rely heavily on them and, a
skilled one is able to influence a doctor's preference of
possible alternatives. It is therefore not surprising drug 
reps account for one-half or more of the marketing budget 
(Burstall 1990b). In essence, the promotion of prescription 
drugs costs money.
Critics of the industry's advertising campaigns argue that
like patents advertising is a 'natural' barrier to
’ Peltzman in Feldstein (1988) - Failure by physicians to adopt
drugs due to a lack of information estimated that, in the case of 
Tuberculosis (TB), 80,600 lives would have been saved if the use of 
TB drugs had spread as rapidly as the Salk vaccine.
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competition. Those firms with larger promotional budgets are 
more able to create product differentiation and brand 
loyalties in the minds of physicians. The effect is to limit 
the field of competition and subsequently affect the 
potential 'best' treatment for patients. They argue that as 
a result, this type of promotion is unethical and 
unequitable. Schwartzman (1976) however argued the need for 
such campaigns declaring that, if all promotional 
expenditures were eliminated the amount of the savings 
eventually passed onto consumers would represent 
approximately 5% of their drugs bill. However, this 
potential saving must be offset by a cost to physicians and 
ultimately, the cost to patients of replacing the information 
previously provided by the drug companies. Further costs 
would be incurred by delays in introducing new products as 
new product marketing declined without promotional 
expenditure and finally, both nominal and quality-adjusted 
prices would remain high with less product competition.
Summary
This chapter examined the question of why there is a need to 
address the issue of the cost to governments and insurance 
companies of prescription drugs. In addition, it looked at 
the characteristics of the prescription drug market to 
determine what distinguishes it from other markets and, why 
this might bring about a need for some form of government 
regulation. This investigation noted that primary health 
care is one of the fastest growing elements of NHS spending 
and within primary health care, pharmaceutical costs were 
rising the fastest. The rapid economic growth of the 
1950s/60s made it possible to support such spending. 
However, the ensuing change in the economic climate led the 
government to seek ways to cutback spending and contain 
expenditure growth on public and social programmes, including 
health care.
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This rapid increase in drug expenditure resulted in part from 
the 'explosion’ of the pharmaceutical industry brought about 
by the apparent scientific revolution. This occurred at
about the time of the introduction of the NHS in the UK which
in itself, brought about an increasing awareness and demand 
for the benefits of good health. Patterns of illness, 
changing social and demographic trends and, attitudes towards 
therapeutic delivery are also considered as equally important 
in influencing spending on pharmaceuticals. Consequently, 
all these factors have given rise to a tremendous expansion 
in the output of the industry.
The problem is complicated by the unique structure of the 
pharmaceutical and prescription drug market. Demand for 
prescription drugs is very specific and, because of
information failure the industry's products are only 
available on a doctor's prescription. Thus, the primary
consumer forfeits his sovereignty to an agent who demands on 
his/her behalf. As a consequence, this secondary consumer's 
beliefs become paramount. The inclusion of a third party 
payer further complicates the demand model because it removes 
the responsibility of the cost of their actions from the 
primary and secondary consumers. The purchaser is left to 
pay for other people's choices and has little or no 
input/influence over the type of purchase and the cost. 
Subsequently, the market becomes relatively insensitive to 
price.
The relationship between the industry and the purchaser in 
the UK has led to further complications. On the one hand, as 
a monopsonist purchaser of a privately produced product the 
government wants to keep prices down. In conflict with this 
need is the need to maintain a lucrative UK export industry 
which requires prices to be kept at a profitable level. As a 
result of this dual role and of other market imperfections, 
the government is challenged with changing consumer attitudes 
towards prescribing and somehow regulating the industry. 
This dilemma is a warning to anyone who thinks that the
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regulation of a private market in the welfare field is an 
easy one. The following discussion will therefore focus on 
what measures the government has undertaken to achieve these 
goals.
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Chapter 2
How has the government sought to contain the drugs bill ?
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Introduction
The structure of the prescription drug market, its 
insensitivity to price and the government’s dual role in the 
pharmaceutical industry makes regulation difficult. It is 
not simply enough to target one level of the market and 
attempt to control either industry prices or change consumer 
attitudes. To successfully reduce expenditure growth and 
contain spending the government must target for control each 
stratum of the market. In doing so, it must try to find the 
most effective way to regulate industry prices, change 
prescribers' attitudes and influence patient demand.
This chapter looks at government attempts, from the early 
20th Century to the NHS Reforms of 1991, to achieve these 
aims and why they proved unsuccessful in terms of influencing 
prescribers’ preferences. The chapter begins by looking at 
government regulation of the industry and moves onto discuss 
its attempts to influence patient demand via a patient cost- 
sharing scheme. The chapter ends by examining government 
attempts to change prescribers’ attitudes and why a new 
approach was required.
Regulating the industry through price controls
Chapter 1 mentioned how the government’s dual role in the 
pharmaceutical industry created a conflict of interests. 
Price controls are particularly tempting. In a market which 
is sensitive to price, to cut prices is to cut expenditure. 
However, because of market imperfections prescription drugs 
are fairly insensitive to price changes. Moreover, to cut 
prices also means to reduce profits, this is contrary to the 
government’s role of maintaining and promoting a lucrative 
national export industry. So what is the solution ?
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Most members of the European and Economic Community (EEC) 
regulate the prices of individual products by one of three 
methods : cost-plus, internal comparison and external
comparison. The cost-plus system bases the price on the 
costs of production with an allowance made for expenditure on 
marketing and research and development. The internal 
comparison system sets prices by reference of comparable 
drugs already on the national market. Under this scheme, 
concessions are made for innovative products which have 
therapeutic advantages. The third scheme, external
comparison, sets product prices by comparing the price of 
that particular medicine in other countries.
Not all countries in the EEC however fix the price of 
individual drugs. The Netherlands and Denmark for example, 
operate a free market and rely on other means to control 
total pharmaceutical spending. Germany, which previously 
operated a system of free pricing, now restricts 
reimbursement under the national health insurance system to a 
fixed sum for multi-source products with identical active 
ingredients. From January 1989 restrictions were extended to 
products which are therapeutically equivalent and to those 
with comparable pharmacological profiles. The reimbursement 
levels chosen are related to those of the generic equivalent. 
Reference prices for products with identical substances were 
set in July 198 9. However, in order to protect research 
based companies these prices could not be fixed until three 
years after the expiry of the relevant patents.
The regulation of the industry in the UK is uniquely British. 
It seeks to control profits rather than product prices. Each 
year the industry negotiates with the Department of Health 
(DoH) the permitted rate of return of capital based on the 
previous year's sales to the NHS. This rate of return is 
fixed on a company by company basis according to the 
individuals company's relevant investments and associated 
long term risks. Provided the company does not
systematically exceed its permitted rate of return it has the
43
freedom to set prices of new products on entry to the market. 
It does however, require official approval for any subsequent 
price increases.
This system of price regulation was first introduced in 1957 
and was known as the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme 
(VPRS), although it was neither 'voluntary' nor a price 
regulation scheme but a profit regulation scheme. Throughout 
the life of the VPRS, later changed to the Pharmaceutical 
Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), certain features have 
remained broadly constant. These features have included the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) and Department of Health & Social 
Security (DHSS) being responsible for price regulation 
through negotiation with the industry's representatives ie. 
Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry (APBI). In 
addition, successive governments have retained statutory 
powers, under NHS legislation, to determine the maximum 
prices of pharmaceutical and medicinal products supplied to 
the NHS. Under more general legislation the government has 
the power to refer any suspected abuses of market monopoly 
for scrutiny by the Monopolies Commission. To date however, 
this has not yet happened.
Negotiation for the first VPRS got underway in 1954. These 
resulted from the Cohen Committee's (see regulation of the 
profession) recommendations that 'existing drugs not 
therapeutically superior to standard preparations should be 
prescribable in the NHS subject to satisfactory price 
arrangements with the manufacturers'. However, the
discussions between the MoH and the APBI were long and 
protracted as the government sought to accommodate acceptable 
prices whilst, maintaining a highly valuable export trade 
which in turn, helped to keep home based pharmaceutical 
prices comparatively lower and pay for essential research and 
development.
Finally, an agreement was reached which gave manufacturers 
the power to set prices for the first three years of life of
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a new product after which, the following three specific and 
alternative pricing routes were to be available, the export 
criterion, the standard equivalent criterion and the trade
price formula ) (Luce 1987). The scheme included a 
provision which gave any manufacturer the option to negotiate 
the price (s) of all or any of his products directly with the 
MoH without reference or with only partial reference to these 
pricing formulae. For manufacturers not exercising this
option, products meeting the 20% export quota had to be
negotiated under the export criterion. Products with less 
than 20% exports had to be dealt with under the 'standard 
equivalent criterion' if generic equivalents existed or,
under the trade price formula if they did not.
Estimated savings of the first VPRS were up to £750,000 a 
year achieved through the reduction of product prices 
although, the primary aim was 'not to reduce prices generally 
but to curb excesses where they existed' (Luce 1987). These 
estimates proved somewhat optimistic as the Hinchcliffe
Committee (see regulation of the profession) reported in
1959. The Committee's Report noted that by early 1959 three 
hundred preparations had been reduced in price at an 
estimated saving to the Exchequer of just over £400,000 per 
annum. However, shortly after the publication of the
Committee's Report two main events ensured the industry's 
pricing levels and practices remained in the forefront of 
British political debate. The first event, which was
 ^Export criterion, applicable to proprietary products where not 
less than 20% of the manufacturers's output was exported. In these 
cases, the NHS price should not exceed the weighted average FOB or 
net wholesale price in the company's six most important overseas 
market.
Standard equivalent criterion, for use where there were generic 
equivalents of proprietary products and requiring the proprietary 
price to be no greater than that of the generic.
Trade price formula criterion, a form of 'cost-plus' calculation in 
which a final price was built up from ingredient costs, a fixed 
12.5% 'on-cost' allowance and allowances for processing, packaging 
and wholesale discounts.
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extensive publicized in the UK press, was the Kefauver 
Committee's investigation in the United States which examined 
individual products and more specifically, several which were 
showing profit margins at a selling price of more than 90% 
over factory costs. This was followed by the widely reported 
disagreement and ultimate legal battle between the American 
firm Pfizer and the NHS over the price charged for the 
antibiotic tetramycin.
The publicity surrounding the Kefauver Committee findings 
served to prompt more examination of what was happening in 
the UK. In 1961 a situation arose which highlighted the 
general unease about the industry's profits and prices. DDSA 
Pharmaceuticals Limited offered to supply tetracycline to the 
NHS for 6-10 shillings per 1000 tablets. Pfizer who, at that 
time, held the patent on the product had a selling price for 
the same volume of tablet of 60. In an attempt to force 
Pfizer to reduce its price, the then Minister of Health gave 
authorization for the drug to be imported for use in the 
hospital services of the NHS. He justified the legality of 
his action by claiming that hospital services were Crown 
users and as such he, as a Minister for the 'Crown' could 
invoke Section 4 6 of the 194 9 Patents Act ) . This claim 
was upheld by the House of Lords despite fierce opposition by 
the firm.
The first VPRS was remarkably unrestrictive perhaps because 
it hoped to be able to exercise an acceptable degree of 
control over all the industry's activities under indirect 
rather than direct methods of control, (ie. believing that 
the MoH and the APBI would be successful in establishing a 
voluntary system of self pricing within the British based 
pharmaceutical sector). In 1961 and 1964 the VPRS was 
renegotiated but retained the basic framework and most of the 
provisions of the 1957 version. Most of the changes of
 ^This section permitted any government department or person 
authorised by the same, to work any patent 'for the services of the 
Crown'.
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detail focused on the circumstances in which the 'freedom 
period' for new product pricing could be enjoyed or, the 
export pricing criterion applied and resulted in tighter and 
fuller definitions being brought into force. Two new 
concepts were introduced in the 1961 version.
The first was the option, applicable to the MoH and available 
under the original scheme only to companies, of insisting on 
direct price negotiation instead of pricing by the export 
formulae. The MoH's freedom to use that option was however 
limited to products with annual NHS sales of £500,000 or 
more. Even in such cases it was obliged to take account of 
any evidence of effective price competition in external 
markets for the product concerned and, take into account, on 
request, a manufacturer's overall profitability on medical 
specialty products or on the whole range of drugs he supplied 
to the National Health Service'. This concept is the first 
reference in the scheme's documentation to an aggregated 
approach to pharmaceutical price regulation.
The second feature which related to aggregates rather than 
individual product costs was added to the 1964 version. This 
imposed the inclusion in the 'Basic Pricing Formula', itself 
a combination of the original 'trade price formula' and 
'standard equivalent criteria, of a research and development 
allowance to be added to the various cost allowances (for net 
ingredients, processing, packaging and wholesale discounts) 
from which final product prices were built up. Despite the 
aims of the VPRS the first decade of its life saw little 
change and in essence, NHS expenditure on medicines continued 
to grow at a slightly inflated rate of NHS spending in 
general, while exports increased rapidly.
In 1967 the Sainsbury Report recommended a further revision 
of the VPRS was necessary and argued that company costs, 
profits and prices should undergo much more rigorous scrutiny 
than had been customary. It further argued that because
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negotiation of prices sometimes failed to result in agreement 
'a procedure must be available to which Ministers may have 
recourse'. The VPRS was subsequently amended and the 
specific Sainsbury recommendation that Section 46 of the 1949 
Patents Act be widened to embrace not only hospital services 
but also the much larger drug market of General Medical and 
the Pharmaceutical Services was adopted. In 1968, the Health 
Services and Public Health Act extended the 'Services of the 
Crown' provision to include explicitly the prescription of 
drugs by GPs and the Banks Committee which reported in 1969 
proposed reforms of the earlier patent system and recommended 
that Section 4 6 should be retained as a 'sanction' if the DoH 
was of the opinion that a patentee's prices were too high.
In 1969 the fourth, and what some consider to be the most far 
reaching revision of the VPRS was published. Although 
sharing the same goals as past VPRSs, this version differed 
significantly in that for the first time, it put the concept 
of an aggregated approach to individual companies' profits 
and costs at the centre of the price-regulatory arrangements. 
It required each company involved to submit detailed Annual 
Financial Returns (AFR) to the DHSS. These were to include 
breakdowns of sales, costs and capital employed. This would 
allow the government to make a rational assessment of the 
'reasonableness' of pharmaceutical prices and profits by 
taking into account items such as promotional outlays and 
transfer costs between affiliated concerns. If, after 
reviewing the prices charged, the DHSS was still unsure about 
their acceptability it could apply one of two further 
supplementary tests.
Consequently, this revised VPRS gave the government greater 
powers to influence both product prices and aggregated 
company profits from sales to the NHS. Moreover, it meant 
they were no longer heavily reliant upon the ABPI using its 
influence to encourage companies to co-operate and supply 
information to the DHSS in a voluntary manner as previously 
undertaken. Subsequently, the rate of growth of NHS
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pharmaceutical spending and the proportion of health service 
money being spent on pharmaceuticals declined. Not
surprisingly, many companies soon expressed their concerns 
about the new scheme's regulations. Many felt that by 
agreeing to supply AFRs its decreased rate of earnings 
increase during the early 1970s, when the rate of increase in 
health service spending and inflation generally was rising 
rapidly, was an excessive price to pay.
The 1972 revision added little to the existing VPRS but, the
1977 revision had a direct effect on the relationship between 
the UK pharmaceutical sector and the NHS. Firstly, the
government re-established its statutory powers to fix the
price of products, including medicines supplied to the NHS if 
this were proved necessary. It required companies to provide 
forecasts of sales for a year ahead as well as returns for 
the last accounting period. In addition, the renegotiation 
of the VPRS resulted in a title change to the Pharmaceutical 
Price Regulation System (PPRS) 1978) ) . Like the VPRS it 
reflected the lack of 'voluntarianism' which existed given 
the 'sanctions' and procedures of the last recourse and aimed 
to control profits rather than prices. Thus, if historic 
profitability was regarded as too low (or too high) by one of 
the parties involved in the negotiation, then efforts would 
be made to try and raise (or lower) prices.
During the 1980s the government's dual interests in the 
pharmaceutical industry led to a straining of the 
relationship between the two. More specifically this was 
brought about by the government's reactions to the 
diminishing domestic incomes of the UK based industry. This 
occurred at a time when there was an increase in the national 
drugs bill promoted by increasing imports encouraged by the 
strength of sterling. In response to this situation the 
government invoked a freeze on medicine prices and introduced 
selected price cuts in 1983. This strategy, together with 
the introduction of a limited list in 1985, was seen to 
directly interfere with the normal activities of the running
49
of the PPRS. By not consulting ABPI before acting publicly 
the government was in effect implying that it would in the 
future act unilaterally to set national pharmaceutical 
prices. The industry registered its objections to this 
arbitrary government intervention and in 1986 renegotiation 
of the PPRS was undertaken.
Essentially the 198 6 scheme retained the basic principles and 
strategies of the earlier schemes giving greater precision 
and transparency to certain key features ). Nonetheless, a 
more concrete emphasis on the need to restrain the growth in 
NHS pharmaceutical supply costs by introducing specific 
procedures for financial analyses of costs relating to 
individual companies' administration, manufacture and sales 
promotion expenditure was applied. In addition, a new and 
explicit framework for the negotiation of research and 
development allowances was also introduced. New provisions 
were added for mutual consultation in the event of the 
aggregate costs of NHS medicines rising significantly faster 
than general inflation with limits implied to the DHSS's 
obligations in respect of cost rises in the industry. 
Finally, the formula pricing procedures for individuals 
products which were originally introduced in 1957 were 
finally dropped.
 ^Arrangements for determining average range and target 
profitability of participating companies was made more explicit. 
As was the concept of the 'grey area' whereby companies may, in 
some circumstances, retain profits above target (normally 50% of 
the target profit where this profit is achieved by the company's 
own efforts) and the use of a 'return on sales' arrangement in 
suitable cases.
An external yardstick for determining changes in average 
pharmaceutical industry profitability is made via reference to 
changes in the average profitability of British industry generally 
is introduced.
The position on pricing of new products and of line extensions of 
existing products are made more explicit. Generic preparations are 
excluded from the scope of the scheme.
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The latest revision of the PPRS was renegotiated at the end 
of 1992. An agreement was reached in the late summer of 1993 
and the revised scheme will operate for the next five years. 
The new scheme proposes to reduce the maximum profit any 
company may earn. In addition, the government has introduced 
an across the board price decrease of 2.5% effective from the 
beginning of October, 1993 to last for a period of three 
years (Watts 1993). The industry reluctantly agreed these 
terms arguing, the imposition of the 2.5% price reduction for 
three years of the scheme will only act as a further 
disincentive to future capital and research investment in the 
UK. Only time will tell how realistic these concerns are.
In addition to government regulation of the industry every 
health care system incorporates an element of patient 
copayment. This usually takes the form of either a flat-rate 
contribution to the cost of the prescription or, requires the 
patient to meet a proportion of the cost. Most EEC countries 
favour one or the other of these methods although, Italy uses 
both. All countries operate a system of exemption from 
charges for particular groups. These are typically those in 
hospitals, the chronically sick, sometimes the young, old and 
the poor. The UK is especially generous in this respect. 
The discussion will now focus on the different types of 
copayment/cost-sharing systems and their impact on patient 
demand. Particular reference is made to patient cost-sharing 
in the UK.
Influencing patient demand via patient cost-sharing
The introduction of the NHS in 1948 brought about new methods 
of funding the drugs bill. Rather than relying on pre­
ordained limits as the ’old’ National Health Insurance (NHI) 
Fund did, this system estimated drug spend. Nevertheless, 
despite these changes there was no real difference in the 
principles of control mechanisms for prescribing behaviour. 
Increases in demand for health care resulting from the NHS’s
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total coverage of the population combined with, doctors' 
greater clinical freedom to prescribe translated into soaring 
drug expenditure. Not surprisingly, the government soon 
realised the need for some form of parallel strategy aimed at 
curbing prescriber and consumer demand.
Thus, in the early years of the NHS the government set up a 
number of working committees (see regulation of the 
profession) to determine the necessity of discouraging what 
it defined as 'undesirable prescribing by GPs' and, define 
what measures could be taken to restrict this. At the same 
time, it tackled the problem of patient demand by introducing 
(1952) a flat rate nominal charge of 5 pence per prescription 
form for encashment. This aimed not only to reduce patient 
demand but also generate additional revenue. However, this 
method of control failed on both counts. It was subject to 
gross exploitation by both patient and GPs alike and was 
wholly inadequate. Thus, in December 1956 the government 
changed the charge to patients for prescriptions to 5 pence 
per item. This had the initial effect of reducing demand but 
by 1958 it had once again begun to increase. The 1960s 
witnessed some of the most dramatic changes in patient demand 
and prescription charges.
Patient demand at the beginning of the decade was lower than 
it had been since the introduction of the NHS and even post 
the introduction of charges per item (Figure 2.1). After the 
increase in prescription charges in 1961 to 10 pence per 
item, demand steadily dropped to its lowest point since 1948. 
Demand began to rise again between 1962 and 1964 with a sharp 
rise during 1964/65 and a peak in demand in 1967. This 
somewhat meteoric rise during this five year period was 
partly due to the abolition of prescription charges in 1965. 
However, when prescription charges were re-introduced in 1968 
at a charge of 13 pence per item demand fell slightly. 
Certain groups however were declared exempt from these 
charges (Figures 2.1 & 2.2).
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NHS prescription charges and items dispensed
by chemists in the UK
Prescription 
items (millions) 
500
Prescription charges (£)—year of introduction
(1) 1 June 1952 0.05 per form (11) 1 April 1983 1.40 per Item
(2) 1 Dec 1956 0.05 per item (12) 1 April 1984 1.60 per item
(3) 1 Mar 1961 0.10 per term (13) 1 April 1985 2.00 per item
(4) 1 Feb 1965 Charges abolished (14) 1 April 1986 2.20 per item
(5) 10 June 1968 0.13 per item (15) 1 April 1987 2.40 per item
(6) 1 April 1971 0.20 per item (16) 1 April 1988 2.60 per item
(7) 16 July 1979 0.45 per item (17) 1 April 1989 2.80 per item
(8) 1 April 1980 0.70 per item (18) 1 April 1990 3.05 per item
(9) 1 Dec 1980 1.00 per item (19) 1 April 1991 3.40 per Item
(10) 1 April 1982 1.30 per item
(5) (6)
10 June 1968
exemptions
ntroduced
April 1985 
Limited List 
introduced
April 1974 
exemptions 
extended to 
include children 
up to age 16 
and women 
aged 60 and over
• July 1975 
exemptions 
extended to 
include tree 
contraceptive 
services
L- 1 Jan 1982 
exemptions 
extended to 
include mothers 
of stillborn 
children
Figure 2.1
Source : DoH
Reference : Pharma Facts & Figures, ABPI 1992
In 1971 prescription charges were increased to 20 pence per 
item and remained at this level until 1978 at which time 
extensions to the exemption categories were also made. 
Examination of prescription charges shows that the nominal 
rate of increase over this period (ie. 1952-79) was in excess 
of 300%, real term growth however fell. In support of these
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findings, Ryan (198 9) found that if charges had increased in 
line with inflation the actual charge per prescription in 
197 9 should have been 24 pence rather than the 20 pence 
charge.
During the 1980s and in conjunction with stricter measures to 
control prescribers' behaviour (see regulating the 
profession), the government embarked on a policy of regular 
increases in prescription charges over and above the rate of 
inflation. By 1990 with a rise of only 19% in the number of 
prescriptions issued to patients in 'real' terms this 
amounted to a staggering 236% rise in prescription charges 
(since 1980). Thus it appeared neither method of control 
(ie. of the profession or the patient) had managed to stop 
the rise in the number of prescriptions dispensed or, growth 
in drug spend. This is not surprising given the increases in 
the number of prescriptions exempt from a charge and hence, 
the subsequent decrease in chargeable prescription items 
(Figure 2.2).
Between 1982 to 1992 for example, the number of chargeable 
prescriptions in England fell from 31% to 19% (Statistical 
Bulletin 1992). Hence, by 1992 over three-quarters of all 
prescriptions (ie. 81% or 168 million items) were exempt from 
a patient charge. For a patient to qualify for 'free' 
prescriptions he/she must be recognised as belonging to one 
of the following groups :
1 the elderly
2 the young
3 Low Income Support Scheme (formerly DSS exempt)
4 'other' category patients ie :
(a) war or service pension
(b) Family Health Service Authority (FHSA) exempt
(c) no declaration and declaration not specific.
54
NHS exempt prescription items dispensed by
chemists and appliance contractors, UK
Prescription 
items (millions)
400 84%
83%
82%
350 82%
78%
76%300 74%
Exempt prescription items'70%
63%250
62%60%
200 58%
54%52%
150
Chargeable prescription items
100
50
1969 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 89 90
F ig u r e  2 . 2  ( '  )
Source : DoH
Reference : Pharma Facts & Figures, APBI 1992
Notes:* 10 June 1968 exemptions introduced
1 9 April 1974 exemptions extended to include
children up to age 16 and women aged 60 and over
2 July 1975 exemptions extended to include free
contraceptive services
3 1 January 1982 exemptions extended to include
mothers of still born children
4 April 1988 exemptions extended to include persons 
under age 19 in full time education
Prescriptions for the elderly account for the largest share 
of all exempt prescriptions and between 1982 and 1992 
increased its share from 33% to 43% (Statistical Bulletin
"All figures are based on a sample of 1 in 200 prescriptions in 
England and Wales, and 1 in 100 prescriptions in Scotland.
*Figures include prescriptions 
certificates.
dispensed via pre-payment
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1992). The 'others' exempt category represented the second 
largest share with 13%. The Low Income Support (LIS) 
Category and the Young People Exempt Category displayed 
similar share sizes (Statistical Bulletin 1992). The LIS 
category demonstrated a reduction in the number of 
prescriptions exempt from a charge between 1988 and 1989. 
This was the first recorded reduction in the number of exempt 
prescriptions in any category since analysis began in 1977. 
Nevertheless, these increases in the number of prescription 
exempt from a charge further adds to the market's 
insensitivity to price. A patient's exemption from cost- 
sharing only leads to demand being difficult to regulate and, 
prescription charges' ability to restrain volume demand for 
medicines is severely limited.
Despite prescription charges' apparent inability to restrain 
patient demand there is evidence to suggest the contrary. 
Supporters of the policy argue patient cost-sharing policies 
effectively reduce patient demand by reducing what the 
government considers 'frivolous' demand. Others argue
however, this policy only acts to deter patients from 
obtaining the necessary medical treatment. Begg (1984) for 
example, found that the proportion of prescriptions not 
cashed was significantly greater for non-exempt groups than 
for exempt. This suggests the existence of a direct 
relationship between prescription charges and prescription 
consumption.
O'Brien (1989) noted a consistent negative relationship 
between prescription charge and utilization as measured by 
the volume of non-exempt items dispensed. Moreover, he found 
gradual changes in elasticities which suggested greater 
elasticity in charge-utilization. However, his study was 
later subjected to criticism by Ryan and Birch (1989) because 
of his failure to distinguish between demand and utilization. 
They went onto state that the real value of the prescription 
charge is associated with a reduction in the relative rate of 
utilization of prescribed drugs carrying a charge (Ryan &
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Birch 1989). However, it is difficult to gauge absolutely 
the effects of such charges in the UK because few studies 
have sought specifically to explore the impact of 
prescription charges as a reason for non-compliance.
In the UK there are no official policy guidelines regarding 
the target relationship between charges and costs. 
Prescription charges are based on a fixed rate and do not 
vary by type of pharmaceutical preparation. Thus, items 
which have a relatively small net ingredient cost (eg. minor 
analgesics - £1.64 ; Office of Health Economics (1987)) are
subject to higher percentage cost-sharing than higher cost 
drugs (e.g anti-inflammatory rheumatic preparations £8.05). 
Changes in average total cost per prescription relative to 
the charge in the period 1969-198 6 show that the average rate 
of cost-sharing has varied over time, falling from 21% (1969)
to 10% (1978) and then rising sharply to 43% (1986) . This
suggests that 'pegging* the charge to costs has only been 
adhered to post 197 9 and during the 'charge-freeze* period of 
1971-1979 as well as the real value of charges falling, so 
did the ratio to average cost.
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Prescription charges 1969-86
220
200 -
180 -
160 -
1+0 -
120 -
NOMINAL PRICE100 -
80 -
60 -
+0 -
REAL PRICE
20 -
tiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiui!iini!nniiiiiiiiiiuiiuuui.uiiuiiiiiiiiuiwiiiiniiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimminni'inmiinii!imiiiii!iiiiiii!iiiniii 
196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419851986
YEAR
F ig u r e  2 . 3
Source : DoH and author's calculations 
Reference : O'Brien B. (1989)
There are few countries in the world which operate a cost-
sharing scheme based on a fixed rate. In 1983 for example,
the national health insurance scheme operating in the
Netherlands introduced a charge for prescriptions of 2.50 
guilders per item and in Belgium and Germany prescription 
charging schemes are based on a fixed charge per 
prescription. However, many countries have sought to reduce 
costs to the purchaser by relating cost as a proportion of 
the total cost of the product. In France from 1982 the share 
of cost falling on patients for 1258 products was increased 
from 30% to 60% and in Luxembourg cost-sharing was raised 
from 15% to 20% (1983) . Other schemes have opted however to
combine these two strategies, charging a fixed rate plus a 
proportion of the cost of the drug (Italy and Portugal)
(Abel-Smith 1984).
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Evidence showing the effects of product proportional cost- 
sharing (ie. co-insurance, copayment and deductibles) is 
given from studies in the United States where families were 
shown to have paid for nearly 75% of the expenses for drugs 
for people under 65 years of age. Private health insurance 
paid one-eight and Medicaid and other public and private 
programmes paid the remaining one-eight. This data indicates 
that expenditure per person on a free plan is about 60% 
higher than in a plan with a 95% coinsurance. This 
represented about the same relative increase for total per 
capita outpatient and inpatient expenditures as reported by 
Leibowitz (1985) .
Cost-sharing and reimbursement schemes in many countries work 
in conjunction with limited drug list systems. In the 
Netherlands for example, prior to the introduction of a 2.50 
guilders per item prescription charge, a negative list of 
drugs was introduced (1982) under national health insurance.
A doctor could prescribe a product on this list, but in doing 
so made the patient liable to pay the full cost of the drug 
as the health insurance funds were forbidden to do so. Other 
schemes relate more to a proportional cost-sharing in 
conjunction with a limited list of one sort or another.
In Denmark patient drug reimbursement is based on a selective 
system ie. oriented towards selected drugs where selection is 
product-determined. Drugs eligible for reimbursement are
published by the national health authority in a special list. 
Group I drugs for example, receive a 75% reimbursement and
Group II drugs 50%. Fully reimburseable drugs do not form
part of the Danish system although they are available under 
Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian systems of reimbursement. 
Since the national health insurance programme covers the
whole population virtually every member is entitled to the 
price reduction scheme for listed drugs. The Finnish drug 
reimbursement on the other hand, is determined by a disease 
selective scheme which subsidizes in full listed drugs for 
specific chronic diseases. An unselective scheme also
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operates which requires those not covered under the 
restricted selective scheme to share a certain percentage of 
the costs of all prescribed medicaments above an amount 
initially covered by the insurance (Leibowitz 1985).
The various schemes which have been undertaken to curb 
patient demand for prescription drugs will surely have little 
effect if the results of such actions are not passed onto 
those who have a strong influence on that demand ie. GPs. 
Under the UK system of health care a number of strategies 
have been initiated aimed at monitoring general practice 
prescribing costs and patterns and penalising those who vary 
from the desired norm. The next part of the chapter will 
therefore look at government's attempts to, influence GPs' 
attitudes towards prescribing and, increase their awareness 
of the costs of their actions.
Regulation of the profession 1912-1947
Regulation of medicines dates back to the early herbal 
remedies with the establishment of the pharmacopoeias of 
London and Edinburgh, the subsequent publication of the first 
British Pharmacopoeia (1864) and eventually the establishment 
of the International Pharmacopoeia (Dunlop 1971). With the 
introduction of the NHI Act (1912 C  )) came the first real 
attempts to control drug spend. A new administrative 
mechanism was established which aimed to increase efficiency 
of care by identifying and where necessary, penalising cases 
of 'excessive' and/or expensive prescribing. A Drug Fund 
with monies arithmetically determined (see also patient cost- 
sharing) was set up specifically to pay for drugs.
^ 1912 National Health Insurance Act (NHI) was a form of 
nationalization of club and contract practice and an attempt to 
eliminate the local influence of employers and trade unions. It 
extended contract practice to all employed working men up to the 
lower white-collar level, but excluded their dependents and 
hospital care
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To ensure doctors' expenditure stayed within the boundaries 
of the Fund panel doctors were issued with a National 
Formulary and Drug Tariff. In effect, this limited doctors 
to what they could prescribe and attempted to make them aware 
of the costs of drugs they prescribed. The Formulary was 
limited to drugs, items such as toiletries and foodstuffs as 
defined by the MoH's special * advisory committee', were no
longer prescribable. Disputes regarding classification were
solved by classifying the substance according to one of three 
categories: never a drug, always a drugs and sometimes a
drug; the latter depending on the purpose for which the item 
was to be used.
As a matter of routine, each doctor's costs were calculated 
for one quarter in every three by the Pricing Bureau ) . 
Any unusually expensive prescriptions or any cases of 
excessive prescribing were reported to the Ministry. The
Ministry had to decide whether or not to initiate an 
investigation. An analysis of the doctor's prescriptions 
together with any explanations for apparent causes of the 
high costs was prepared by the Bureau. A statement was then 
sent via the Ministry's Region Medical Officer to the 
practitioner who was given the opportunity to explain his
case. After consideration of all the facts the Minister 
could, in a few of the worst cases, refer the matter to the 
Panel Committee.
This Committee was responsible for examining all the facts 
and making a decision on whether there was evidence of 
'extravagance'. They would submit their findings and 
recommendations to the Minister who was ultimately 
responsible for determining the course of action. In extreme 
cases this could mean directing the Committee to withhold the
®Calculation was based on a fixed ratio of individual doctor's 
prescription costs in comparison with the appropriate average for 
the area in which he practised
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GP’s remuneration C  ). Critics of this system argued it was 
however ineffective. Moreover, it caused constant anxiety to 
doctors who were fearful of overstepping the narrow limits of 
too much or too little (Levy in Martin 1957). On the other 
hand, others saw it as a gentle form of guidance. The 
Regional Medical Officer was there to offer support and 
guidance to the doctor, to advise him of the ways to 
economize on his prescribing. Nevertheless, the duality of 
his role was always a discrete but constant reminder that 
trouble lay ahead for those who might prescribe 
'extravagantly' (Martin 1957).
Regulation of the profession 1948-1990
Under the terms of the NHS (1948) the institution of total 
coverage of the population led to a sudden and rapid increase 
in the demand for health care and an increased output by 
prescribers. Ultimately, there was a rapid increase in drug 
spend which exceeded government expectations. As a result of 
this, in the early life of the NHS the government realised 
the need for stricter controls to curb consumer demand (see 
also patient cost-sharing) and subsequently set up a Joint 
Committee on Prescribing (® ) to determine the necessity of 
discouraging undesirable prescribing by GPs.
By 1953 the Committee had classified all the available drugs 
and recommended that a small standing committee be set up who 
would be responsible for adding new products to the list as 
they became available. In 1954 the Standing Committee on the 
Classification of Proprietary Preparations (Cohen Committee)
 ^Figures to 1951 show the number of doctors referred to the 
Committee was 1 in 2,000. Data on later years found the number of 
doctors actually fined each year rarely achieved double figures 
(Reekie & Weber 197 9) . NB. The paucity of data may reflect the 
lack of interest in this type of data collection should it be 
available. Moreover, it is likely to be a reflection of the 
difficulty of proving unreasonable prescribing based on only one 
case (ie. prescription) of the doctor's prescribing.
® Joint Committee on Prescribing, 194 9 set up by Central & 
Scottish Health Services Council
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was set up. This Committee drew up a 'white list' of 
proprietary preparations which a doctor would be permitted to 
prescribe. The Committee however agreed that a doctor should 
retain his clinical freedom to prescribe a drug 'which in his 
opinion was necessary for the treatment of his patient'. In 
conjunction with these controls the government introduced the 
patient prescription charge (1952) aimed at curbing patient 
demand (see patient cost-sharing).
Although the Cohen Committee's recommendations were 
relatively successful they failed to reduce expenditure on 
general practice prescribing. Subsequently a new committee, 
the Guillebaud Committee, was convened in 1956 to investigate 
overall NHS spending and the economic consequences and, to 
identify areas requiring further investigation. The
Committee concluded (1956) that about one-third of the 
increase in drug expenditure between 1949 and 1953/4 resulted 
from the introduction of new and expensive drugs which was 
reflected by the increase of branded products. In December 
of that year the system of prescription charges was changed 
to 5 pence per item (see patient cost-sharing).
In 1959 a new committee, the Hinchcliffe Committee, was set 
up to examine further the increases in drug costs resulting 
from prescriptions issued under the NHS. Moreover, it was to 
recommend strategies for cost containment. The Committee 
found that branded medicines were accounting for an ever- 
increasing share of the total pharmaceutical expenditure. 
This provided further evidence to support the Guillebaud 
Committee's findings and resulted in the Hinchcliffe 
Committee recommending the use of generic names on 
prescriptions in preference to brand names.
In 1964 the Cohen Committee, partly in response to the 
removal of some of its functions to the newly established 
Committee on the Safety of Drugs, was wound down and replaced 
by a committee chaired by Professor MacGregor (1965). This 
Committee published a revised system of classification of
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drugs and recommendations on prescribing. The aim of which 
was to 'help doctors decide which preparation should be used 
in the treatment of their patients and, to identify those 
preparations the prescribing of which appears to call for 
special justification'. The Committee also established a 
central source of information incorporating the increasing 
number of advisory publications advising GPs on how to 
prescribe economically. The published periodical, the
Proplist, detailed all the preparations classified and gave 
articles about new and existing medicines in clinical use. 
This was then circulated to each doctor.
However, the operations and principles of the Committee 
raised continuous doubts. Its attitudes were often referred 
to as 'Doctrinaire' and the inconsistencies in its Proplist 
and failures to agree with its counterpart ) led to 
confusion and lessened the effect of its 'advisory' capacity 
to affect prescribing patterns. In response to these 
difficulties the Proplist and the Committee stood down in 
1969 and, by 1972 the Committee on Safety of Medicines was 
contemplating assuming the 'educative' role.
Since the Hinchcliffe Report government policy was to 
encourage doctors, albeit on a modest scale, to prescribe 
generically. In 1982 the Greenfield Committee which was 
responsible for identifying ways of encouraging effective 
prescribing, was set up. The Committee reported that the 
balance of prescribing remained heavily weighted towards 
brand name products. In 1980 for example, 20% of
prescriptions were written by approved name. Subsequently, 
the Greenfield Report recommended : pharmacists be able to
substitute generic drugs for brand name products on 
prescriptions; GPs should become more involved in district 
drug and therapeutics committees and; local formularies
*Prescribers' Journal, was issued free of charge to all doctors 
by the Department of Health and offered other semi-official 
attempts at moulding prescribing patterns.
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should be introduced along with the setting up of a national 
limited list for drugs.
The government however argued such measures would be 
restrictive towards clinical freedom. Moreover, they would 
directly affect pharmaceutical profits and subsequent 
investment in pharmaceutical research. The drugs bill 
however, reached around £1,400 million a year (1984 (Chapter 
6) ) compared with £250 million ten years previously, 100 
million more prescriptions were written for 17,000 different 
products, double the range used 25 years previously. Not 
surprisingly the government recognized the need for action. 
Thus in 1985, side stepping the controversial issue of 
'generic substitution' which was potentially applicable to 
every prescription, the government introduced a restricted 
NHS drugs list for eight categories of drugs, for which OTC 
alternatives were available (^° ) but which were costing the 
Health Service about £120 million a year (DoH estimation).
The policy was immediately met with vigorous opposition from 
the British Medical Association (BMA) and the ABPI. They 
accused it of being a direct challenge to medical authority 
within the NHS as well as, cutting right across the tradition 
of negotiation between the trade association and the DHSS 
established through the VPRS/PPRS (Voluntary Price Regulation 
Scheme/ Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme). The
resulting public dispute was injurious to all parties but 
eventually, following the move of the then Health Secretary 
to another post, 'normal relations' were resumed with both 
sides able to point out some positive outcomes. Indeed, data 
post limited lists indicates growth in drug spend did not 
reach the 1975-82 trends and real savings on a recurrent 
basis were achieved (Taylor & Maynard 1990).
Government regulation of the profession so far, and not just 
in the UK, has been based on the theory that pharmaceutical
The major exception was benzodiazepine sedatives
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cost containment may ultimately be solved using indirect 
controls namely, persuasion or coercion. For political 
reasons persuasion is often used in the first instance and 
examples include :
1 Circulating periodicals containing information and 
advice about effective, rational prescribing and 
information on cheaper preparations.
2 The circulation of lists of standard equivalents of 
proprietary preparations (UK).
3 Encouraging limited lists of drugs (UK).
4 Financing the continuing education of doctors in 
therapeutics and so on.
5 The use of formularies for specific (Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy) or recommended drugs to be paid for under social 
security systems (France, Germany, Netherlands).
6 Examination and audit of prescriptions.
7 Questioning doctors and arranging visits to discuss 
clinical judgement on specific items prescribed 
(Ireland, UK).
Coercion on the other hand appears the more complex of the
two and involves more than one method of control although
basically it pinches the wallet. Under a coercive system 
attempts to limit the variety of items prescribed follow one 
of two paths. Doctors can be penalised for prescribing 
'black-listed' preparations perhaps by surcharging the doctor 
the total cost of supplying the item by withholding that 
amount from the doctor's remuneration. However, this is 
unsatisfactory because it requires the lists of prohibited
items to be extensive and compilation is never easy. 
Alternatively, patients may incur some sort of charge for
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cashing a prescription or, a purchaser may examine the 
manufacturers' profits and try to regulate the fees etc. paid 
for pharmaceutical work whether by professional pharmacists 
or doctors who do their own dispensing (Martin 1957; Abel- 
Smith 1984; see regulation of the profession and, patient 
cost-sharing).
The discussion has so far concentrated on government's 
attempts to influence GPs' attitudes by providing them with 
information about drugs in the market. It has not yet 
discussed the role of feedback as a mechanism for influencing 
choices and behaviour. Several studies have for example, 
demonstrated that the feedback doctors receive about their 
actions can result in changes in prescribing, though this 
change is liable to disappear should feedback cease (Spencer 
& van Zwanenberg 1989; Wyatt, Reilly et al 1992). However, 
it is noted feedback should be combined with other 
educational measures in order for it to achieve some success 
in changing practices. It is not sufficient to simply 
feedback information on performance, as this approach has 
almost no impact on changing clinical behaviour (Mitchell & 
Fowkes 1985) . This may at least explain in part why, prior 
to 1988 only a small minority of GPs had requested this 
information.
Prescriptions which have been cashed by the patient are sent 
to the Prescription Pricing Authority (PPA) . This is the 
special health authority responsible for authorising payment 
to contractors for dispensing NHS prescriptions and for 
providing prescribing and drug information for England. The 
PPA is able to collect and collate all data with regard to 
prescribing costs and trends and are in an ideal position to 
provide GPs with information and feedback about their 
activities in this field. In the mid 1970s, the PPA 
undertook a seven year computerisation programme (from 197 6) 
which they believed would result in a more informative and 
selective information system on prescribing costs available
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to GPs. In October of 1988 GPs received their first 
Prescribing, Analysis and CosT (PACT) data.
PACT aims to provide GPs with reliable, regular information 
on their prescribing habits and costs and increase awareness 
of weaknesses and strengths. As such, PACT provides a useful 
tool for FHSAs and GPs alike in assessing prescribing costs 
as well as making the use of a formulary and working from a 
selected list of familiar products attractive. PACT allows 
the government to identify more specifically where the money 
is going and permits analyses illustrating the value (versus 
cost) of prescribing. However, although it provides
information on cost and number of items, in various
permutations, prescribed by each prescription pad it is at 
best a proxy outcome measure of the complex act of
prescribing and has limitations.
It is unlikely for example, to discriminate between good 
prescribing and bad prescribing. It is not related to
clinical care or consultation rates. Moreover, it provides 
no clue to the proportion of consultations that end without a 
prescription being issued. Repeat prescriptions cannot be 
identified though they may comprise 66% of the total items
and make a major contribution to the overall cost (Spencer &
van Zwanenberg 198 9) and, it also fails to provide any
information about patient details. Nonetheless, PACT has 
already started to influence GPs ' choice of drug by putting 
price firmly on the agenda as an item to consider when 
choosing between drugs. The industry has responded by 
marketing several products principally on the basis of their 
cheapness in comparison to similar products and pricing them 
to be comparable to generic alternatives or overall low costs
(eg. less than 5 pence per day) (Head 1990).
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Summary
The structure of the pharmaceutical market, the market's 
insensitivity to price and the government's dual role in the 
industry makes regulation difficult. Nonetheless, the 
government has attempted to contain expenditure growth by 
adopting a 'three-pronged attack'. It has targeted all 
players in the market : the industry, the prescriber and the 
consumer. The UK government's regulation of the industry is 
unique to Britain. Unlike other countries, it does not seek 
to regulate products prices but industry profits thereby 
safe-guarding its dual role. Each year companies must 
negotiate with the government about the amount of profit they 
can keep. However, they retain the freedom to set product 
prices on entry into the market but, must seek official 
approval for increases in price thereafter. The first price 
regulation scheme was remarkably unrestrictive, consecutive 
revisions have however, witnessed an increase in government 
powers to determine company profits and prices to the NHS.
In terms of government attempts to influence patient demand 
and professional attitudes towards prescribing, these have 
met with only limited success. Historical mechanisms of 
consumer regulation have been based on the use of deterrents. 
However, patient cost-sharing under the UK system gives 
little or no incentive for cost-effectiveness. This results 
from the increase in the exemption categories for 
prescription charges which makes regulation of demand 
difficult as prescription charges' ability to restrain volume 
demand for medicines is severely limited. Attempts to 
influence prescribers' attitudes have also failed to produce 
the much longed for result. This is however not surprising 
given the lack of real incentives and sanctions to prescribe 
more cost-effectively. Moreover, the government focused most 
of its attentions on influencing the industry and the patient 
although, regulation of the profession has a longer history 
than either of the other two.
69
It is this failure by successive governments to 
satisfactorily contain drug expenditure which led to a 
revision of the existing methods of regulation in the latter 
part of the 1980s. In 1988 new proposals were introduced 
(Working for Patients, 1989) which focus on exerting downward 
pressure on GPs through cash 'limited* budgets and tighter 
financial boundaries. For the first time GPs will be given a 
financial incentive which will include the very real threat 
of immediate sanctions for failure to prescribe more cost- 
effectively. This approach is a way of re-addressing the 
balance of regulation. This arises from a realization that 
prescribers, rather than the industry or the consumer, are 
the key to containing costs and reducing expenditure growth 
on prescription drugs.
The research interest of this project therefore relates to 
the latest government attempts to influence GPs' attitudes 
towards prescribing. The study focuses on the use of the 
government's use of financial incentives and strict financial 
boundaries to change GPs' prescribing practices. The
research question therefore is :
How effective are the new mechanisms for containing the 
drugs bill ?
The next chapter outlines the method used to study the 
effects of the 1991 NHS reforms on general practice 
prescribing trends. Thereafter, the study seeks to determine 
whether the reforms have been successful in reducing 
expenditure growth and containing drug costs.
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CHAPTERS
Methodology
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Introduction
This study seeks to determine whether certain policies 
instituted under the 1991 NHS Reforms have had any impact on 
general practice prescribing trends and in particular, GP 
fundholders. The study compares the prescribing trends of 
eight firstwave GP fundholding practices with local averages 
for a four year period 1989 to 1993. Trends in national data 
between 1975 and 1992 were also reviewed. The study employed 
both qualitative and quantitive methods for research purposes 
and a case-study approach was adopted. Qualitative
information was obtained from semi-structured interviews and 
interactive research methods in the form of informal 
discussions. A  review of the literature was also conducted.
Quarterly Prescribing, Analysis and CosT (PACT) data were 
obtained from the practices and FHSAs. In addition.
Prescribing Data sheets (PD2), which record annual national 
prescribing data, were obtained directly from the PPA and 
reviewed.
Literature Review
The literature was reviewed to determine the research 
questions, aims and objectives. A review of individual
practice reports and business plans was also conducted in 
order to compile a descriptive profile of the organizational 
structure and demographic characteristics of each practice. 
The literature was divided into sections; the first part 
focused on why governments have sought to curb spending on 
pharmaceuticals and in particular, prescription drugs issued 
by GPs. The investigation of the literature focused on the 
factors which led to the increased demand for pharmaceuticals 
and, the apparent ’explosion' in drug spend. This entailed 
examining literature detailing the changes in historical, 
demographic, therapeutic, economic, social and policy factors
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which led to changes in demand between 1948 and the late 
1980s.
In order to understand the essence of the problem the 
literature reviewed included economists and others' work on 
the pharmaceutical market and the demand for pharmaceuticals.
This work was reviewed in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 reviewed 
government attempts to contain expenditure growth via 
regulation of the industry, the profession and the consumer 
from the beginning of the 20th Century to the early 1990s. 
Archive and current literature including governmental papers 
and reports, journal articles and books obtained from a 
number of sources was thus reviewed. This section concluded 
that the mechanisms implemented so far achieved only moderate 
success. Government efforts to influence GPs to modify their 
behaviour failed because of the lack of incentives or 
sanctions. Moreover, the government had focused its
attentions mainly towards regulating the industry and curbing 
patient demand.
Regulation of the industry had been the most consistent and 
rigid and was proving to be the more successful. Changing 
patient demand proved more difficult because of the existence 
of a number of exemption categories. The literature 
concluded the government's use of deterrents had proved 
unsatisfactory in containing expenditure growth on 
prescription drugs. This led to new mechanisms of control in 
the 1991 NHS Reforms. This was the focus of the remainder of 
the research. The central research question was therefore :
How effective are the new mechanisms for containing the 
drugs bill ?
It could be broken down into a number of more detailed 
research aims :
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1 To determine the consequences of the institution of GP 
fundholding on general practitioner prescribing trends.
2 To test a number of hypotheses arising from the 
introduction of GP fundholding namely :
(a) the introduction of the cash limited drugs budget 
will be a sufficient motivation to influence GPs ' 
to modify their prescribing choices based on cost;
(b) the effects of the reforms on non-fundholding 
practices will be less than fund-holding practices;
(c) GPs' strategies of what they say and do will be 
reflected in their prescribing trends and 
management of drugs budgets.
Research strategies :
1 Review published material relevant to the debate.
2 Select a case-study sample of GP fundholders and collect 
data pertaining to their prescribing patterns.
3 Conduct semi-structured interviews with relevant 
professionals and collect information relevant to the 
aims of the study.
4 Analyze the data and use it to test the hypotheses 
described in the aims.
5 Make conclusions about what has been shown through the 
study in respect of cost containment in GP generated 
drug expenditure.
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study Design :
Case-studies
Individual practice reports and business plans compiled by 
each practice in the two years prior to fundholding were 
reviewed. From this information and, information obtained 
from interviews and discussions with the practice (Appendix), 
a descriptive profile of each practice was compiled outlining 
the organizational and demographic characteristics, a
synopsis of which is presented below and in Appendix A. 
These profiles would be referred to in subsequent discussions 
relating to prescribing trends and policy initiatives
implemented by the practice.
The research sample is concentrated in three regions; the two 
metropolitan regions of London and The Home Counties and 
rural East Anglia. The group chosen was also part of a 
larger study of fundholding conducted by the London School of 
Economics (Glennerster, Matsaganis & Owens 1992). Practices 
who indicated an interest in adopting fundholding in the 
first year were approached about their willingness to be 
included in the study by their regional medical advisers. An 
initial list of potentially collaborating practices was drawn 
up out of which fifteen were chosen. These fifteen reflected 
a cross-section of types of practices who had opted for 
fundholding at that time and were included because of 
differences in size, social situation, geography, the pull of 
the London teaching hospitals, referral patterns and practice 
organization. The group were therefore not a random sample 
but a 'judgement* sample chosen to reflect a variety of
situations not a statistically representative group.
During the initial interviews in 1990 five of the practices 
chose not to proceed in the study. The remaining ten
practices therefore made up the initial sample used in 
Professor Glennerster's study. It was agreed with Professor 
Glennerster at the beginning of this study that I should,
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under his supervision, be entirely responsible for that part 
of the wider study which concerned the drugs budget of these 
practices. Although all practices agreed to submit their 
prescribing data for a period of at least four years, it 
proved difficult to obtain a complete data span from three 
practices. By the end of the study two practices had to be 
totally excluded. Data for the third practice, although also 
incomplete, was sufficient to provide some description of 
prescribing patterns post reforms in relation to the 
practice's prescribing policies.
Thus, eight fundholding practices participated fully in the 
study. They allowed me access to their drug expenditure data 
and discussed their management strategies for regulating drug 
spend. As a result of the stringent entry criteria to the 
fundholding scheme ) and, the geographical pattern of 
applications an uneven spread of practices entering 
fundholding in the research regions emerged. Very few 
traditional inner city deprived areas entered the scheme, the 
highest concentration of practices being in semi-rural areas 
just beyond greater London (see below and also Appendix A).
Practice profiles : 
Practice 1
This is an inner city prescribing practice situated in an 
affluent part of South West London. As a result of its 
location in an area where most of the population belong to 
British social classes I & II, it does not experience many of 
the problems generally attributed to inner city practices. 
The practice population, of approximately 9,000, reflects the 
cosmopolitan nature of the city but has a relative excess of 
patients aged 18-30 years, many of whom live in flats and
 ^Have a registered list size of at least 9,000 and, show an 
ability to manage budgets (eg. adequate administrative support and 
IT and information systems).
76
hostels which partially explains the transient nature of the 
population.
Practice 2
A small town/semi-rural prescribing and dispensing practice 
in West Hertfordshire, this practice was first established in 
1912 and today has two surgery sites and five GP partners. 
The practice population of 12,239 reveals 46% aged 15-44 
years and 24% aged 45-64 years. Notably, the elderly make up 
12% of the list size.
Practice 3
This combined prescribing and dispensing practice, situated 
about five miles from a new town and growing industrial area, 
has a catchment area spanning two counties with 60% of its 
patients inhabitants of Bedfordshire and 40% Buckinghamshire.
The practice was established about 100 years ago and today 
has 5 GPs caring for the welfare of 9,300 patients. The 
population remains relatively static at 7% with lower than 
average mobility. Particular characteristics of the practice 
population are, a higher than average proportion of elderly 
(15%) and, the 75 year olds and over represent a slightly 
higher percentage compared with the younger elderly. In 
addition, there is a lower than average number of children 
under 5 despite a fairly recent (1992) increase in the 
population.
Practice 4
This prescribing only practice was established in 1967 in an 
essentially very deprived area in north London. The 
population of the area is predominantly Orthodox Jewish 
though there is an upward trend of other ethnic minority 
groups coming to live in the locality. These groups include 
political and economic refugees from Turkey, Kurdistan and
77
Zaire. The patient population of approximately 13,000 
reflects the deprivation experienced by many inner city 
areas. It has a high turnover of patients (average 20% per 
annum) mainly among the young, though in reality the list 
size remains fairly static. Many of the patients joining the 
practice have greater health needs than those they replace 
and include the homeless, those under 'Care in the Community' 
and, an increasing elderly population, 11.4% of the practice 
population are over 65 years.
Practice 5
This small town/semi rural prescribing and dispensing 
practice in South East Hertfordshire was established in 1981 
and today has 9 partners. The area is fast developing and 
there has been a considerable amount of new housing in the 
area which in turn, has resulted in an influx of young 
married couples with small children and a subsequent high 
patient turnover. There has also been an increase in the 
stock of sheltered accommodation consequently, there has been 
a sharp rise in the numbers of elderly residents in the area. 
There is a upward trend in population growth and of those 
registering with the practice. The number of new patients 
registering each quarter is around the 250 mark and there is 
currently no sign of a slow down in this upward trend.
Practice 6
This small, thriving market town practice in rural East 
Anglia is a combined prescribing and dispensing practice and 
operates from two surgery sites. 7 GPs, 2 part-time 
assistants and 1 GP trainee work in the practice and look 
after a practice list size of 13,000 which is essentially 
unremarkable. The majority of patients are aged 5-65 years 
old, there is a significant elderly population (20%) and only 
5% of the registered patients are under 5 year olds.
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Practice 7
This is a large training partnership based on the outskirts 
of greater London. The practice was established at the turn 
of the century and today, it operates from only two sites. 
The area is populated by a predominantly working and lower 
middle class transient population and is witnessing a rapid 
increase in the numbers of political and economic refugees 
from countries such as Turkey, Zaire and Kurdistan. About 
ten years ago this was a very industrial area since then 
however, there has been a rapid decline in industry and a 
dramatic increase in unemployment.
The practice population of 14,823 reflects many of the 
elements of the overall population. A study carried out by 
the practice of under 5s registered with the practice found 
that at least 25% were of ethnic origin as defined by family 
name. The study did not however, reveal those children whose 
parents’ origins are ethnic such as West Indian, but whose 
name is English sounding eg. Phillips, Williams etc.
Practice 8
This partnership, in the South East Hertfordshire commuter
belt, was established about 30 years ago. It is a small town 
prescribing and dispensing practice with two surgeries. 
There are 6 partners. The practice list size of
approximately 13,000 is quite unremarkable with respect to 
demography and reflects the national (?) trends. The 
practice has however, detected the existence of an
exceptional multiple pathology, especially amongst its 
elderly population (15.4% of list size) and relates this to 
the area’s ’geographical quirk’ which demonstrates an
uncharacteristically cold and damp climate.
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A basis for conparison
Due to time constraints of the study and the difficulties of 
finding comparable statistical data on prescribing in non- 
fundholding practices, the prescribing costs for these eight 
fundholding practices were compared with prescribing data 
from all the practices in their Family Health Service 
Authority (FHSA).
Ideally the fundholders should have been compared with their 
local FHSA data excluding their own and other fundholders'
returns. However, the PACT data could not be disaggregated 
in this way, the PPA could not or would not do this despite 
many attempts. This did not however, prove ruinous to this 
research design for two reasons. First, fundholders in the 
first wave were for the most part, a small minority group
(ie. 5%) and therefore had only a small impact on the FHSA 
averages (this was least true in Hertfordshire where, in the 
first wave the percentage of fundholders was over 20%) .
Secondly, the inclusion of fundholders in the average biased 
the results towards showing there was no difference between 
fundholders' figures and the average FHSA.
The nature of the comparison also makes a statistical 
significance test inappropriate. The results are therefore 
indicative no statistically conclusive. They are however, in 
line with others' research which followed a randomized
control trial procedure and, reviewed national data covering 
all practices in the country analyzed by the Department of 
Health. The statistical material is best thought of as 
background to these first studies which examine how practices 
went about containing their drugs budgets.
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Semi-structured interviews
Medical advisers from three FHSAs, one located in The Home 
Counties, one in Inner London and the other in rural East 
Anglia, who had fundholding practices participating in the 
study were also interviewed. These three FHSAs were chosen 
because together, six of the study's practices were 
accountable to them. FHSAs' prescribing trends were compared 
with national averages to illustrate how typical they were 
in comparison to the national picture.
Contact with practices and FHSAs was made initially in 
writing. This was followed up a week later by telephone. 
This telephone contact outlined in more detail the research 
aims and objectives, timetable and what contribution to the 
study the practice/FHSA could make. An appointment to visit 
and interview one of the practice team (ie partner and/or 
practice manager responsible for fundholding/drug budget) or 
FHSA medical/pharmaceutical adviser was also made at this 
contact. I conducted all face-to-face interviews.
The purpose of the interviews was to elicit the views of 
practice and local health authorities about the impact of the 
new budgetary system on prescribing trends and behaviours.
It was also an attempt to define the policy processes and 
decision-making methods employed by those directly involved 
in applying the new system (Appendix B & C) . Each interview 
lasted between one and one and a half hours and was usually 
attended by the partner responsible for managing the drugs 
budget and the practice manager.
Initially, interviews were to be conducted approximately one 
year post implementation of the reforms. However, it became 
apparent nearer the interview time this would not be feasible 
for either practices or FHSAs. This was because this was one 
of their busiest administrative times of the year as they 
undertook preparing their end of year financial reports for
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audit. Consequently, the interviews took place 15-18 months 
post implementation and after practices had produced their 
first set of end of year returns.
Interactive research methods
These interviews were supported by regular and informal 
telephone discussions with the practice managers who were 
contacted approximately once every six to eight weeks.
Through these contacts I was able to successfully build up a 
good rapport with each practice. These contacts provided 
regular feedback about how the reforms and any new FHSA or 
regional directives were affecting the practices in addition 
to, any in-year changes with regards to demographic, 
morbidity and practice characteristics.
Other agencies contacted informally by telephone and 
occasionally by letter, included the Department of Health, 
The Northwest Thames Regional Health Authority, The 
University of Leeds Prescribing Research Unit, The 
Prescription Pricing Authority, The Royal College of General 
Practitioners, The British Medial Association, The Associated 
British Pharmaceutical Industry, The Office of Health 
Economics, The Research Teams of the Conservative, Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats Parties. From discussions with these 
professional agencies I was able to ascertain information 
regarding national and regional policy initiatives as well as 
prescribing trends.
In general, these agencies were helpful and willing to 
discuss issues surrounding the reforms and its intended 
effects. I did however, encounter problems with the larger 
government department who were severely restricted in what 
information they were able to discuss. They continuously 
referred me onto other departments within the institution who 
then referred me on again. They also refused me access to
82
their library records and documents. In view of these 
specific problems I had to rely on the other sources 
mentioned above eg. Prescription Pricing Authority, Office of 
Health Economics, Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Industry etc.
Responses to the questions asked in both the semi-structured 
interviews and informal telephone discussions were recorded 
at the time in written note form. They were transcribed 
fully shortly after completion of the interview/discussion.
Prescribing data
In addition to interviews and informal discussions 
information specific to prescribing trends was gathered from 
returns to the PPA from ten firstwave GP fundholding 
practices and three FHSAs. Annual national aggregated figures 
for prescribing information was also collected. This
information included aggregated quarterly practice and FHSA 
figures for net ingredient costs, number of items prescribed, 
average cost per patient, generic percentage and list size. 
The first two of these measurements were also disaggregated 
by therapeutic category (ie. cardiovascular, gastro­
intestinal, musculoskeletal, respiratory, central nervous 
system, infections and others).
Prior to June 1991 practices which were both dispensing and 
prescribing and their FHSAs received two set of quarterly 
PACT data. Though the data recorded the same prescribing 
variables, as above, it did so according to whether 
prescriptions had been written for prescribing or dispensing 
patients. After June 1991, the PPA aggregated this data and 
practices and FHSAs started to receive an aggregated set of 
quarterly figures. For the purposes of this research both 
prescribing and dispensing PACT figures for individual 
practices and FHSAs prior to June 1991 were aggregated to
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give a single figure for each variable. This was achieved by 
adding the dispensing figures to the prescribing figures 
except in the case of percentages, such as generic percentage 
(Appendix D) .
The types of questions asked of this quantitive data 
include :
a What assumptions can be made about prescribing trends in
terms of expenditure, numbers of prescriptions written, 
average cost per person, categories of drugs prescribed 
etc ?
b How do fundholding practices compare with their local
area averages in terms of prescribing trends ?
c How do fundholding practice FHSAs compare with the
national average ?
d Since fundholding are there any marked changes in
prescribing trends at practice, FHSA and national 
level ?
e If so, what might these changes be a result of ? (eg.
the introduction of new practice/FHSA policies such as 
new drug formularies, generic prescribing etc)
The initial request for individual practice and FHSA
quarterly PACT data Level 1 for the one year prior to and two 
years post fundholding was made by post. This level of data 
illustrated individual practice prescribing compared with 
FHSA averages and FHSA prescribing compared with national 
averages respectively. In most instances practices were able 
to provide this information. Occasionally however, the data 
had been mislaid and was therefore requested from the PPA, 
who retain a practice’s quarterly PACT for the last six 
quarters. From April 1991 each practice and FHSA was
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contacted quarterly by phone in the first instance, and 
followed up by post if necessary, for their last quarter's 
PACT Level 1 data.
Data collection was sometimes slow because there was usually 
a period of about ten weeks before the PPA received all 
practice and FHSA prescription returns and before they issued 
the subsequent feedback to practices and FHSAs. This led to 
the relevant information only being forwarded onto me 
approximately twelve weeks after the quarter end. In 
addition, as mentioned previously, data collection at the 
year end was further compounded by end of year audits and 
reports. Consequently, my requests for prescribing data at 
this time of year were secondary to a practice's/FHSA's other 
commitments. This delay was between sixteen and twenty-four 
weeks in total.
Analysis of data
The quarterly data for each practice and FHSA was aggregated 
to year end. Trends were produced for total net ingredient 
cost, total number of items prescribed, average cost per 
patient and proportion generic prescribing. As a true 
measure of cost-restraint it was decided to examine the 
annual growth trends of either average cost per patient or, 
average cost per prescribing unit ) rather than average 
cost per item prescribed. This decision was based on the 
knowledge that average cost per item is an unsatisfactory 
measurement tool. Until recently volume ie. number of items 
prescribed) has been presented in two ways.
 ^A prescribing unit is a unit which is weighted to take account 
of the effect of age on demand. In the 1991/92 and 1992/93 
budgets, budgets were calculated according to a weighted population 
whereby a person aged 0-64 years was awarded a weight of 1; persons 
aged 65+ were awarded a weight of 3. This means persons aged 65 
and over are more likely to demand three times more than persons 
aged 0-64 years
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It was either presented as 'prescribed items' which made no 
allowance for the quantity of drugs in each item or, in the 
listings of prescriptions by different quantity and strengths 
which cannot be conveniently aggregated (Maxwell, Heaney et 
al 1993; Chapter 9). Moreover, any indication of a reduction 
in the annual rate of expenditure may simply be a reflection 
of reductions in volume rather than cost-restraint. 
Therefore, the use of average cost per patient or per 
prescribing unit which takes into account patterns of 
expenditure in relation to volume would be more likely to 
reflect real cost-containment. The next stage was to 
determine which of these two units of measurement should be 
used.
It is recognised that the elderly demand and receive more 
health care and drug therapy than a younger population 
(Chapter 1) . This is taken into account in the health care 
'formula' (Chapter 4). It was therefore not enough to choose 
average cost per patient without reference to the impact of 
elderly on prescribing costs. The choice of measurement was 
based on a system which ranked practices according to their 
total percentage growth in average cost per patient and per 
prescribing unit (Appendix E) . The practice with the 
smallest percentage growth was awarded a rank of 1 and the 
practice with the highest overall percentage growth was 
ranked 8.
Only when the rank for average cost per patient was higher 
than average cost per prescribing unit was there any 
suggestion that the elderly accounted for the majority share 
of the practice's drug spend. Only one practice in the study 
demonstrated a higher rank for average cost per patient 
(Appendix E) . Therefore, a decision to use average cost per 
patient as a measurement tool of cost-restraint was made 
because, there was little evidence to suggest a need to take 
extra consideration for the age factor.
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Practice trends for all these measurements were compared with 
FHSA average trends in all but average cost per patient due 
to the lack of FHSA data. The data of three individual FHSAs 
was also analyzed and trends subsequently produced for total 
net ingredient cost, total number of items prescribed, 
average cost per patient and proportion generic prescribing. 
These were compared with national average trends respectively 
in all but average cost per patient due to the lack of
national data. This was to determine how typical they were 
of the local average.
In an attempt to obtain a clear indication of potential
reasons for prescribing differences between groups, further 
investigation of the data was carried out. This involved 
scrutinizing each of the therapeutic categories to see which 
one(s) might be responsible for producing higher/lower than 
local/national average differences. These were then reviewed
in the light of the information recorded in the practice
profiles and with the qualitative data collected to determine 
whether any significant patterns could be explained.
Annual national data taken from PD2 forms and from the DoH's 
Health and Personal Social Services Statistics for England 
for the period 1975 to 1992 inclusive were examined and 
trends illustrating were produced :
a) total net ingredient cost
b) total number of items prescribed
c) average cost per patient
d) proportion of generic prescribing
This data was reviewed in conjunction with information 
detailing national cost containment policies for this period.
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Presentation of the material
The succeeding results chapters present first, the national 
trends in prescription costs followed by, the FHSA data and 
then practice level material (Chapters 6-8). I begin 
however, by explaining the 1991 health reforms and GP 
fundholding.
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CHAPTER 4
Controlling prescribing costs from information and 
advice to cash iimited budgets : 1985-1992______
89
Introduction
Chapter 2 examined government attempts to curb the growth in 
drug spend of prescription drugs by, regulating industry 
prices and profits and trying to influence prescribers' 
choice and patient demand. Essentially, GPs had experienced 
very few restraints on their 'freedom' to prescribe and, in 
only a few exceptional cases were GPs asked to justify 
prescribing particular items. Such controls which did exist 
were largely ineffective and fell outside the remit of the 
Family Practitioner Committee's responsibility.
This chapter focuses on the movement away from using only 
information and advice as a form of control to a method which 
incorporates these with cash limited budgets, financial 
incentives and immediate cash penalties. The chapter begins 
by outlining the origins of the move towards cash limits 
before discussing the structure of the new budgetary system 
and how this applies to setting the various budgets at 
different levels. The chapters moves onto discuss the role 
of the PACT information and feedback system under the new 
system of regulation followed by the revised method of 
referral to the Professional Committee.
The origins of the NHS reforms
In the mid 1980s the Treasury's attention focused on primary 
health care which, unlike hospital and community services 
remained uncash limited. It was also the fastest growing 
sector of NHS spending and pharmaceutical spend generated by 
GPs was the fastest growing element of spending within this 
sector. As a consequence, the government was keen to improve 
the system for monitoring GP prescribing so that it could act
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where necessary to control what it defined as unreasonable 
and/or excessive prescribing. However, a system to allow 
more rigid and regular monitoring of GPs' prescribing was 
already being developed by the PPA (Chapter 2). The 
Treasury's discussions of the mid 1980s also featured an idea 
of imposing cash limits on GPs' prescribing. The idea was 
pursued again in new discussions set up by the Thatcher 
government (1988) proposing much broader reforms of the whole 
NHS.
Those participating in the discussions were divided on which 
of two approaches to adopt (Butler 1993; Glennerster 1992). 
On the one hand, it was argued that District Health 
Authorities (DHAs) should be given the power to purchase all 
services in their area on behalf of their GPs. The system 
should be further modified by forcing hospitals to compete 
with each other to gain contracts internally (A Enthoven 
1985). On the other hand, there were those who wanted GPs to 
become the purchasers. This model stemmed from two premises. 
The first was GPs would be better purchasers because they 
were closer to patients and therefore, more likely to be 
informed about preferences than remote districts (Maynard 
1983; Glennerster 1992). Secondly, GPs should be faced with 
the financial consequences of their actions. Previously, 
they referred patients to hospital without any responsibility 
for the financial consequences of their actions.
By giving them a cash limited hospital budget they would be 
forced to consider which referrals were most necessary. 
Subsequently, this might reduce the wide variation in 
referral patterns which could otherwise not be explained. In 
exactly the same way, a cash limited drug budget would force 
GPs to think about their prescribing choices in a serious 
way. If the two budgets were amalgamated or, if GPs could 
move money from one budget to another they would have a 
direct incentive to contain their drug spending for use on 
other purposes or, stop and re-spend it on reducing their 
capacity to refer. For these reasons the GP based budget
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model was more attractive than the Enthoven model and was 
subject to achieve wider objectives.
However, obvious problems existed in transposing the Maynard 
HMO system to the UK. In the first place, under Maynard's 
system the HMO held a registered patient list size of not 
less than 50,000 and incentives to discriminate against 
potentially expensive patients. In contrast, no UK
individual practice or even group practice had a list size 
anywhere near this figure. Moreover, doctors had never had 
any incentive to discriminate against a patient on the 
grounds of expense. Despite these problems the government 
was eventually able to define a number of solutions. 
Firstly, only practices with a list size of 11,000 and over 
could become fundholders (Glennerster 1992). However, after 
further discussion it was decided this figure was too high 
and was subsequently lowered to 9,000.
Secondly, to safeguard against bankruptcy and/or over­
spending on annual budgets as a result of expensive patients, 
a 'ceiling' of £5,000 was placed on how much a practice would 
have to pay for anyone patient in a single year for hospital 
costs. A similar but more informal and regionally based 
'stop loss' for drugs was worked out. Any expenditure over 
and above this limit would automatically be paid for by the 
district. Finally, it was decided that budgets would, in the 
first instance, only cover standard and relatively 
inexpensive treatments without open-ended follow-ups. 
Initially GPs would be able to purchase outpatient treatment, 
diagnostic tests and certain inpatient and day case 
treatments. With the publication of the working document 
came the fuller technical list of the treatments to be 
included. Spending on drugs prescribed by the practice were 
included.
After consideration of Maynard's bottom-up funding and 
Enthoven's secondary level purchaser models, the government
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chose to adopt both simultaneously. This led to the new 
structure of organization as shown in Figure 4.1.
Purchasers and providers in the internal market
NON-FUNDHOLDING
PRACTICES
FUNDHOLDING
PRACTICES
DISTRICT HEALTH 
AUTHORITIES
DIRECTLY MANAGED PRIVATE SELF GOVERNING
HOSPITALS PROVIDERS UNITS 
Figure 4.1
'Internal' arrangements 
Contract-based transfer funds
Reference : Glennerster, Matsaganis & Owens (1992)
The new budgetary scheme
Under this new structure two types of general practice have 
emerged, fundholding and non-fundholding. Practices with the 
appropriate list size can apply for fundholding status for
the next financial year at anytime during the current year 
and fundholders can, if they wish, opt out of fundholding at 
a later date. Their budgets were originally set by the
Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) but in 1991 were later set 
by Family Health Service Authority (formerly known as the 
Family Practitioner Committee (FHSA)) within guidelines from 
the RHA. These practice firm budgets comprised three 
elements to cover hospital services, practice staff costs and 
pharmaceuticals. In 1993 Community Health Service budgets
were added to the budget.
The practice has the freedom to use this combined budget
flexibly. This acts as a powerful incentive for fundholders
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to save on one element of expenditure, drugs for example, and 
spend the money elsewhere. However, the consequences for 
failure is high. Any budget overspend requires immediate
input from another element of the budget. This may involve 
transferring 'funds' from the prescribing element for example 
to make up the shortfall on hospital services. Non­
fundholders on the other hand, do not have to worry as much 
about such occurrences.
In contrast to fundholders, non-fundholders are merely set a 
target rather than a firm cash limit that covers prescribing 
cbsts (ie. indicative prescribing amount (IPA)). They are
nonetheless expected to keep to their IPAs. The FHSAs have 
to cover any practice overspend from their reserve budgets. 
FHSAs have experienced the problems in trying to finance
practice overspends from their limited cash resources. They 
have limited sanctions to keep non-fundholding practices 
within their drug budgets (ie. referral to the Professional 
Committee).
One of the major dilemmas facing the DoH was how to set
fundholders' practice budgets. The original intention was to
allocate the hospital element of the budgets on a weighted 
capitation formula like DHAs. This however proved
impractical (Glennerster 1992). Therefore, in the first
years budgets were set based on historic levels of referrals 
and their costs given correct hospital services. Practices' 
drug budgets were to be set in the same way as non­
fundholders' IPAs. This chapter will now discuss in more 
detail the process of calculating and monitoring the 
prescribing part of the practice budget. The process begins 
with setting the national budget.
Setting drugs expenditure at national level
Each year the DoH forecasts the total national expenditure on 
drugs, medicines and appliances to be prescribed by GPs and
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dentists. This calculation uses a statistical model which 
takes into account the cost and volume of prescriptions 
including demographic factors, product mix and expected 
increases in drug manufacturers' prices. The sum for 
prescribing amounts set under the non-fundholding scheme (ie. 
IPAs) is ring-fenced and is not available to finance other 
areas of the health authority expenditure. The national sum 
for Family Health Service dispensed drugs excluding the sums 
for GP fundholders is then distributed as 'firm budgets' to 
each of the 14 RHAs.
Authority level firm budgets
Authority level firm budgets represent anticipated 
expenditure on all prescriptions dispensed by community 
pharmacists, dispensing doctors and appliance contractors 
paid for by each authority. As such, firm budgets take 
account of and include elements for:
a basic price of the medicines and appliances dispensed;
b deductions for discounts available to dispensers;
c additions for container allowances available to
dispensers;
d reimbursement of VAT for dispensing doctors and
appliance contractors;
e prescriptions written by dentists, which are not
separately identifiable;
f prescriptions written by some doctors other than GPs but
dispensed in the community.
RHAs are notified of their firm budgets at the same time they 
are notified of the likely level at which FHSA firm budgets
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should be set. These regional firm budgets are flexible
enough to allow, if required, FHSA firm budgets to be
adjusted according to locally considered factors. The model 
used to calculate FHSA firm budgets adjusts the total basic 
prices (net ingredient costs) of drugs paid for by each FHSA 
in the last calendar year to take account of demographic
factors.
The starting point for calculating budgets, taking into 
account demographic factors, is the age profile of the 
population. Age is accepted as influencing prescribing costs 
and an attempt has been made to standardise for the age 
factor in the formula by estimating a set of expenditure
weights which correspond to the prescribing units used in
PACT ). These weights (Table 4.1) were then applied to
each FHSA's resident population, using Office of Population 
Census Statistics (OPCS) figures (^ ) , to derive a weighted
population for each FHSA. The total of net ingredient costs 
of drugs in each FHSA in the last calendar year is then
divided by the calculated age weighted population of each
FHSA to yield an estimate of annual basic price weighted for
age. This projection of basic price derived is then
expressed as a proportion of the total projections for all 
FHSAs and these proportions are used to divide the total 
national sum for the coming year into firm budgets for each 
FHSA. The recommended firm budgets for each FHSA are
aggregated to provide the total firm budget for each RHA.
^Aged 0-64 = weight of 1, aged 65+ = weight of 3. These 
weights were used for setting budgets between 1991 and 1993 
inclusive after which, the new weighted capitation system and 
the ASTRO PU were used (refer Chapter 9).
 ^Regional PUs are derived using OPCS figures rather than 
aggregated practice list sizes. This is because the 
Prescribing Research Unit (Leeds) found that practice list 
size has a tendency to record large variances eg. -2% to 39%.
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Prescribing Unit Values
Age Group 
(years)
Men Women
<64 1 1
>64 3 3
Table 4.1 
Local variation
At least one RHA in the country however felt this national 
formula was too crude. It argued the application of the same 
increase nationally did not reflect accurately individual 
FHSA or practice needs. Subsequently, it instructed one of 
its FHSAs (FHSA N) to investigate alternative methods for 
calculating FHSA, practice firm budgets and IPAs which could 
be implemented regionally. After a period of investigation 
the method finally adopted by the region forecast spending 
based on, specific practice expenditure data for designated 
time periods rather than the DoH overall two year annual drug 
spend. The method examined average cost per PU for the 
individual practices for a full range of quarters (last four 
quarters of 1989/90) to determine whether a pattern existed.
It observed there was a clearly defined seasonal quarterly 
change and an underlying curvilinear trend. Examination of 
the annual cost per PU for each of the two years showed 
practice costs remained fairly consistent with ranking 
amongst other practices remaining unchanged. This
observation supported the adoption of some form of 
forecasting procedure. Thus, if a practice spent on average 
£3.50 per PU last year and this year, it was likely it would 
spend £3.50 in the next year plus inflation (^ ; Financial 
Pulse Feb. 1992). The FHSA used a monetary figure rather 
than percentages in the equation because they found year on
Interview with FHSA N
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year it reduced the variation between practices as the 
percentage becomes less and less.
This regional/FHSA defined formula embodied individual 
practice costs in association with the FHSA as a whole. It 
combined a bottom-up strategy which attempted to reduce the 
level of variation between the practices whilst remaining 
responsive to individual needs yet at the same time, 
retaining a uniform overall rate. The success of FHSA N*s 
method was graphically illustrated by its overall end of year 
spending figures which recorded a 1% underspend in the first 
year of fundholding (Chapter 8; M  compared with an 8%-13% 
for the rest of the country for the same time period (Doctor, 
Sept. 1992).
By the time the FHSA received information about a centrally 
defined method for national implementation they had already 
won the support of their Local Medical Committee. They were 
thus able to successfully convince their RHA that their 
method, rather than any other, was more applicable for their 
practice population. Consequently FHSA N, in the first year 
of fundholding, implemented its own firm budget/IPA formula 
rather than the DoH dictated one.
GP fundholders :
Under the scheme, RHAs are given separate guidance about 
calculating amounts for GP fundholders. FHSAs are
responsible for recommending to the RHA the size of the drug 
element of the practice fund. In doing so they have to 
calculate a drug expenditure for each potential fundholder in 
exactly the same way as for non-fundholders. The practice 
firm budget behaves like a RHA and FHSA firm budget in that 
it is cash-limited and takes account of the national average 
discount available to pharmacists and an estimate of the cost 
of containers. Nevertheless, in the first two years of
4 Interview with FHSA medical adviser
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fundholding, the methodology used to set fundholders budgets 
was precisely the same as for non-fundholding and was based 
on historic prescribing patterns.
Practice level indicative prescribing amounts
IPAs differ in two important respects from firm budgets at 
authority level. Firstly, like practice firm budgets these 
amounts are the result of a 'bottom-up' process which takes 
full account of the needs and circumstances of each practice. 
Unlike practice firm budgets and authority firm budgets, 
amounts set for non-fundholding practices represent only the 
basic price of drugs prescribed by and dispensed for each 
practice ie. there are no discounts or container cost 
allowances. It is clearly impossible to determine precisely 
what each practice is expected to spend in the coming year. 
Therefore IPAs represent the best possible estimate of what 
each practice can reasonably be expected to incur in the 
forthcoming year. When determining practice firm budgets and 
IPAs FHSAs must be aware and take account of basic 
information about practice prescribing costs. This
information, which should if possible be quantified, includes 
a profile of each practices* list size including:
a forecast changes in the patient list size and age/sex 
profile;
b forecast changes in the number of patients requiring
particularly expensive medicines;
c forecasts of changes in services provided by the
practice which may have implications for increased drug 
costs eg. screening for hypertension;
d any special interests of the practice eg. treatment of
drug addicts;
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e whether the practice has in its area a nursing home or
other institution where there is a need for particular
kinds of drugs or high volumes of drugs;
f what local hospital out-patient prescribing policy may
be;
g 'neighbourhood' factors about the general area in which
the practice is located including the nature of local 
employment and local economic factors;
h information about the number of temporary residents as
they are thought to significantly impact on the 
prescribing of particular practices.
The interpretation of all the data available about individual 
practices and their prescribing patterns requires 
consideration by the FHSA professional adviser (ie. medical 
adviser) . It is their role to form an opinion as to whether
the practice's current level of expenditure can be clinically
justified. In some cases, the medical adviser may be able to 
decide this on the basis of all the information available. 
However, for the majority of practices it may be necessary to 
hold detailed discussions with doctors to ascertain the 
reasons for their prescribing trends which might be unknown 
to the medical adviser.
However, at least one FHSA in the study reported that not all 
practices had initially been willing to disclose patient-cost 
information. FHSA H found some GPs failed to inform them 
accordingly of expensive patients and treatments which 
subsequently resulted in a 'shortfall' in allowances and a 
lower than expected budget for some practices. The medical 
adviser explained some GPs failed to reveal this information 
because, they resented being asked to disclose information 
which they felt was intrusive and somehow intended to 
undermine their clinical freedom. In the second year of
100
fundholding however, the FHSA felt that practices had 'learnt 
their lesson' and readily submitted all the relevant data.
Despite the problems experienced by FHSA H there was an 
overall agreement that GPs had responded willingly to 
requests for patient information. FHSAs also agreed that 
they in turn examined the comments closely in order to 
determine the extent to which their amounts should be
modified. On the whole, they felt they had calculated 
practice firm budgets/IPAs realistically and few warranted 
change. FHSA N for example found that only five practices 
justified amendment.
Estimates of forthcoming drug expenditure are not only based 
on profiles of the population but also historical patterns of 
prescribing behaviour. It is important therefore for FHSAs
to build up practice data on overall expenditure, expenditure 
by at least therapeutic group level, prescribing by 
particularly expensive drugs and the levels of generic 
prescribing. I noted in discussions with FHSA H that they 
had chosen to apply practice spending figures for 1990/91 in 
their calculations of practice amounts rather than the DoH's 
suggested 1989/90 figures. They explained this was because 
they believed two year historical spending data gave rise to 
crude predictions of future spend.
Once practice historic spending patterns have been outlined 
they are then raised to current cash levels by applying a 
national figure, ie. uplift factor, for in-year price
changes. This figure is supplied annually by the DoH. In the 
first year of fundholding the uplift was calculated at 13.5% 
and when changes in volume were added the final uplift was 
18.5%. This sum can be adjusted up or down to that level 
depending on whether the medical adviser thinks it is
clinically justified. This adjustment in uplift has been 
illustrated by an National Association of Health Authorities 
Trust (NAHAT) survey which found that, although 32% of GPs in 
the study were allocated an uplift of more than 13.5% more
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surprisingly, 9% of practices had to cope with an uplift of 
less than this figure (Berwick 1992). Explanations for such 
differences range from price and volume changes to 
deprivation and a sympathetic FHSA.
FHSA B for example, awarded a 16.5% uplift for their first 
year of fundholding. This was intended to cover a 14% change 
in product mix ) and price rises plus, a 2.5% volume change 
in prescribing as a result of the new screening contracts. 
Similarly, an FHSA in Merseyside awarded 16.5% uplift 
explaining that : 'We tried to give a meaningful I PA to our
GPs. Last year we gave a 16.5% uplift to practices and a 
third of them have met that target. We can justify this 
because of the deprivation in the Wirral, although it may be 
appropriate to stick to the DoH uplift in affluent areas' 
(Medeconomics 1992). In comparison, FHSA H calculated their 
uplift as 14%, only slightly higher than the national 
average. This was expected to cover an estimated 7% annual 
increase in inflation and other costs.
In contrast to the DoH's uniform uplift figure, FHSA N again 
chose to apply its own 'type' of uplift. This was based on 
its calculations of cost per PU for the region as a whole. 
Cost per PU translated into percentage terms allowed for 
practice variation and meant a 12.1% addition to the basic 
amount in the first year of fundholding. Unlike the national 
uplift figure which essentially covered two years (ie. based 
on 1989/90 figures meant it covered 1989/90 and 1990/91) this 
figure covered only one year. Though this may seem generous 
in comparison to the national average, the FHSA felt the 
figure was realistic and was justified by the end of year 
spending figures.
 ^Product mix is simply the extent to which doctors are 
prescribing one product rather than another as the favoured 
treatment for a particular condition. Such switching is generally 
the change from the older, cheaper products to the newer and more 
expensive ones.
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There has been considerable criticism of the ’unrealistically 
and inadequately low’ level of uplift calculated by the DoH 
C  ; Medeconomics 1992; Financial Pulse Feb. 1992). However, 
from the examples given such criticism should perhaps be 
challenged in view of the fact that, not one of the FHSAs 
allocated the 18.5% maximum allowed nor did they offer an 
explanation why.
A separate formula for GP fundholders
In 1992 the DoH decided that it must move toward formula 
funding for both the hospital and the drug element in 
fundholders’ budgets. Historic cost budget setting defeated 
much of the point of the reforms in setting a limit to 
budgets unaffected by the practices referring and prescribing 
peculiarities. The Department therefore asked the Leeds 
University Prescribing Research Unit to work on a drug 
formula which could be applied to both fundholders and non­
fundholders alike, but with the prime factor being the need 
to set budgets for the increasing number of GP fundholders 
(Chapter 9).
Containment by regulation
It is generally assumed that, because relatively few cases of 
excessive and/or unreasonable prescribing against GPs have 
been referred to the Local Medical Committee and have been 
proven (Chapter 2), GPs prescribe sensibly. This however 
does not mean GPs prescribing should not continue to be 
monitored. Quite the reverse, regular in-year monitoring of 
GP prescribing trends is clearly vital to the success of the 
scheme. A year or two before the reforms health authorities 
automatically began to receive monthly reports on expenditure 
in their areas. This provided the basic information needed 
to monitor the scheme. RHAs receive statements for each of 
the FHSAs and FHSAs received statements for each of their
Interview with FHSA
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practices. At all levels the objective was and is to detect 
early on any movement away from anticipated expenditure and 
take steps to discover the causes.
Prior to the 1991 reforms the government had announced (DoH 
Nov. 1987) its intention to make FHSAs more responsible for 
monitoring individual practices' and doctors' prescribing 
through the use of PACT data. Subsequently, the 1991 reform 
package included in the financial allocations to FHSAs funds 
to employ a full-time medical adviser and pharmaceutical 
adviser. The medical adviser is initially responsible for 
advising FHSAs on how to compile prescribing profiles and how 
to calculate practice firm budgets/IPAs and for each practice 
as well as, monitoring the practices' performance against 
these with the aid of monthly PACT expenditure reports and 
statements.
At grassroots level the medical adviser with input from the 
pharmaceutical adviser, is expected to discuss with practices 
their current levels of generic prescribing; the range and 
nature of. products prescribed within particular therapeutic 
groups; whether they are prescribing drugs in accordance with 
currently accepted medical knowledge and, whether they are 
operating effective repeat prescribing systems. In addition 
to his/her advisory role the medical adviser acts as a 
liaison officer between the FHSA and practice notifying the 
FHSA of any unexpected changes in circumstances of the 
practice in-year.
Quarterly PACT data, provided in three levels of detail and 
sent to FHSAs, outlines individual practice and FHSA 
expenditure compared with national average for each of the 
five therapeutic categories. This and other information 
received by the FHSA is intended to alert the medical adviser 
to the fact that a particular practice has expenditure which 
warrants closer monitoring. In such instances, the medical 
adviser usually obtains a PACT Level 3 report for the 
practice and arranges a discussion with the GPs. The aim of
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such discussions is to arrive at a shared understanding of 
the prescribing expenditure of the practice.
FHSA H for example, said that its 'team' inspects each 
quarter each practice's Level 3 data and pulls out any major 
and/or noticeable changes in prescribing behaviour. This 
includes any over/underspend of more than 5%. They explained 
Level 3 information allows them to closely scrutinise
practice prescribing patterns and costs and identify problem 
areas more easily. Once a 'problem' area is identified the 
practice is targeted for a visit by the pharmaceutical
adviser who reviews the Level 3 data with the practice, 
together they discuss the 'problem' and the solutions. This 
method was certainly the most commonly adopted procedure for 
monitoring amongst the FHSAs interviewed.
FHSAs are expected to exercise other professional and 
managerial options when examining prescribing. For example, 
where it perceives generally poor standards of prescribing or 
persistent prescribing for symptomatic short-lived 
conditions, an FHSA may prefer to deal with the matter by 
education, audit and actions of the FHSA medical adviser
rather than by reference to the Committee which is seen as a 
last resort. However, in the event the medical adviser feels 
there is a case to refer to the Professional Committee,
he/she must first satisfy himself/ herself that :
a discussions between himself and the GP have not resolved
the matter to the medical adviser's satisfaction;
b the GP's prescribing is excessive as defined by the new
regulation C  ) and;
 ^Excessive prescribing is defined in Regulation 15 of the 
National Health Service (Service Committees and Tribunal) 
Regulations 1992 as :
'Where.... the cost of any drug or appliance.... ordered by a 
doctor on a prescription form in relation to any patient is, by 
reason of the character of the drug or appliance in question or the
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c there is documentary evidence, which if necessary can be
obtained from the PPA who retain all prescription forms 
for a period of 21 months.
If all these conditions are met the FHSA is then responsible 
for making the case at the hearing.
Referral to the Professional Committee
A case of suspected excessive prescribing is referred to a 
Professional Committee under Regulation 15 of the Services 
Committee and Tribunal Regulations (1992), announced in 1990 
under Section 10, Improving Prescribing, for further 
investigation (NHS Management Executive 1992). Previously, 
such cases were referred to the Local Medical Committee only 
by the Secretary of State. The regulation applies both to 
fundholding and non fundholding GPs and each case is heard by 
a three-member Professional Committee. Such committees are 
however not 'standing' and so one must be appointed by the 
FHSA. The Committee comprises :
a a practising GP chosen by the FHSA, though there is no
requirement for the GP to be local;
b a practising GP nominated by the Local Medical 
Committee;
c a doctor nominated by the NHS Management Executive.
This doctor must be drawn from a panel who has 
substantial experience of clinical pharmacology and who 
has been agreed by the General Medical Subcommittee.
Once a case has been referred to the Committee the onus of 
responsibility for providing all the necessary documentation 
to the Committee including defensive comments from the GP,
quantity in which it was ordered, in excess of that which was 
reasonably necessary for the proper treatment of that patient....'
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arranging the date, time and place of the hearing and acting 
as liaison officer between the Committee and the practitioner 
falls on the FHSA.
The Professional Committee in turn is responsible for 
deciding whether or not there has been excessive prescribing. 
If it decides the case has been proven it may then decide to 
withhold remuneration from the doctor concerned. The
Committee must notify both the FHSA and GP of its decision 
and its reasons for its judgement. The GP then has the right 
to appeal to the Director of the Family Health Services 
Appeal Unit. However, in the event such an appeal is 
unsuccessful the amount to be withheld from the doctor, 
determined by the Professional Committee, must be recovered 
by the FHSA.
Sanctions such as these are however, seen as a process of 
last resort and are not expected to be commonplace. In fact, 
those FHSAs participating in the study said they were very 
unlikely to impose sanctions. They further argued that in 
any case it was unlikely such a situation could arise because 
they conduct regular and thorough monitoring of practices' 
prescribing patterns. Any ’corrective' action to prevent 
excessive prescribing would have been taken at an early 
stage.
In addition to FHSA monitoring of practice expenditure, 
practices are also expected to conduct their own in-house 
monitoring throughout the year. To this end, they are 
provided with monthly statements of expenditure and quarterly 
PACT data. The format is similar to FHSA data. PACT data 
presents GPs with information at three levels, depending upon 
the needs of the practice, and is designed to enable GPs to 
review their prescribing habits and costs, develop and 
monitor prescribing policies within the practice, compare 
themselves with colleagues in the same FHSA and nationally 
and, to improve cost effectiveness of practice prescribing.
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Containment by financial incentive
In an attempt to encourage GPs to adopt effective and 
economic prescribing mechanisms the reform package includes 
certain incentives. As previously noted, GP fundholders are 
allowed to keep whatever savings they make to re-invest in
other areas of the practice. However, under the I PA scheme 
the incentives are not quite so straightforward nor are they 
designed for individual practice benefit. The emphasis of 
the I PA incentive scheme is for the development of primary 
health care projects in the FHSA area rather than those 
relating to individual practices. The scheme provides for 
certain incentives where GPs manage to achieve a specific 
target saving in prescribing costs throughout the FHSA area. 
This assumes an element of altruism amongst non-fundholding 
practices.
Any Local Medical Committee may approach its FHSA with a
specific target saving in prescribing costs throughout its 
area. It must first however be satisfied that such a saving 
is achievable without detriment to patient care. In April of 
each financial year a specific target saving is agreed with 
the FHSA. If, and only if that target is achieved half that 
sum will be made available to the FHSA in the following year 
to be used on primary health care projects. The payment, for 
a period of one year only, is spent on projects which have 
locally been agreed upon. There is however no link between 
savings which a particular practice may make nor, any 
benefits its patients and doctors could gain from such 
schemes. The FHSA is responsible for notifying RHAs, who in
turn notify the DoH by the beginning of May each year, of the
proposed targets that have been agreed. This allows a 
decision to be taken nationally on which FHSAs will 
participate in the scheme.
Though local authorities have in the first instance been 
encouraged to participate, subsequent feedback suggests
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practices have been hesitant to join the scheme. Some have 
suggested they feel an overall lack of support from the 
General Medical Subcommittee prescribing subcommittees. In 
addition, the DoH's intransigence on the rules as illustrated 
by the following comment have contributed to the scheme's 
current lack of success :
'You get no accrued savings until you reach your target 
and if you exceed the amount you don't get any extra. 
The only modification the DoH has made for next year is 
that only 60 per cent of practices in the area have to 
opt into the scheme - this year it was all of them' 
(Medeconomics 1992).
It must be noted however, incentives are not always 
financial. FHSA H's medical adviser for example, said that 
the incentive for many GPs was simply a desire not be 
different from the others and show up as an 'over' 
prescribing practice.
Summary
Previous attempts to contain GP prescribing costs have so far 
achieved only moderate success. Consequently, there was a 
clear need for government to reassess the mechanisms it 
employed to monitor GP prescribing and to influence their 
choice of drug therapy based on cost-effectiveness. In the 
NHS Review of the late 1980s two new models were proposed to 
achieve these aims. The first proposed making District 
Health Authorities responsible for purchasing all the health 
care services on behalf of GPs and making hospitals compete 
internally for contracts. The second model wanted to make 
GPs sovereign purchasers of its services. In the end both 
models were implemented in conjunction with one another and 
only after some modifications.
Under the new system the principle is, that if GPs are 
offered more freedom in the use of a larger budget they may 
be more willing to accept a cash limit on the whole 
allocation of funds, including prescribing costs. The
109
ability to use this combined practice budget will act as an 
incentive for the practice to make savings in one element for 
re-investment in other areas. The extra 'incentive* is the 
threat of immediate 'pay-back' (sanction) for failing to 
spend within a cash limited budget. For those GPs who do not 
'hold' their own funds, little will change. They will remain 
uncash limited although they will be notified of a desired 
target amount for spending within. Nonetheless, they will 
still not have to bear the ultimate responsibility of their 
actions in terms of referring to hospital or for that matter, 
of continuing to prescribe as they have in the past.
Any overspend will be met not by them but their FHSA who will 
bear the cost of their actions out of the FHSA's firm budget. 
A practice overspend under this system triggers a contact 
visit from the FHSA medical adviser who discusses the 
situation. Although practices/GPs are threatened with 
referral to the Professional Committee, this appears to be 
something of a hollow threat. Most FHSAs only consider this 
as a last resort. The incentive scheme for non-fundholding 
practices is based on the assumption that GPs will want to 
make savings for the greater good of the community. This 
assumption of altruism however appears wide of the mark.
In essence, the redistribution of funds away from central 
provision to grassroots level has led to a restructuring of 
the main element of NHS primary health care services. It 
has, through the use of incentives and cash limited budgets, 
provided a greater onus on some GPs to think more about their 
prescribing choices and to examine alternatives in order to 
prescribe more cost-effectively. In an effort to determine 
whether the 1991 NHS reforms have achieved their aims this 
study will examine the prescribing trends of eight firstwave 
GP fundholding practices. These practices are compared with 
non-fundholders, as measured by FHSA averages, for at least 
one year prior to the implementation of the reforms and two 
years post. In addition, interviews with both general
practices and FHSAs are intended to reveal what policies, if
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any, have been drawn up and implemented with regards to the 
management of the drugs budget.
Ill
CHAPTERS
Adapting to a cash limit for drugs
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Introduction
The previous chapter described the latest in a series of 
methods employed by the government in its attempt to contain 
expenditure on GP generated prescriptions drugs. The current 
reforms endeavour to demonstrate that, faced with a cash 
limit for drugs GPs are having to make choices and agree
priorities about the use of financial resources they have at 
their disposal. The aim of this chapter is to describe the
approaches taken by eight GP fundholding practices to adapt
to these latest reforms and meet the expectations of 
government. The chapter begins by outlining some of the 
factors which practices consider directly affect their 
prescribing costs. This summary is proceeded by a series of 
descriptions of the individual practices, the problems they 
face in containing drug expenditure and, the policies they 
have employed to counteract these problems.
Prescribing problems and policies
Table 5.1 outlines the factors eight GP fundholding practices 
believed were responsible for influencing their prescribing 
trends and sometimes their behaviour in the surgery. The
reasons most frequently given for certain prescribing 
behaviours were : an increase in the elderly population, a
high patient turnover and a shift in hospital prescribing to 
general practice. Other factors relate primarily to the 
social and economic deprivation of a population and the new 
contractual requirements of the reforms. The presence of 
expensive patients, partnership changes and 'underfunding' by 
the FHSA have also been identified as contributing factors to 
a practice's ultimate drug expenditure.
In an ideal world a practice's patient population, based on 
age/sex and demand dictates that it is within the GP's power 
to affect his/her prescribing. Any suggestion to the 
contrary is considered a reflection of a GP's lack of 
responsibility. However, in reality populations are not
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'ideal* nor standard but exhibit many idiosyncrasies. It is 
these idiosyncratic factors which influence doctors' 
prescribing. There is no 'law of averages' in prescribing, 
GPs are constantly facing numerous intractable problems which 
dictate their prescribing. Some practices are faced with 
problems of a more overlapping nature and complexity than 
others (Table 5.1). Consequently, it is more difficult for 
GPs to easily and readily control their prescribing.
Factors affecting prescribing choices 
Fundholding Practices
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Rise in elderly pop X X X X X X
Shift in hospital 
prescribing
X X X X X X X
High patient turn-over X X X
Inner city status X X
Greater health demands X X
Unemployment/redundancy X X
Influx refugees X X
Cultural expectations X X
Expensive patients X X X
Health promotion X
Contractual requirements X X
Partnership changes X
FHSA 'underfunding' X
Table 5.1
Source : study data
Practice 1
This is the only practice in the study located in and thus 
defined as an inner city practice. It does not however
exhibit the typical problems associated with inner cities. 
It is located in an affluent part of central southwest London 
and has a very cosmopolitan population who are predominantly
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British social classes I & II. Its population is different 
in other aspects to other practices in the study; the 
majority of these patients are aged 18-30 years and many live 
in flats or hostels. Subsequently, this is a very transient 
population and this is reflected in practice statistics which 
display a high annual patient turnover. Indeed, practice and 
FHSA records demonstrate this practice has the highest 
patient annual turnover rate within the FHSA and, the FHSA 
has the highest value for registration transactions of any 
other FHSA in the country for both internal and external 
transfers. Moreover, it displays the highest list inflation 
in the country.
Historically, the practice perceives itself as relatively low 
spending compared with its FHSA and the national average. 
This is despite its policy to prescribe newer, more expensive 
drugs. Since fundholding the practice has expressed a growing 
awareness that it is being asked to prescribe treatments 
which have traditionally been the responsibility of hospital 
consultants such as those illustrated in Table 5.2.
Expensive patients : Practice 1 (1991/2)
Drug therapy treatments N= Approx average cost/ 
patient per month £
Cyclosporin A 1 750.00 +
Growth hormone injections 1 875.00
Zoladex 3 125.40 +
Losec 10 36.36 +
Acyclovir tablets 6 28.89
Fertility treatments N/A N/A
Table 5.2
Sources : Practice 2 & British National Formulary
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Practice policies :
The practice explained that its awareness of potentially 
spiralling drug costs had led it to institute a policy 
encouraging greater use of generic preparations. In addition 
it had introduced a set of diagnostic protocols for certain 
illnesses such as asthma, diabetes and hypertension. Its 
discussions with hospital consultants about outpatient 
prescribing had so far not been successful in modifying their 
attitudes. In any case, the practice suggested that at this 
stage this was not a priority. However, it envisaged this is 
something which will become more important in the future.
By the end of the first year of fundholding the practice 
claimed it had successfully managed to stay within its drugs 
budget (Chapter 8) . However, the partnership agreed this 
outcome should be looked at in the context of a budget 
calculated on 'inflated pre-fundholding expenditure'. In an 
attempt to ensure they received 'a decent budget' and not be 
penalised for their already good prescribing record, the 
practice admitted that in the year prior to fundholding they 
had undertaken to 'push up' their prescribing costs by 'not 
stinting themselves' when it came to prescribing. This 
decision was taken in the light of their participation, a few 
years previously, in an pilot experiment for the Family 
Practitioner Committee (FPC) to review prescribing practice.
As a result of the experiment the practice explained that it 
successfully reduced its prescribing costs and had continued 
to remain a low spending practice since. When fundholding 
was proposed however, the practice admitted to embarking on a 
course of action to 'artificially inflate' its prescribing 
costs. Once the practice's needs had been assessed pre- 
fundholding and budgets set, the practice said it reverted 
back to its 'old' prescribing habits.
The response to the second year's fundholding was swifter as 
expenditure in the first three months was greater compared
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with other years. The partnership was unable to offer any 
reasons for this. Since then, the practice has been keen to 
keep a check on the progress of spending and welcomes regular 
visits from the FHSA pharmaceutical adviser who identifies 
areas of high spend and advises them on alternatives.
Two other practices in the study (practices 4&7 see below) 
share many characteristics associated with a typical inner 
city practice. Both however, are situated on the outskirts 
of Greater London. These two practices, similar in many 
respects to each other, are located in areas populated by a 
predominantly working and lower middle class transient 
population (practice 7 average 20% per) of mixed ethnicity. 
Both are also currently witnessing a rapid increase in the 
numbers of political and economic refugees from countries 
such as Turkey, Zaire and Kurdistan and many of whom have 
greater health needs than the existing resident population.
Practice 2
This small town/semi-rural practice in West Hertfordshire 
felt that since fundholding it had not witnessed any changes 
in prescribing practices. This was despite its awareness of 
a shift in hospital consultant prescribing (eg. Zoladex at a 
cost of £125.40 per month) and, underfunding as a result of 
the FHSA's incorrect assessment of their drug expenditure 
(Chapter 4). Although the practice has a sizeable elderly 
population (ie. 12% out of a list size of 12,239) it does not 
feel they contribute unusually to their prescribing costs 
(Chapter 8) . In the first year of fundholding the practice 
estimated that it overspent on drugs by £34, 453 (ie. 7%, 
Chapter 8) whilst making savings in other areas to the sum of 
£2,100. There was little change in terms of prescribing 
practices in the second year and the practice anticipated 
another end of year overspend (Chapter 8).
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Practice policies :
The practice’s perceptions of the continuous underfunding by 
the FHSA led it to look at ways to keep within, as near as 
possible, the boundaries of their allocated drugs' budget. 
One method for containing drug spend was the use of a 
hospital formulary although, they expressed a keenness to 
compile their own. Time constraints however proved the 
largest hurdle to compiling their own formulary. The FHSA 
had offered the services of its medical/pharmaceutical 
adviser to help with the task but, the practice declined 
expressing concerns about loss of clinical freedom to choose 
a formulary based on their own expertise and choices. 
Efforts have however, been made to restrict the range of 
drugs prescribed by the practice by introducing a limited 
list for antibiotics. This list drawn up using PACT level 3 
data to identify the number of brand named drugs in use 
versus generic equivalents is regularly updated.
To counteract what the practice sees as a move by hospitals 
to shift their prescribing costs over to general practice 
and, other problems associated with contracts the practice 
joined forces with other fundholders in their area. They 
perceived the benefits of the scheme were that, by pooling 
together their clinical experience and expertise they would 
avail themselves with greater negotiating powers. This 
philosophy has so far achieved some degree of success. The 
'firm' managed to negotiate contracts for fertility 
treatments with the local hospital whereby, practices pay for 
treatments inclusive of four cycles. This works out cheaper 
for the practice because it also includes any other 
treatments necessary within (unexpectedly perhaps) these four 
cycles.
Not all problems related to a shift in hospital prescribing 
can however be solved by the 'firm'. The practice found that 
it is having to seek advice from the FHSA medical adviser 
about hospital practice to prescribe expensive treatments
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such as Zoladex. Other problems encountered by the practice 
are however discussed only by the doctors at their regular 
monthly practice meetings or quarterly fundholding meetings.
Practice 3
Practice 3 has a list size of just over 9,100 of which 40% 
are dispensing patients and the remaining 60% are prescribing 
only patients (^ ). The practice is a little unusual compared 
with the other practices in that, its catchment area spans 
two counties resulting in 60% of its patients living in
Bedfordshire and the remainder inhabiting parts of
Buckinghamshire. It has a higher than average number of 
elderly within its practice population (65-74 years 8%; 75+
9%) but this is balanced out against the lower than average 
numbers of children under 5 year (0-5 years 6%).
The practice is about five miles from a new town and growing 
industrial area. Within its immediate area there are a 
variety of light industrial companies but on the whole, local 
employment is fairly low with most people working out of
town. There is however, one very unusual aspect to the
practice’s responsibility. Within the catchment area there 
is an English stately home which is home to a number of 
unusual animals and, whose employees fall under the care of 
these GPs. This has in the past given rise to rather strange 
complaints such as bits from exotic animals !
 ^Prescribing only patients : patients who receive a
prescription from the doctor and may only cash this at the 
pharmacy.
Dispensing only patients : patients who live more than one mile
away from the nearest pharmacy and can therefore get their 
prescriptions cashed by the GP/practice pharmacy.
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Expensive Patients - Practice 3 (1991/92)
Patient type N= Approx average cost/ 
patient per month (£)
Renal transplant 2 750.00 +
Cancer (unspecified) 7 1 on Estrocyte 8 daily 
£136.00
6 on Zoladex £125.40
Hypertensives N/A N/A
Table 5.3
Sources : Practice 3 & British National Formulary
Like one or two other practices this practice has an active 
disease management policy. This has inevitably identified 
patients who require expensive and long-term drug therapy
(Table 5.3). In addition, the practice has noted a shift in 
hospital prescribing over the last year which they believe 
has increased their drug spend. Historically, practice 
prescribing costs have been higher than the FHSA average. 
This, the practice believes results from their disease 
management policy of the last ten years which screens 
patients particularly for hypertension.
Practice policies :
In line with the partnership’s policy for overall good 
disease management it has investigated ways to regulate drug 
expenditure. Part of these investigations led to the 
introduction, six years ago, of its practice formulary with
the intention of reducing the range of drugs used. During 
the last two years, the practice has sought to tighten it up
through a process of partnership ’away days’ from the
surgery. Each partner in rotation, was asked to present 
his/her findings on a drug audit, using PACT data, for a 
given diagnostic category. After a short presentation a 
joint agreement was reached about the drug’s inclusion into 
the formulary based on its cost, efficiency, patient
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acceptability and so on. The formulary is now on the 
computer system and avails each GP quick and easy access to 
it. It is regularly updated at approximately six monthly 
intervals.
Despite the practice's strenuous efforts to control its drug 
expenditure it still encounters problems beyond its control, 
these include hospital consultant prescribing. Although the 
practice accepts that little can be done about its problem of 
expensive patients, it was trying to draw up contracts with 
hospital consultants. During the terms of this study this 
approach however met with little success. The practice holds 
regular weekly meetings to discuss future projects and any 
problems which have arisen during the week. At one such 
meeting the issue of moving over to more generic prescribing 
was discussed. However, this option was rejected because 
they did not want the safety or legal responsibility as a 
dispensing clinic for generic drugs which currently have no 
British generic standard.
Practice 4
Practice 4 is situated in an essentially very deprived area 
in north London where the population is predominantly 
Orthodox Jewish. Its list size of approximately 13,000 
revealed a higher than average elderly population (11.4% are 
65+ years) which is on the increase. The practice is 
responsible for providing a service for an increasing number 
of homeless and those from refuge houses within its catchment 
area. In addition, it has seen an increase in the number of 
mental handicap patients it is now being asked to care for 
under the 'Care in the Community' scheme. The practice also 
anticipated an increase in future drug spend as a result of 
its agreement to pilot two schemes.
The first scheme offers early morning surgeries to patients 
and the second offers Sunday morning surgeries in place of 
the current Saturday morning surgery. Its decision to
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participate in both schemes is a response to the needs of the 
Orthodox Jewish community whose demands are very high at 
weekends apart from hours of the Sabbath on a Saturday. In 
addition, the practice anticipated it would have to treat
(1992/93) approximately one-quarter of its practice list size 
for Hepatitis A, a disease prevalent amongst the population 
in the area. Traditionally, the practice felt it had been 
'conservative' in its drug expenditure despite the recent 
increase. After reviewing its drug spend information it had 
identified hospital generated prescribing as the culprit and 
cited the case of Evening Primrose Oil for mastalgia.
Practice policies :
This practice felt its traditional 'conservative approach' to 
prescribing had so far proved adequate. It could therefore 
see no need to introduce policies to change their prescribing 
practices. There was however, a general understanding that 
the partners would follow a procedure for generic prescribing 
where possible. As a means of ensuring economical
prescribing GPs were assisted by a computerised list of the 
most commonly prescribed drugs used in the practice by 
diagnostic category. This system GPs with a list of the 
commonest and cheapest drugs prescribed by the practice.
However, it was suggest the system had a hidden agenda and
that was, GPs would not want to differ from their colleagues
in terms of prescribing. They would therefore refer to the 
computer before making a choice of drug therapy. For reasons 
of cost and effectiveness (?), the practice had agreed not to 
prescribe certain hospital generated prescriptions which can 
in some instances, be bought over the counter Evening 
Primrose Oil was a prime example.
Practice 5
This is a small town/semi rural practice in South East 
Hertfordshire. It runs its own preventive care unit,
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pharmacy, dental surgery and conducts its own minor surgery 
and day case operations on site. In addition it has an 
agreed and established disease management policy. 
Subsequently, it expected its prescribing costs to reflect 
this by suggesting that it was becoming less efficient and 
less well managed when in fact, the opposite was true. The 
practice also expressed concerns that because of a shift in 
hospital prescribing, an increase in the numbers of elderly, 
a high patient turnover, the existence of expensive patients 
and increased identification of potentially expensive 
patients as a consequence of the new contractual screening 
requirements it was difficult to contain growth in drug 
spend.
The sudden influx of young married couples with small 
children and a sharp rise in the numbers of elderly resident 
had resulted from a considerable amount of new housing being 
built in the area together with an increase in the stock of 
sheltered accommodation. Cheaper 'starter homes' are
plentiful but housing density is quite high. Subsequently, 
any requirement for increased accommodation by virtue of an 
increase in family size or improvement prosperity 
necessitates a move. Consequently, there is a high patient 
turnover but also an upward trend in population growth and of 
those registering with the practice. The number of new 
patients registering each quarter is around the 250 mark with 
no sign of an apparent slow down in this trend.
In line with its of active disease management policy the 
practice offers a wide range of clinics and screening 
programmes (Appendix A) . The aim is to identify and detect 
early on patients requiring potentially long-term and 
expensive treatments. Screening of the elderly takes place 
every Tuesday morning in an informal atmosphere lasting about 
three hours. The practice arranges for patients, and in some 
instances pet dogs ( ! ) , to be collected by minibus and 
brought to the surgery for the Elderly Circle where tea and 
coffee is laid on. This provides an ideal opportunity for
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regular contact with friends and with doctors and makes it 
easier for the clinical staff to detect any changes in 
patient health and welfare. Non-attendance at the Circle is 
quickly followed up to check the patient is alright.
As well as screening existing patients the practice has a 
policy to screen all new patients registering so their
medical requirements can be identified sooner rather than 
later. When asked whether this procedure was a way of 
excluding potentially expensive patients the practice
strongly denied this (ie. adverse selection (Scheffler 1989); 
cream skimming (Glennerster, Matsaganis & Owen 1992)), though 
they are 'naturally concerned' about future high cost
patients. In 1991/92 the practice registered that it had at
least six expensive patients (Table 5.4).
A breakdown of these costs reveals, the average monthly costs 
for each transplant patient is £750 thus, aggregated monthly 
costs for all transplant patients is £3,750. The average 
monthly cost for growth hormone injections is £875 bringing 
the total monthly expenditure for these six patients to 
£4,625 and the total quarter to £13,875. Though these six 
patients constitute only 0.0034% of the total patient 
population of 18, 000 they account for 1.93% of the total 
annual drug spend. Furthermore, in the case of the 
transplant patients the figures quoted refer only to those 
drugs associated with the prevention of rejection (ie. 
cyclosporin and azothiaprine). These calculations make no 
allowances for the wide range of other drugs taken by three 
of the patients to combat a range of disorders associated 
with primary cardiac pathology. The addition of all these 
drugs would completely cancel any practice overspend.
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Expensive Patients - Practice 5 (1991/2)
Patient type N= Approx average cost/ 
patient per month £
Cardiac transplant patient 3 750.00 +
Liver transplant patient 1 750.00 +
Renal transplant patient 1 750.00 +
Growth hormone replacement 
therapy
1 875.00
Table 5.4
Sources : Practice 5 & British National Formulary
In addition to concerns about the above patient costs, the 
practice has also expressed concerns about the costs incurred 
as a result of hospital consultant prescribing. They cite a 
number of examples within their locality of situations where 
consultant expenditure is high ). Three typical examples 
are :
a a local gastroenterologist who chooses Zantac
(ranitidine) for all his patients with dyspeptic 
symptoms rather than the 40% cheaper Tagamet 
(cimetidine) ;
b a local physician who uses Zestril (lisinpril) for
hypertension rather than the cheaper available ACE 
inhibitors;
c a local physician who uses Volmax (a slow release
formulation for Salbutamol) rather than Salbutamol 
itself which is a fraction of the cost.
 ^This may in some cases, be the result of special arrangements 
with pharmaceutical companies resulting in cheap contract 
agreements for a particular drug which, though cheaper for the 
hospital may be considerably more expensive when prescribed on an 
FPIO by the GP.
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The practice explained that when a patient has either been 
referred to a consultant or is an emergency hospital 
admission it is very difficult for GPs to modify or change 
the medication on which the patient is discharged.
Practice policies :
The practice's heightened awareness of the mounting costs of 
its prescribing led it to and scrutinize its own drug 
expenditure between 1988 to 1991. This exercise revealed, 
their strenuous efforts to reduce expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals was moderately successful. This had been 
achieved through, their use of a formulary to reduce the 
range of drugs used within the practice, an increase in the 
use of generic preparations, a reduction in the quantities 
per prescription to no more than 28 days unless in 
exceptional circumstances and, the use of drug regimes for 
commonly occurring conditions. Regular monitoring of
expenditure through PACT data helped the practice to identify 
any areas of unnecessarily high prescribing (Table 5.1).
Nevertheless, even though the practice has made every effort 
to prescribe conservatively it estimated that by January 1993 
their overspend was in the region of 20% (Chapter 8) . 
Regular weekly practice meetings are held to discuss matters 
arising from the week and future projects. All meetings are 
minuted so that all GPs are kept up-to-date on progress. 
Drug representatives are allowed in at the end of these 
meetings for only 15 minutes, after which short discussions 
follow between the partners and a practice decision is taken 
about trials of the product.
Practice 6
This is a small thriving market town in rural East Anglia not 
far from the coastline. It has a higher than average elderly 
population (20%) but this is balanced out somewhat by the 
lower than average numbers of children below the age of 5
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years (5%). The practice population displayed no other 
features of note.
Practice policies :
The practice expected its data to show that traditionally it 
had prescribed more, though generally less expensive items 
than its FHSA average. It explained that as a dispensing 
practice it was acutely aware of the costs of drugs and so 
tended to prescribe conservatively. In an effort maintain 
its low drug spend the practice introduced its own practice 
formulary (1990) with the intention of reducing the range of 
drugs used and to make those on the list the most efficient.
The formulary was compiled over a period of a year during 
regular partnership meetings. During these meetings each GP, 
in rotation, was asked to present an audit of commonly 
occurring illnesses and drug regimes implemented to treat 
them. A short period of discussion followed before a joint 
decision was taken about which drugs based on cost, 
effectiveness, patient acceptability, GP preference etc. were 
to be included in the formulary. The formulary is updated 
six monthly. Any minor changes during the intervening period 
tend to be made by the dispensing manager and the partner 
responsible for managing the drugs budget.
As well as the institution of the formulary, the practice 
also agreed on a move towards more generic prescribing where 
possible. It soon become apparent however, that a number of 
problems existed in the implementation of the policy. 
Firstly, patients are divided in two categories, prescribing 
only patients who receive generic products and, dispensing 
patients who are prescribed proprietary drugs. When a 
prescribing only patient is discharged from hospital in most 
cases they are given a prescription for a proprietary 
product. GPs thus find it difficult to modify hospital 
consultant discharge prescriptions and are left with the
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cost, not only for the immediate prescription but also for 
the long-term costs (?) of moving this patient over to the 
dispensing list. Despite this problem, during the study 
period the practice had not approached their local hospitals 
to discuss the problem.
Elderly patients as well as dispensing patients are also 
exceptions to the generic 'rule'. In the majority of cases 
prescriptions for the elderly are for proprietary products. 
This stems from the practice's discovery that there is less 
patient acceptability of generic drugs by elderly patients. 
The consequence of this is, extra cost for the practice for 
wasted untried drugs and new prescriptions for traditional 
drugs. The dispensing manager oversees all drugs dispensed
by the practice and is therefore able to monitor practice 
behaviour. Through close liaison with the partners she is 
able to keep them informed about trends and suggest cheaper
alternatives where she feels it may be appropriate.
Practice 7
Practice 7 is a large training partnership with a current 
population list size of approximately 14,823, 25% of whom are 
aged under five years (^ ) . It is situated in an area which 
has, in the last ten years, seen a rapid decline in local 
industry and a dramatic increase in redundancy and 
unemployment. As a consequence, the practice has noticed a 
steady but rapid increase in the numbers of patients
presenting with depression. The practice has described its 
population as : 'one of being very demanding, tending only to 
register with the practice when there is a problem then 
demanding more than the average number of out of hours and 
home visits, presenting as emergency cases, unwilling to 
follow the appointment system and so on'. One partner
explained that this 'demanding nature' placed enormous time 
constraints on the doctors and as a result, it was 'easier to
 ^This was noted in a study conducted by the practice (about two 
years ago) of registered patients.
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prescribe just to get the patients out of the door'. This
perceived high rate of prescribing heightened the partners'
awareness of the potential costs of their actions and the 
need to keep costs down. This had led therefore to a
tendency amongst the doctors to prescribe cheaper items
(Chapter 8).
The practice described its historical prescribing as higher 
than FHSA average in terms of number of items prescribed 
although, these tended to be cheaper. The practice explained 
that a visit of the Regional Medical Officer about ten years 
ago revealed, there was a line of practices along the Old 
Cambridge Road, of which this practice belonged, which all 
had higher than average prescribing. Thus the practice 
appeared to be fairly typical of the area. By way of 
explanation, the practice felt its prescribing was reflective 
of the deprivation in the area and, the cultural expectations 
expressed by the increasing ethnically mixed population.
It was anticipated that the end of year prescribing figures 
in the first year of fundholding might highlight some minor 
differences in comparison to previous years. This was likely 
to result from a recent partnership change. The senior 
partner explained that in October 1991 one of the partners 
left the practice and took with him his list size of just 
over 2,000 patients. However, expenditure was not expected 
to be very different because those doctor's patients had only 
been with the practice for 3-4 years and were mainly relative 
newcomers. Thus, when he left he took with him these 
patients leaving behind the existing expensive patients.
Practice policies :
The practice's awareness of the potential for drug costs to 
spiral led it to agree a policy of prescribing more generic 
products where possible. In addition, it was in the process 
putting together its own practice formulary and, was 
investigating ways to compile drug regimes for specific
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diseases such as hypertension and asthma. Controls on repeat 
prescribing were tightened up as the partnership became even 
keener to ensure patients receive only what they really need. 
They were also assessing the feasibility of pre-dating repeat 
prescriptions, for example six months, so that GPs could 
monitor the number of repeats more reliably and review 
patients regularly.
Practice 8
Practice 8 is a small town partnership in the South East 
commuter belt with a list size of approximately 13,000 which, 
the practice describes as not 'dissimilar to the national 
picture'. Within its population however, it has detected the 
existence of an exceptional multiple pathology, especially 
amongst the elderly who make up 15.4% of the list size. It 
relates this to the area's 'geographical quirk' which 
demonstrates an uncharacteristically cold and damp climate. 
Perhaps as a consequence of this it has witnessed an increase 
in prescriptions for anti-inflammatories. During the last 2- 
3 years the practice noticed an increase in redundancy and 
unemployment within the area. As a result of this it 
witnessed an increase in prescriptions for anti-depressants. 
The practice also prescribes for at least six expensive and 
long-term patients (Table 5.5).
The practice reported that in its first year of fundholding 
it overspent on its drugs budget by only 7% (Chapter 8) . As 
a result of this and previous years' drug spending the 
practice felt it managed its prescribing conservatively and 
consequently its expenditure was realistic.
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Expensive patients - Practice 8 (1991/92)
Patient type N= Approx average cost/ 
patient per month £
Kidney transplant 3 750.00 +
Heart transplant 1 750.00 +
Liver transplant 1 750.00 +
Growth hormone replacement 
therapy
1 875.00
Table 5.5
Sources : Practice 5 & British National Formulary 
Practice policies :
This 'conservatism* derived from the practice's awareness of 
drug costs arising from its role as a dispensing practice. 
Subsequently the practice had, for a long time, been 
conscious of the need to contain expenditure realistically 
and had sought to rationalize this by targeting certain areas 
of drug therapy. Firstly, the practice had looked at ways to 
reduce the range of drugs used by the practice secondly, they 
had promoted greater use of generic preparations. In the 
first instance, by using a process of audit to look at their 
use of antidepressants, the practice successfully reduced the 
number used from more than three types of 5HT expensive anti­
depressants to one (Prozac) . Audit procedures have also been 
used to look at the practice's use of generic equivalents. A 
quarterly audit of 4-6 generic drugs is conducted and this is 
followed by a discussion about the costs, effectiveness, 
patient acceptability and so on of the drugs compared. A 
decision is then taken about the drug's inclusion/rejection 
into the dispensary. Despite partnership concerns about 
quality of generic drugs (does the coating keep the drug 
bound together ?) there has been a gradual but determined 
effort to switch over more and more to generic prescribing.
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In addition, the practice had already introduced a number of 
generic drugs to the practice dispensary for example : 
Zyloric in place of Analaprinol, Lasex for Frusimide.
Prescribing only patients registered with the practice now 
receive generic preparations but dispensing patients still 
receive proprietary products. However, the shift in hospital 
prescribing to general practice has brought its own problems 
for the practice. Besides the obvious additional costs, the 
practice is also facing an increase in drug expenditure as a 
result of having to prescribe non-generic drugs for 
prescribing only patients discharged from hospital with a 
prescription for a non-generic drug. The patient has also to 
be moved onto the more expensive dispensing list. Though the 
practice has expressed grave concern over this problem they 
had not, during the term of the study, discussed their 
preferred prescribing regimes for its patients with the 
hospital consultants.
Summary
This chapter outlined the types of problems GPs face in 
containing prescribing costs. If each problem occurred 
separately and was tackled individually, GPs would probably 
be able to find a solution and contain drug spend more 
easily. However, these problems compound one another and 
make the task of developing and implementing a strategy to 
counteract their effects very difficult. Some of these 
problems have existed for at least a number of years and 
relate to social and demographic factors, factors which the 
practice can do very little about. However, other problems 
are of a more recent making and appear to relate directly to 
the NHS reforms.
One of the commonest problems cited has been the shift in 
hospital prescribing costs onto practices and, although this 
is a very small sample it nonetheless gives an indication 
that this may be a universal problem. The evidence presented
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by these practices certainly provides evidence to support 
claims that hospitals, who are themselves facing tighter 
budgetary constraints, are looking to solve some of their 
financial problems by shifting some of their costs to primary 
health care. Nearly all of the practices were able to cite 
examples of treatments they were now being asked to prescribe 
which had previously been prescribed by their local 
hospitals. In addition, there was evidence to support the 
argument that the new screening contracts were responsible 
for an increase in drug spend. GPs were carrying out these 
new requirements and were subsequently identifying patients 
in need of expensive and long term drug therapy.
Despite these problems, GPs appeared keen to 'take the bull 
by the horns' and seek ways to address these issues. The 
majority of practices opted to encourage greater use of 
generic prescribing (Chapter 8) in conjunction with a number 
of other strategies. Practices regularly reviewed their 
progress in terms of spend and also their cost-containment 
strategies. These reviews were conducted during practice 
meetings with the aid of the PACT information data and in 
some instances, input from the FHSA medical/pharmaceutical 
adviser. It was difficult to determine, because of the small 
sample size and absence of matched control group, whether 
these practices were representative of all fundholding 
practices and indeed, non-fundholding practices. However, 
the evidence suggests this sample is indicative of other 
fundholding practices and, that this intensity of action is 
not being matched by non-fundholding practices (Glennerster 
1994).
These eight practices have put forward descriptions of 
themselves and their prescribing practices. Chapter 8 
examines their prescribing data to see whether these 
descriptions and perceptions of what they do and how well 
they do it are realistic. First however, the investigation 
compares national prescribing trends in view of cost- 
containment mechanisms instituted between 1975 and 1992.
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Chapter 7 is proceeded by a chapter describing the 
prescribing trends of the three FHSAs who participated in the 
study.
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Chapter 6
Results Part I 
The National Picture
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Introduction
Despite government policies introduced during the 1980s and 
early 1990s (Chapters 2 & 4) GP generated prescription drugs 
remain one of the fastest growing elements of expenditure in 
the NHS (Health and Personal Social Service Statistics, DoH 
1993). In 1992 drug expenditure in England amounted to 
£2, 858 million, 9% of the total NHS budget for the year and 
has increased by 978% since 1975. The aim of this chapter 
therefore is to examine in turn:
(a) what changes have occurred between 1975 and 1992 in 
terms of the share of total NHS budget devoted to 
prescription drugs;
(b) whether growth in drugs expenditure is the result of 
increases in the relative price of drugs over and above 
the rate of inflation or;
(c) whether it is in response to increases in the volume of 
drugs prescribed.
In addition, the chapter will examine changes in the overall 
prescribing trends in relation to specific government 
initiatives and policies introduced during this period. It 
is however noted that, the latest reforms may not yet be 
showing any real impact because of the newness and subsequent 
limited study follow-up period. Nevertheless, this
discussion will attempt to determine whether these policies 
have had any effect on influencing GPs' prescribing practices 
as measured by changes in prescribing expenditure and 
patterns.
Industry regulation and its effect on drug expenditure
By 1992 drug expenditure had risen 978% from £265 million in 
1975 to £2,858 million (1992). Real term growth however was
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150% (^ ) in comparison. At the same time the number of items 
dispensed rose by just 40% from 282 million to 394 million. 
This was also at a time when the registered patient
population remained fairly static increasing by only 4% 
overall ) (Table 6.1). 1983 marked the turning point in
patterns of prescribing. Prior to 1983 expenditure growth had 
grown at an average annual rate of 19%, volume growth was 1% 
annually and the rate of generic prescribing only increased 
by one percentage point overall (Table 6.1). However, post 
1983 the annual rate of expenditure growth dropped to 11%. 
In contrast, there was an increase in the annual rate of
volume growth to 3% and a sharp rise in the annual rate of 
generic prescribing.
Between 1975 and 1992 NHS spending as a whole increased by 
580% and drug expenditure as a share of total NHS spend 
increased from 6% to 9%. This rise in drug spend has
however, not been at a constant rate. Between 1975 and 1983 
drug expenditure, as a proportion of total NHS spend 
demonstrated a large overall increase compared with the
period 1984-92. This is not surprising given that very few
measures aimed at curbing prescribing were introduced during 
the former period (Table 6.1). What measures that were 
introduced were directed mainly at controlling industry 
prices (profits) through the Voluntary Price Regulation 
Scheme (VPRS) and curbing patient demand (Chapter 2) . The 
VPRS was revised several times during this period (ie. 1975- 
92) .
The 1972 revision of the VPRS changed little from the 1969 
version giving government greater powers to influence product 
prices and company profits from sales to the NHS. 
Subsequently, the growth rate in NHS pharmaceutical spending 
and the proportion of health service money spent on 
pharmaceuticals appeared to fall such that, by 1976 it
 ^Calculated using the Retail Price Index 1987 = 100
 ^Based on figures for registered patient populations 
obtained from Prescription Pricing Authority PD2 forms.
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accounted for only 5% of the total NHS spend. In 1977 there 
was an increase in the proportion of NHS money devoted to 
prescription drugs (Table 6.1). This increase was something 
of a surprise given that, the government had re-established 
its statutory powers to fix product prices, which included 
medicines supplied to the NHS if necessary. In addition, 
companies were required to provide forecasts of sales for the 
year ahead as well as returns for the last accounting period.
Prices could therefore be set according to historic patterns 
of profitability. The effects of these new measures appeared 
only temporary and in any case, appeared to have little 
effect on reducing expenditure growth.
The VPRS was twice revised in the 1980s and produced some of 
the strictest controls to date. In 1983 the government 
introduced a price freeze on medicines sold to the NHS. Two 
years later it introduced selected price cuts on prices it 
was prepared to pay for drugs. These industry controls 
coincided with some of the most rigid recommendations and 
stricter controls on the profession (Chapter 2; Table 6.1). 
As a consequence of these strategies compounding one another 
it is difficult to disentangle their individual effects but, 
in combination they managed to stabilize the share of 
expenditure taken by drugs.
The effects of patient cost-sharing policies on demand
Prescription charges to patients had first been introduced in 
1952 (Chapter 2) however, between 1971 and 1978 the cost to 
patients of a prescription item remained unchanged at 20 
pence. In 1978 the government increased charges to 45 pence 
per item but at the same time extended the criteria for 
exemption categories. There was nonetheless, a drop in 
demand which was sustained until 1982 despite only one 
further increase in prescription charges in 197 9 (Table 6.1).
Since 1982 the government has instituted a policy of regular 
increases in prescription charges to consumers. Despite this 
there was a faster increase in the volume of drugs prescribed
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in the period 1984-92 compared with the earlier period 1975- 
83.
Thus, during this seventeen year period it is possible to see 
that a succession of government measures aimed at controlling 
producer prices and consumer demand had achieved only a 
moderate degree of success. On the one hand, there had been 
a reduction in the annual rate of increase in pharmaceutical 
spending together with a stabilizing of the proportion of NHS 
money devoted to pharmaceuticals. However, the volume of 
drugs prescribed had again begun to increase. During the 
most part of this period government attention was focused 
primarily on the industry and the patient consumer not the 
profession. It was only from the mid 1980s that the 
government began to redress this balance. The next part of 
the chapter will therefore examine the effects of government 
controls of the profession.
The effects of government regulation on professional 
practices
After a long period of apparent inactivity in terms of 
regulation of the profession the government commissioned in 
the early 1980s, an investigation into GPs' prescribing 
practices. The subsequent report (Greenfield 1984, Chapter 
2) was published about the time when there was a turning 
point in both prescribing trends and growth rates. The 
Greenfield Report recommended greater use of generic 
preparations, generic substitution, local formularies and a 
restricted list of prescribable items. In the year of the 
Report's publication expenditure on prescription drugs rose 
by only 8%, one of the smallest annual percentage increases 
in the seventeen year period. At the same time, the rate of 
generic prescribing rose for the first time in six years by 
one percentage point to 16%. However, it must be remembered 
this was also the year immediately after the government 
instituted a price freeze on medicines sold the NHS. It is 
therefore difficult to determine whether this price freeze
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or, the Report was responsible for this reduction in 
expenditure growth. In all probability.it was both but, the 
Report had more of an impact in terms of generic prescribing.
The introduction of the limited list in 1985 helped to 
further reduce expenditure growth to 6%, this was the lowest 
annual percentage increase recorded during the seventeen 
years. Moreover, there was a 1% fall in the number of items 
prescribe by GPs in that year. One of the most striking 
effects of the limited list has been the rapid increase in 
the rate of generic prescribing since that year. More 
dramatic has been the increase in the share of associated net 
ingredient costs (Table 6.1). In the late 1980s the 
government brought on line its latest prescribing information 
system in an attempt to persuade GPs to modify their
prescribing behaviour (Chapter 2). This system (Prescribing, 
Analysis, CosT (PACT)) provided GPs with regular and reliable 
information and feedback about the prescribing activities.
In 198 8 GPs received their first PACT data and for the next 
few years at least, GPs expenditure growth responded more 
closely to increases in volume.
The Reforms
In the year immediately prior to the introduction of the NHS 
Reforms drug expenditure rose more-or-less in line with 
inflation at 10%. Volume rose by 3% and the rate of generic 
prescribing increased in that year to 37%. In the first year 
of the reforms (1991) expenditure on pharmaceuticals rose at 
double the rate of inflation producing a real terms
expenditure growth of 11%. In short, the health reforms 
produced a faster rate of increase in drug spend not a
reduction the reforms had been hoping for. However, these 
figures must be interpreted with caution because, in 1991 the 
Prescription Cost Analysis System (PCA) was upgraded to
encompass all prescribing data rather than a sample 
selection. It also amalgamated both prescribing and
dispensing data for individual FHSAs and general practices.
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In the second year of the reforms (1992) the rate of 
expenditure growth dropped to 13% and was nearer the rate of 
inflation (ie. 9%). The number of items dispensed increased 
by a further one percentage point to 5% and there was also a 
rise in the rate of generic prescribing also increased. 
Thus, by 1992 36% of all prescriptions were for generic
products and in terms of expenditure, 29% of the total share 
of NICs were for generic preparations.
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Htunber and Net Ingredient Costs Of Prescriptions In England
Year 75
All services(Em) 47 63
Prescriptions(NICs Em) 265 
Real term expenditure[842]
NICs as percentage 
of all services 6
No. of items 282
(millions)
Person on NHS 
prescribing
lists(m) 4 5.6
Average NIC/
patient(£) 5.79
Percentage
Generic (%) 15
Associated
NICs (%) 5
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 R5 £7 M 89 90 91 12
6441 6186 6879 7749 9241 11897 13389 14657 15534 16659 17581 19008 21003 23232 25554 28560 32371
343 434 518 592 718 834 977 1096 1181 1250 1366 1537 1737 1882 2079 2520 2858
[915] [993] [1078] [1127] [1155] [1187] [1241] [1327] [1360] [1371] [1419] [1537] [1682] [1695] [1740] [1935] [2108]
5 7 8 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9
293 296 307 305 303 300 311 315 321 319 323 335 347 352 361 377 394
45.6 45.7 45.8 45.9 46.1 46.1 46.2 46.1 46.3 46.5 46.9 47 .1 47.7 48.0 47.5 47.4 47.4
7 .52 9.50 11.29 12. 90 15.57 18.09 21.15 23.75 25.51 26.86 29.13 32.61 36.42 39.21 43.77 53.16 60.30
{30} [26] {19} {15} {21} [16] {17} {12} {25.51} {5} {8} {12} {12} {8} {12} {21} {13}
14 15 15 16 16 16 16 16 17 25 31 33 34 36 37 35 36
5 5 5 5 6 6 5 5 5 7 10 12 13 15 17 27 29
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[ ] Real term expenditure
(1) VPRS revision
(2) Prescription charge £0.45
(3) Prescription charge £1.00
(4) Prescription charge £1.30
(5) VPRS revision
(6) Greenfield Report
(7) Price freeze
(5) (6/7/8) (9)
Table 6.1
Source : Health and Personal Social Service Statistics for England 1982-93 
Study data
Key :  { } annual percentage increase
(8) Prescription charge £1.40
(9) Prescription charge £1.60
(10)Price cuts
(11)Introduction of Limited List
(12)Prescription charge £2.00
(13)VPRS revision
(10/11/) (13/14) (15/16/ (18/19) (20) 
(12) (17)
(21) (22/23)
14) Prescription charge 2.20 (20)Prescription charge £3.05
(15)PACT on line (21)Prescription charge £3.4 0
(16)Prescription charge 2.40 (22)NHS Reforms
(17)GPs receive first PACT data (23)PPRS revision
(18)Prescription charge £2.60
(19)Prescription charge £2.80
Trends in therapeutic prescribing
As a result of difficulties in obtaining consistent and 
reliable data relating to prescribing trends of the different 
therapeutic categories for the full period 1975 to 1992, this 
discussion concentrates on data from 1982 and specifically 
from 1987 to 1992. In summary, of the broad 22 therapeutic 
groups, as defined by the 1991 edition of the British 
National Formulary (March 1991), only six groups account for 
the largest share in terms of value and volume of NICs. 
These are:
Cardiovascular 
Gastro-intestinal 
Respiratory 
Musculoskeletal 
* Central Nervous System 
Infections
★
★
Between 1982 and 1992 these leading six groups accounted for 
approximately two-thirds of the value and volume of total 
NICs nationally. Despite increases in expenditure and the 
number of items dispensed the overall share fell slightly, 
particularly in the last six years (Tables 6.2 & 6.3). All 
'other' drugs account for the remaining total share and have 
demonstrated a steady increase in share size at the expense 
of these other six groups.
Table 6.3 shows that the volume share of each group has 
remained fairly static in the decade 1982 to 1992. Table 6.2 
in comparison shows greater activity with all categories 
displaying some change in value share. It is thus suggested, 
increases in expenditure of the individual therapeutic groups 
has little to do with changes in disease patterns or GP 
prescribing behaviours in terms of volume. It is more than 
likely that the relative price of drugs has changed. For 
example, the volume share of gastro-intestinal drugs remained 
fairly static but nearly doubled in terms of value share.
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This suggests that increases in gastro-intestinal drugs are 
primarily the result of price increases. The static trend in 
volume shares of musculoskeletal drugs together with a rapid 
decrease in value share suggests a relatively rapid fall in 
the average NICs for musculoskeletal drugs. Cardiovascular 
drugs however, have demonstrated a slower decrease in 
relative prices since 1982. However since 1987 there has 
been a slightly more rapid reduction in the average NIC per 
item.
Drugs prescribed for central nervous system disorders appear 
to be one of the ’best buys’. Compared with other categories 
volume share was greater than value share suggesting this 
category could buy more drugs ’per pound’. However, there 
are also indications that whilst the value share has remained 
fairly static volume has slowly decreased since 1982 and 
subsequently the relative price of central nervous systems 
drugs has begun to increase. The same is more-or-less true 
for drugs prescribed for infectious diseases. Although it is 
the value share which has demonstrated a slow decline whilst 
the share volume of NICs has remained fairly stable. The 
relative price of respiratory drugs appears to have remained 
stable, increasing only slightly since 1982. All ’other’ 
drugs have shown a steady increase in the value share but a 
much slower increase in volume share. However, between 1982 
and 1990 the volume share was marginally larger than the 
share value suggesting that although the relative price was 
increasing, initially this category was getting reasonably 
good value for money. Since 1991 the share values have been 
the same and increases have also been the same suggesting 
prices have remained the stable.
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Total Share of Net Ingredient Costs (£ millions)
NIC all 
prescription :
82
977
87
1537
Year
88
1737
89
1882
90
2079
91
2520
92
2858
Cardiovascular 209 352 385 418 448 517 546
(21) (23) (22) (22) (22) (21) (19)
Gastro-intestinal 70 174 203 232 272 332 390
(8) (11) (12) (12) (13) (13) (14)
Respiratory 98 158 196 215 242 294 342
(10) (10) (11) (11) (12) (12) (12)
Musculoskeletal 119 195 205 207 209 225 231
(12) (13) (12) (11) (10) (9) (8)
Central Nervous 140 166 178 186 206 247 308
System (14) (11) (10) (10) (10) (10) (11)
Infections 94 139 153 156 167 191 203
(10) (9) (9) (8) (8) (8) (7)
Others 239 353 418 469 536 713 838
(24) (23) (24) (25) (26) (28) (29)
Source : DoH 
Reference :
Table 6.2
Health and Personal Social Services 
Statistics for England 1993 Edition
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Total Share of Number of Items (millions)
82 87
Year
88 89 90 91 92
No. all 
prescriptions : 11 335 347 352 361 407 425
Cardiovascular 48 58 59 61 63 70 73 .
(15) (17) (17) (17) (18) (17) (17)
Gastro-intestinal 20 25 26 27 28 32 34
(6) (7) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8)
Respiratory 33 35 37 36 37 41 43
(11) (10) (11) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Musculoskeletal 18 21 22 22 22 25 26
(6) (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) (6)
Central Nervous 67 68 68 68 69 75 77
System (21) (20) (20) (19) (19) (18) (18)
Infections 37 41 43 43 43 48 48
(11) (12) (12) (12) (12) (12) (11)
Others 88 88 92 95 98 116 124
(28) (26) (27) (27) (27) (28) (29)
Source : DoH 
Reference :
Table 6.3
Health and Personal Social Services 
Statistics for England 1993 Edition
Summary
This chapter looked at the changes in national prescribing 
trends which have occurred since 1975. It appeared that the 
government's regulation of prices and profits in the industry 
brought about the most change in expenditure growth up to 
1983. Since 1983 the government has embarked on a policy of 
regular review of drug expenditure and looked at ways which 
would influence the behaviour not only of the industry but 
also, the profession and the consumer. The effect has been 
to stabilize drug expenditure at a time when the general rate
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of inflation was increasing. Although these policies have 
not stopped GPs' overall prescribing it has changed the 
nature of their prescribing. They are now prescribing a 
greater proportion of generic preparations at the expense of 
proprietary brands and a shift in GP habits has been 
achieved.
Control of consumer demand has proved more difficult despite 
a policy of regular increases in prescription charges. This 
however, is the result of a disproportionate increase in the 
number of exempt prescriptions compared with those where a 
charge is levied. Thus, by 1992 three-quarters of all 
prescriptions were exempt from a charge. This study is 
particularly concerned with the effects of the 1991 NHS 
reforms on drug expenditure. The next chapter therefore 
focuses on the effects of the Reforms on micro-level 
prescribing with particular reference to three Family Health 
Services Authorities.
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CHAPTER?
Results Part II 
Family Health Services Authority Level
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Introduction
This chapter examines the prescribing trends of three Family 
Health Service Authorities (FHSAs) to determine the effects 
of the reforms at this level. Each of the three FHSAs has at 
least one fundholding general practice participating in the 
study. The chapter endeavours to learn whether these FHSAs 
have managed to contain their drug spend with a cash-limited 
budget and, whether there are any clear indications of 
changes in prescribing trends which might explain the 
results. The limitations of the study are noted in terms of 
the study’s time span. Therefore, a long-term picture of the 
impact of the reforms is not possible. The study should 
nevertheless provide some indication of whether the 
government is on the right track.
Expenditure under the Indicative Prescribing Amount Scheme 
(IPA) and the General Practice Fundholding Scheme (GPF) are 
examined and discussed in terms of their contribution to the 
FHSA’s total end of year spend. Each FHSA is compared with 
the national average (^ ) in an attempt to determine how 
typical each and their prescribing patterns are.
Prescribing within a limited budget
Only one FHSA (FHSA 3) managed to spend within its firm 
budget but only in the first year of the reforms. Although 
its second year’s overspend was only fractional. The other 
two exceeded their budgets and also increased their annual 
percentage overspend. FHSA 1 was allocated a budget of £25.1 
million in 1991/92. Its end of year spend exceeded this by 
7% (£26.8 million). In the second year the FHSA was
allocated an additional 12% taking its budget up to £28 
million. However, its spending increased by 3% resulting in
^All figures represented by the ’National average’ are based on 
the actual figures for England adjusted to reflect an average FHSA 
with the same number of prescribing units as the FHSA.
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an FHSA total spend of 8% above budget. The disaggregated 
data shows that in the first year of the reforms both IPA and 
GPF Schemes exceeded their budget by 7%. In the second year 
the IPA Scheme increased its annual percentage overspend to 
8%, the GPF Scheme however, recorded the same percentage 
overspent as the previous year. Thus, the total FHSA 
overspends were due to both general practitioner schemes 
exceeding their amounts.
FHSA 2 also demonstrated an overspend in both the first and 
second years of the reforms. The first year overspend of 10% 
resulted in the FHSA being awarded an additional 15% in its
second year budget. However, the FHSA again exceeded its
budget although it again recorded a 10% overspend. The 
disaggregated data shows however, the total overspend was due 
essentially to the IPA Scheme exceeding its target budget. 
In the first year of the reforms the IPA exceeded its target 
budget by 10% and, in the second year it increased this 
percentage overspend recording an end of year spend 13% 
above its target. In comparison, the GPF Scheme spent 
fractionally more than its budget (ie. 0.3%) in the first 
year. In the second year however, the Scheme successfully 
spent within its budget though only fractionally (ie. 0.6%).
FHSA 3 is the only FHSA in the study to have kept its
spending within its budget. This however only occurred in 
the first year of the reforms. This was also the only year 
the FHSA's own calculated budget was accepted by the DoH. In 
the second year of the reforms the FHSA's annual spend was 
within a 1% margin of the allocated total budget. In 1991/92 
the FHSA spent £43.9 million, this was 1% below its set
budget of £44.5 million. In the following year the FHSA had 
to accept the RHA's calculated budget recommended by the DoH. 
In that year as expenditure rose the FHSA overspent on its 
budget by 1%.
The disaggregated data shows the total overspend in the 
second year of the reforms was again due to the IPA Scheme
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exceeding its target budget. In 1991 both the IPA and GPF 
Schemes underspent on their budgets. However, this was not 
copied in the second year by the IPA Scheme which recorded an 
overspend of 1%. In comparison, the GPF Scheme underspent on 
its cash-limited budget and also achieved an increase in 
percentage underspend in the second year (2% in 1991, 4% in
1992).
In an attempt to find out why these FHSAs spent as they have, 
the following will be a description of their prescribing 
patterns in relation to the national average. These three 
FHSAs cover a whole range of general practices from inner 
city to rural. They differ in terms of geography, population 
size and mix and, types of practice ie. prescribing only and, 
dispensing and prescribing practices ) . All three
demonstrated overall prescribing patterns different to the 
national average. FHSAs 1 & 2 for example, prescribed below 
the national average with the exception of FHSA 2 who 
prescribed above the national average in terms of generic 
prescribing. FHSA 3 on the other hand, demonstrated 
prescribing trends above the national average in all but 
generic prescribing.
FHSA 1 Location : Home Counties
FHSA 1 is part of the Northwest Thames Regional Health 
Authority. Its practices range from inner city to semi-rural 
and, from prescribing only to prescribing and dispensing 
practices. It comprises areas of extreme deprivation with 
high unemployment, higher than average numbers of elderly, 
elderly alone, single-parent families in temporary 
accommodation and, homelessness. At the other end of the
 ^Prescribing only practice : practices which only prescribe
drugs but do not dispense drugs.
Prescribing & dispensing practice : practices which are allowed to 
dispense their own drugs, these are usually in rural areas.
Where the FHSA has both prescribing and dispensing patients the 
figures for both will be amalgamated (including list size).
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spectrum there are areas of relative wealth. It has the 
second largest registered patient population of all three 
FHSAs and despite its obvious tendency for a high turnover of 
patient, between 1990 and 1992 it remained relatively static 
(Table 7.1). Within this population the elderly account for 
over 12% of the total. However, like the other two FHSAs 
this group does not appear to account for the majority of 
drug spend.
FHSA 1 is fairly typical of the national average in terms of 
expenditure but less so in terms of total volume of net 
ingredients costs (NICs) prescribed. Between 1990 and 1992 
the FHSA only spent 2% less but prescribed 7% fewer items 
than the national average. In terms of overall percentage 
growth, the FHSA was again fairly typical of the national 
average. In the second year of the reforms the annual rate 
of increase was less both in terms of value and volume of 
NICs. The FHSA however, displayed slightly less of a 
reduction in the rate of expenditure compared with the 
national average.
The data suggests the FHSA, like most of the FHSAs in the 
region, was showing a reduction in the annual rate of 
expenditure growth. However, although the FHSA was more 
conservative in its expenditure, it was slightly less able to 
curb growth than the majority of FHSAs in the region. The 
reliability of these trends are confirmed by the rate of 
increase displayed by the annual rate of increase in the 
average cost per patient (Table 7.1).
The FHSA displayed a lower annual rate of generic prescribing 
than the FHSA. However, it demonstrated a greater increase 
over a three year period (Table 7.1). In 1990 for example, 
37% of all prescriptions written within the FHSA were for 
generic preparations compared with a national average of 42%. 
By 1992 the FHSA had increased its rate of generic 
prescribing to 42%, a rise of five percentage points, 
compared with 44% for the national average. Consequently,
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one of the effects of the reforms has been to increase the 
FHSA's overall rate of generic prescribing within the FHSA as 
a whole and, at a faster rate than the national average.
Despite demonstrating an overall prescribing trend below the 
national average, FHSA 1 prescribed above the national 
average in three therapeutic groups. These were infections, 
respiratory (value only) and all 'others' (value only). The 
musculoskeletal category of drugs was unique because it was 
the only drug group to demonstrate a fall in average NIC per 
item. Although the FHSA displayed a similar reduction in the 
annual rate of expenditure growth, this level of restraint 
was insufficient for FHSA expenditure to remain within either 
its first or second year drug budgets. Nor was it enough to 
stop the FHSA from increasing its percentage end of year 
spend in the second year of the reforms.
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Nuihber and Net Ingredient Costs 
Family Health Service Authority 1
1990 1991 1992
Total Budget Allocation
(£ million) ** 25084919 27970064
Total Net Ingredient 23647813 26922611 30488677
Costs (NICs £) (24083046) (27658080) (31207282)
Indicative Prescribing 
Amount Scheme (£m) 
(Annual Amount) ** 23256758 25617020
(Cumul. Spend) ** 24801012 27762082
General Practitioner 
Fundholding Scheme (£m) 
(Annual Amount) ** 1828161 2353044
(Cumul. Spend) ** 1958739 2521827
Total Number of Items 3826386 4041622 4243512
(4108881) (4347318) (4553918)
Percentage of generic 37 40 42
prescribing (%) (42) (43) (44)
Total number of FHSA 572595 575129 576098
registered patients (577446) (571831) (568102)
Average NIC per 41.03 46. 81(14%) 52. 92(13%)
patient (£) (41.71) (48.38) (16%) (56.93) (14%)
Table 7. 1
Sources : Prescription Pricing Authority
Study data
( ) represents national average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
FHSA 2 Location : Central London
FHSA 2 is also part of the Northwest Thames Regional Health 
Authority. It is a prescribing only FHSA covering an area in 
central London subsequently, its general practices are inner 
city practices. Contrary to the traditional image of inner 
cities this FHSA boasts a number of extremely wealthy areas 
where the social status of the population can be defined as 
British social classes I&II. There are however, other areas
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within the FHSA which are defined as deprived inner city. 
This is an area with a higher than average patient turnover 
and a wide mix of ethnic minority groups. The FHSA has the 
smallest registered patient population of all three FHSAs as 
well as, a patient population below the national average. It 
is also the only FHSA in the study to display a fall in the 
size of the patient population but this is also typical of 
the national average. Within the FHSA population the elderly 
account for 13%.
Like FHSA 1, FHSA 2 also prescribed below the national 
average but with the exception of generic prescribing. 
Compared with the two other FHSAs, this FHSA is the least 
reflective of the national average. The FHSA prescribed 
significantly below the national average particularly in 
terms of volume of NICs and, between 1990 and 1992 it spent 
on average 31% less and, prescribed 40% fewer items. In 
terms of overall percentage growth, the FHSA again did not 
reflect the national average. Between 1990 and 1992 the FHSA 
spent on additional 35% (real term growth was 19%) compared 
with a national average of 22% (real term growth was 8%). At 
the same time, the number of items prescribed by the FHSA 
rose by 10%, double the national average rate of 5%.
In the second year of the reforms the annual rate of growth 
rose at more than double that of the previous year (ie. 23% 
and 10% respectively) . This was quite different to the 
national average pattern and level of growth whereby, growth 
in the first year of the reforms was 11% in comparison and 
fell to 10% in year two. In terms of volume, the FHSA 
displayed a constant rate of increase in both years since the 
reforms compared to a reduction in the rate of increase from 
3% to 2% for the national average. These trends indicate and 
are borne out by the annual rate of increase in the average 
cost per patient (Table 7.2) that, FHSA 2 was less able to 
restrain growth in expenditure than others in its region. 
Whereas, the national average trend displayed a reduction in
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growth the FHSA demonstrated a much faster rate of increase 
in drug spend.
The FHSA had a higher annual rate of generic prescribing than 
the national average and, displayed a similar marginal 
overall growth between 1990 and 1992 (Table 7.2). In 1990 
for example, nearly one-half of all FHSA prescriptions were 
for generic preparations (ie. 48%). This compared with a 
national average of 42%. By 1992 however, the FHSA rate of 
generic prescribing had only increased by one percentage 
point to 4 9% compared with a national average increase of two 
percentage points to 44%. It is perhaps surprising that, 
given the similar rates of increase in the rate of generic 
prescribing the FHSA displayed a higher overall rate of 
increase in expenditure.
All drug categories in the FHSA, with the exception of 
infections, displayed prescribing trends significantly below 
the national average. Musculoskeletal drugs was the only 
category with a cheaper relative price per item (ie. 10% 
less) than the national average. Fundamentally, the FHSA 
appeared to be very conservative in terms of overall value of 
NICs but more particularly, in terms of volume of items 
prescribed. Part of this conservatism reflected the FHSA's 
previous drive to reduce expenditure growth and modify 
prescribing behaviour (Chapter 5) . In addition however, it 
also reflected a reduction in the size of the patient 
population. Although the FHSA displayed a relatively high 
rate of generic prescribing this was not enough to ensure the 
FHSA spent within its first and second year drug budgets. 
Moreover, the FHSA demonstrated an increase in percentage 
overspend in the second year.
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Number and Net Ingredient Costs 
Family Health Service Authority 2
1990 1991 1992
Total Budget
Allocation (£m) ** 12846946 14741236
Total Net Ingredient 12058575 13258413 16295506
Costs (NICs £) (18819434) (20908804) (22991653)
Indicative Prescribing 
Amount Scheme (£m) 
(Annual Amount) ** 12599930 13638494
(Cumul. Spend) * ★ 13888997 15402907
General Practitioner 
Fundholding Scheme(£m) 
(Annual Amount) ** 247016 1102742
(Cumul. Spend) ** 247733 1095776
Total Number of Items 1891796 1981124 2071902
(3210385) (3312209) (3364176)
Percentage of generic 48 48 49
(*) (42) (43) (44)
Total number of FHSA 441179 431341 424190
registered patients (577446) (571831) (568102)
Average NIC per 27.33 30.74(12%} 38. 42(23%}
patient (£) 1 (32.59) (36.56) (12%) (40. 47) (14%)
Table 7.2
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority
( ) represents national average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
FHSA 3 Location : East Anglia
FHSA 3 is an FHSA in East Anglia. It is predominantly semi- 
rural/rural and as a result, the majority of its general 
practices are prescribing and dispensing. As well as being 
an agricultural area there are a number of small market towns 
and at least one large city. It is also an essentially 
coastal area which caters for a summer trade of holiday­
makers. Thus, the area is a mix of agriculture, light
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industry, tourism and commercial employment. FHSA 3 has the 
largest registered patient population in the study and was on 
average 48% above the national average. Between 1989 and 
1992 it rose by 3%. The FHSA patient population was on 
average 48% above the national average (Table 7.3).
In addition the FHSA also features the largest proportion of 
elderly of any FHSA in the study. Between 1989 and 1992 the 
elderly accounted for nearly one-fifth of all patients and, 
although this group increased by 3% their share remained the
same. It has been suggested the area's close proximity to
the coast is what attracts people in their retirement.
Nevertheless, the data indicates this sector of the
population did exert any more or a strain on FHSA expenditure 
than expected.
FHSA 3 is the only FHSA in the study which displayed an
overall prescribing trend above the national average, with
the exception of generic prescribing. It is nonetheless 
fairly typical of the average but only in terms of volume of 
NICs. Between 1989 and 1990 for example, the FHSA prescribed 
1% fewer items but spent 32% more than the national average 
on drugs (Table 7.3). In terms of overall percentage growth 
the FHSA demonstrated a slightly higher rates of increase in 
both value of volume of NICs prescribed than the FHSA
average.
The pattern of annual growth shows that in the year
immediately prior to and, the first year of fundholding, the 
FHSA appeared less able to curb expenditure growth than other 
FHSAs in the region. However, in the second year of the 
reforms the FHSA's annual rate of increase was marginally 
less than the national average. During this year period the 
rate of increase in volume remained relatively static 
although again, the FHSA demonstrated a slightly higher rate. 
In terms of overall cost-containment, as measured by average 
cost per patient (Table 7.3), the FHSA displayed a greater 
restraint in the first year of the reforms but this was only
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short-lived. Overall, the FHSA showed greater activity in 
the rate of increase than the national average.
In terms of generic prescribing, the FHSA demonstrated a 
lower rate of generic prescribing than the national average. 
Not only this, between 1989 and 1992 it displayed a lower 
overall rate of increase which resulted in an increase in the 
margin of difference between the two. For example, in 1989 
less than one-third of all FHSA prescriptions were for 
generic preparations compared with a national average rate of 
38%. By 1992, the FHSA rate of generic prescribing had 
increased by only five percentage points to 37%. In
comparison, the national average rate had increased to 45%, 
eight percentage point higher than the FHSA level. It is 
however noted, between 1989 and 1990 the FHSA demonstrated a 
higher rate of increase than the national average but this 
was not sustained. In fact, the FHSA exhibited a fall in the 
generic rate of prescribing in the following year.
Although the overall prescribing trends were below the
national average, in two therapeutic categories (infections 
and respiratory (volume only)) the FHSA demonstrated an above 
average trend. Similar to FHSAs 1 and 2 the average cost per 
musculoskeletal drug fell consecutively since 1989. This is 
the only category where this occurred. This FHSA is the only 
one in the study who demonstrated an ability to spend within 
a cash limited budget (Table 7.3). However, this only
occurred in the first year of the reforms when the FHSA had 
set its own budget. In the following year when it was forced 
to accept the DoH’s advised budget, the FHSA overspent on its 
firm budget. However, the level of overspend was only 
marginal (ie. less than 1%).
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Number and Net 
Family Health
Ingredient Costs 
Service Authority 3
1989 1990 1991 1992
Total Budget 
Allocation (£m) * * * * 44544490 49169779
Total Net Ingredient 33718499 38062207 43909682 49641351
Costs (£m) (31141372) (34907700) (39516235) (44931572)
Indicative Prescribing 
Amount Scheme (£m)
(Annual Amount) * + * * 40433584 44715871
(Cumul. Spend) ★ * * * 39882077 45357981
General Practitioner 
Fundholding Scheme(£m)
(Annual Amount) ** ** 4110906 4453908
(Cumul. Spend) ** * * 4027605 4283370
Total Number of Items 5838786 6106601 6428662 6818646
(5836145)(6071987) (6309756) (6609463)
Percentage of generic 32 38 37 37
prescribing (%) (38) (40) (43) (45)
Total number of FHSA 751918 753909 769231 772321
registered patients (515568) (513241) (516979) (519240)
Average NIC per 44.84 50.49(13%} 55. 41(10%} 63.75(15%}
patient (£) (60.40) (68.01) (13%) (76.44) {12%} (86.53) (15%)
Table 7.3
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority
( ) represents FHSA average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
Summary
This chapter looked at three different Family Health Service 
Authorities to see whether the NHS reforms of 1991 were 
successful in getting FHSAs to spend within a cash limited 
budget. The data suggests that, in terms of overall spend 
the reforms appear to have done little to curb growth in drug 
expenditure at FHSA level. Only one FHSA was able to contain
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its expenditure on drugs within a limited budget. The other 
two FHSAs not only exceeded their drug budgets annually but 
also increased the amount by which they overspent. 
Disaggregated data however indicates that overspend at this 
level was essentially the result of the IPA Schemes exceeding 
their target budgets. GPF Schemes did overspend on their 
limited budgets but their margins of difference were closer 
to the financial boundaries.
The principle that direct incentives and cash limited budgets 
are more effective in achieving cost-containment was
supported. Where these are absent it is indicated GPs' 
prescribing patterns remain very much as before. The next
chapter takes a more indepth look at the 'success' of the GPF
Scheme by examining the prescribing trends of eight GP
fundholding practices. It examines the strategies
implemented by these fundholders in an attempt to contain 
drug spend within a cash budget.
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CHAPTER 7
Results Part II 
Family Health Services Authority Level
148
Introduction
This chapter examines the prescribing trends of three Family 
Health Service Authorities (FHSAs) to determine the effects 
of the reforms at this level. Each of the three FHSAs has at 
least one fundholding general practice participating in the 
study. The chapter endeavours to learn whether these FHSAs 
have managed to contain their drug spend with a cash-limited 
budget and, whether there are any clear indications of 
changes in prescribing trends which might explain the 
results. The limitations of the study are noted in terms of 
the study's time span. Therefore, a long-term picture of the 
impact of the reforms is not possible. The study should 
nevertheless provide some indication of whether the 
government is on the right track.
Expenditure under the Indicative Prescribing Amount Scheme 
(IPA) and the General Practice Fundholding Scheme (GPF) are 
examined and discussed in terms of their contribution to the 
FHSA's total end of year spend. Each FHSA is compared with 
the national average C  ) in an attempt to determine how 
typical each and their prescribing patterns are.
Prescribing within a limited budget
Only one FHSA (FHSA 3) managed to spend within its firm 
budget but only in the first year of the reforms. Although 
its second year's overspend was only fractional. The other 
two exceeded their budgets and also increased their annual 
percentage overspend. FHSA 1 was allocated a budget of £25.1 
million in 1991/92. Its end of year spend exceeded this by 
7% (£26.8 million). In the second year the FHSA was
allocated an additional 12% taking its budget up to £28 
million. However, its spending increased by 3% resulting in
^All figures represented by the 'National average' are based on 
the actual figures for England adjusted to reflect an average FHSA 
with the same number of prescribing units as the FHSA.
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an FHSA total spend of 8% above budget. The disaggregated 
data shows that in the first year of the reforms both IPA and 
GPF Schemes exceeded their budget by 7%. In the second year 
the IPA Scheme increased its annual percentage overspend to 
8%, the GPF Scheme however, recorded the same percentage 
overspent as the previous year. Thus, the total FHSA 
overspends were due to both general practitioner schemes 
exceeding their amounts.
FHSA 2 also demonstrated an overspend in both the first and 
second years of the reforms. The first year overspend of 10% 
resulted in the FHSA being awarded an additional 15% in its 
second year budget. However, the FHSA again exceeded its 
budget although it again recorded a 10% overspend. The 
disaggregated data shows however, the total overspend was due 
essentially to the IPA Scheme exceeding its target budget. 
In the first year of the reforms the IPA exceeded its target 
budget by 10% and, in the second year it increased this 
percentage overspend recording an end of year spend 13% 
above its target. In comparison, the GPF Scheme spent 
fractionally more than its budget (ie. 0.3%) in the first 
year. In the second year however, the Scheme successfully 
spent within its budget though only fractionally (ie. 0.6%).
FHSA 3 is the only FHSA in the study to have kept its 
spending within its budget. This however only occurred in 
the first year of the reforms. This was also the only year 
the FHSA's own calculated budget was accepted by the DoH. In 
the second year of the reforms the FHSA's annual spend was 
within a 1% margin of the allocated total budget. In 1991/92 
the FHSA spent £43.9 million, this was 1% below its set 
budget of £44.5 million. In the following year the FHSA had 
to accept the RHA's calculated budget recommended by the DoH. 
In that year as expenditure rose the FHSA overspent on its 
budget by 1%.
The disaggregated data shows the total overspend in the 
second year of the reforms was again due to the IPA Scheme
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exceeding its target budget. In 1991 both the IPA and GPF 
Schemes underspent on their budgets. However, this was not 
copied in the second year by the IPA Scheme which recorded an 
overspend of 1%. In comparison, the GPF Scheme underspent on 
its cash-limited budget and also achieved an increase in 
percentage underspend in the second year (2% in 1991, 4% in
1992).
In an attempt to find out why these FHSAs spent as they have, 
the following will be a description of their prescribing 
patterns in relation to the national average. These three 
FHSAs cover a whole range of general practices from inner 
city to rural. They differ in terms of geography, population 
size and mix and, types of practice ie. prescribing only and, 
dispensing and prescribing practices ) . All three
demonstrated overall prescribing patterns different to the 
national average. FHSAs 1 & 2 for example, prescribed below 
the national average with the exception of FHSA 2 who 
prescribed above the national average in terms of generic 
prescribing. FHSA 3 on the other hand, demonstrated
prescribing trends above the national average in all but 
generic prescribing.
FHSA 1 Location : Home Counties
FHSA 1 is part of the Northwest Thames Regional Health 
Authority. Its practices range from inner city to semi-rural 
and, from prescribing only to prescribing and dispensing 
practices. It comprises areas of extreme deprivation with 
high unemployment, higher than average numbers of elderly, 
elderly alone, single-parent families in temporary 
accommodation and, homelessness. At the other end of the
 ^Prescribing only practice : practices which only prescribe
drugs but do not dispense drugs.
Prescribing & dispensing practice : practices which are allowed to 
dispense their own drugs, these are usually in rural areas.
Where the FHSA has both prescribing and dispensing patients the 
figures for both will be amalgamated (including list size).
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spectrum there are areas of relative wealth. It has the 
second largest registered patient population of all three 
FHSAs and despite its obvious tendency for a high turnover of 
patient, between 1990 and 1992 it remained relatively static 
(Table 7.1). Within this population the elderly account for 
over 12% of the total. However, like the other two FHSAs 
this group does not appear to account for the majority of 
drug spend.
FHSA 1 is fairly typical of the national average in terms of 
expenditure but less so in terms of total volume of net 
ingredients costs (NICs) prescribed. Between 1990 and 1992 
the FHSA only spent 2% less but prescribed 7% fewer items 
than the national average. In terms of overall percentage 
growth, the FHSA was again fairly typical of the national 
average. In the second year of the reforms the annual rate 
of increase was less both in terms of value and volume of 
NICs. The FHSA however, displayed slightly less of a 
reduction in the rate of expenditure compared with the 
national average.
The data suggests the FHSA, like most of the FHSAs in the 
region, was showing a reduction in the annual rate of 
expenditure growth. However, although the FHSA was more 
conservative in its expenditure, it was slightly less able to 
curb growth than the majority of FHSAs in the region. The 
reliability of these trends are confirmed by the rate of 
increase displayed by the annual rate of increase in the 
average cost per patient (Table 7.1).
The FHSA displayed a lower annual rate of generic prescribing 
than the FHSA. However, it demonstrated a greater increase 
over a three year period (Table 7.1). In 1990 for example, 
37% of all prescriptions written within the FHSA were for 
generic preparations compared with a national average of 42%. 
By 1992 the FHSA had increased its rate of generic 
prescribing to 42%, a rise of five percentage points, 
compared with 44% for the national average. Consequently,
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one of the effects of the reforms has been to increase the 
FHSA's overall rate of generic prescribing within the FHSA as 
a whole and, at a faster rate than the national average.
Despite demonstrating an overall prescribing trend below the 
national average, FHSA 1 prescribed above the national 
average in three therapeutic groups. These were infections, 
respiratory (value only) and all 'others' (value only). The 
musculoskeletal category of drugs was unique because it was 
the only drug group to demonstrate a fall in average NIC per 
item. Although the FHSA displayed a similar reduction in the 
annual rate of expenditure growth, this level of restraint 
was insufficient for FHSA expenditure to remain within either 
its first or second year drug budgets. Nor was it enough to 
stop the FHSA from increasing its percentage end of year 
spend in the second year of the reforms.
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Number and Net Ingredient Costs 
Family Health Service Authority 1
1990 1991 1992
Total Budget Allocation
(£ million) ** 25084919 27970064
Total Net Ingredient 23647813 26922611 30488677
Costs (NICs £) (24083046) (27658080) (31207282)
Indicative Prescribing 
Amount Scheme (£m) 
(Annual Amount) ** 23256758 25617020
(Cumul. Spend) ** 24801012 27762082
General Practitioner 
Fundholding Scheme (£m) 
(Annual Amount) * * 1828161 2353044
(Cumul. Spend) ** 1958739 2521827
Total Number of Items 3826386 4041622 4243512
(4108881) (4347318) (4553918)
Percentage of generic 37 40 42
prescribing (%) (42) (43) (44)
Total number of FHSA 572595 575129 576098
registered patients (577446) (571831) (568102)
Average NIC per 41.03 46. 81(14%) 52.92(13%}
patient (£) (41.71) (48.38) (16%) (56.93) (14%)
Table 7.1
Sources : Prescription Pricing Authority
Study data
( ) represents national average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
FHSA 2 Location : Central London
FHSA 2 is also part of the Northwest Thames Regional Health 
Authority. It is a prescribing only FHSA covering an area in 
central London subsequently, its general practices are inner 
city practices. Contrary to the traditional image of inner 
cities this FHSA boasts a number of extremely wealthy areas 
where the social status of the population can be defined as 
British social classes I&II. There are however, other areas
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within the FHSA which are defined as deprived inner city. 
This is an area with a higher than average patient turnover 
and a wide mix of ethnic minority groups. The FHSA has the 
smallest registered patient population of all three FHSAs as 
well as, a patient population below the national average. It 
is also the only FHSA in the study to display a fall in the 
size of the patient population but this is also typical of 
the national average. Within the FHSA population the elderly 
account for 13%.
Like FHSA 1, FHSA 2 also prescribed below the national 
average but with the exception of generic prescribing. 
Compared with the two other FHSAs, this FHSA is the least 
reflective of the national average. The FHSA prescribed 
significantly below the national average particularly in 
terms of volume of NICs and, between 1990 and 1992 it spent 
on average 31% less and, prescribed 40% fewer items. In 
terms of overall percentage growth, the FHSA again did not 
reflect the national average. Between 1990 and 1992 the FHSA 
spent on additional 35% (real term growth was 19%) compared 
with a national average of 22% (real term growth was 8%). At 
the same time, the number of items prescribed by the FHSA 
rose by 10%, double the national average rate of 5%.
In the second year of the reforms the annual rate of growth 
rose at more than double that of the previous year (ie. 23% 
and 10% respectively) . This was quite different to the 
national average pattern and level of growth whereby, growth 
in the first year of the reforms was 11% in comparison and 
fell to 10% in year two. In terms of volume, the FHSA 
displayed a constant rate of increase in both years since the 
reforms compared to a reduction in the rate of increase from 
3% to 2% for the national average. These trends indicate and 
are borne out by the annual rate of increase in the average 
cost per patient (Table 7.2) that, FHSA 2 was less able to 
restrain growth in expenditure than others in its region. 
Whereas, the national average trend displayed a reduction in
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growth the FHSA demonstrated a much faster rate of increase 
in drug spend.
The FHSA had a higher annual rate of generic prescribing than 
the national average and, displayed a similar marginal 
overall growth between 1990 and 1992 (Table 7.2). In 1990 
for example, nearly one-half of all FHSA prescriptions were 
for generic preparations (ie. 48%). This compared with a 
national average of 42%. By 1992 however, the FHSA rate of
generic prescribing had only increased by one percentage 
point to 4 9% compared with a national average increase of two 
percentage points to 44%. It is perhaps surprising that, 
given the similar rates of increase in the rate of generic 
prescribing the FHSA displayed a higher overall rate of 
increase in expenditure.
All drug categories in the FHSA, with the exception of 
infections, displayed prescribing trends significantly below 
the national average. Musculoskeletal drugs was the only 
category with a cheaper relative price per item (ie. 10% 
less) than the national average. Fundamentally, the FHSA 
appeared to be very conservative in terms of overall value of 
NICs but more particularly, in terms of volume of items 
prescribed. Part of this conservatism reflected the FHSA's 
previous drive to reduce expenditure growth and modify 
prescribing behaviour (Chapter 5) . In addition however, it 
also reflected a reduction in the size of the patient 
population. Although the FHSA displayed a relatively high 
rate of generic prescribing this was not enough to ensure the 
FHSA spent within its first and second year drug budgets. 
Moreover, the FHSA demonstrated an increase in percentage 
overspend in the second year.
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Number and Net Ingredient Costs 
Family Health Service Authority 2
1990 1991 1992
Total Budget
Allocation (£m) ** 12846946 14741236
Total Net Ingredient 12058575 13258413 16295506
Costs (NICs £) (18819434) (20908804) (22991653)
Indicative Prescribing 
Amount Scheme (£m) 
(Annual Amount) ** 12599930 13638494
(Cumul. Spend) ** 13888997 15402907
General Practitioner 
Fundholding Scheme(£m) 
(Annual Amount) ** 247016 1102742
(Cumul. Spend) ** 247733 1095776
Total Number of Items 1891796 1981124 2071902
(3210385) (3312209) (3364176)
Percentage of generic 48 48 49
(%) (42) (43) (44)
Total number of FHSA 441179 431341 424190
registered patients (577446) (571831) (568102)
Average NIC per 27.33 30. 74(12%} 38.42(23%}
patient (£) (32.59) (36. 56) {12%} (40.47) (14%}
Table 7.2
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority
( ) represents national average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
FHSA 3 Location : East Anglia
FHSA 3 is an FHSA in East Anglia. It is predominantly semi- 
rural/rural and as a result, the majority of its general 
practices are prescribing and dispensing. As well as being 
an agricultural area there are a number of small market towns 
and at least one large city. It is also an essentially 
coastal area which caters for a summer trade of holiday­
makers. Thus, the area is a mix of agriculture, light
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industry, tourism and commercial employment. FHSA 3 has the 
largest registered patient population in the study and was on 
average 48% above the national average. Between 1989 and 
1992 it rose by 3%. The FHSA patient population was on 
average 48% above the national average (Table 7.3).
In addition the FHSA also features the largest proportion of 
elderly of any FHSA in the study. Between 1989 and 1992 the 
elderly accounted for nearly one-fifth of all patients and, 
although this group increased by 3% their share remained the
same. It has been suggested the area’s close proximity to
the coast is what attracts people in their retirement.
Nevertheless, the data indicates this sector of the
population did exert any more or a strain on FHSA expenditure 
than expected.
FHSA 3 is the only FHSA in the study which displayed an
overall prescribing trend above the national average, with
the exception of generic prescribing. It is nonetheless 
fairly typical of the average but only in terms of volume of 
NICs. Between 1989 and 1990 for example, the FHSA prescribed 
1% fewer items but spent 32% more than the national average 
on drugs (Table 7.3). In terms of overall percentage growth 
the FHSA demonstrated a slightly higher rates of increase in 
both value of volume of NICs prescribed than the FHSA
average.
The pattern of annual growth shows that in the year
immediately prior to and, the first year of fundholding, the 
FHSA appeared less able to curb expenditure growth than other 
FHSAs in the region. However, in the second year of the 
reforms the FHSA's annual rate of increase was marginally 
less than the national average. During this year period the 
rate of increase in volume remained relatively static 
although again, the FHSA demonstrated a slightly higher rate. 
In terms of overall cost-containment, as measured by average 
cost per patient (Table 7.3), the FHSA displayed a greater 
restraint in the first year of the reforms but this was only
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short-lived. Overall, the FHSA showed greater activity in 
the rate of increase than the national average.
In terms of generic prescribing, the FHSA demonstrated a 
lower rate of generic prescribing than the national average. 
Not only this, between 1989 and 1992 it displayed a lower 
overall rate of increase which resulted in an increase in the 
margin of difference between the two. For example, in 1989 
less than one-third of all FHSA prescriptions were for 
generic preparations compared with a national average rate of 
38%. By 1992, the FHSA rate of generic prescribing had 
increased by only five percentage points to 37%. In
comparison, the national average rate had increased to 45%, 
eight percentage point higher than the FHSA level. It is 
however noted, between 1989 and 1990 the FHSA demonstrated a 
higher rate of increase than the national average but this 
was not sustained. In fact, the FHSA exhibited a fall in the 
generic rate of prescribing in the following year.
Although the overall prescribing trends were below the
national average, in two therapeutic categories (infections 
and respiratory (volume only)) the FHSA demonstrated an above 
average trend. Similar to FHSAs 1 and 2 the average cost per 
musculoskeletal drug fell consecutively since 1989. This is 
the only category where this occurred. This FHSA is the only 
one in the study who demonstrated an ability to spend within 
a cash limited budget (Table 7.3). However, this only
occurred in the first year of the reforms when the FHSA had 
set its own budget. In the following year when it was forced 
to accept the DoH's advised budget, the FHSA overspent on its 
firm budget. However, the level of overspend was only 
marginal (ie. less than 1%).
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Number and Net 
Family Health
Ingredient Costs 
Service Authority 3
[ 1989 1990 1991 1992
Total Budget 
Allocation (£m) ** ** 44544490 49169779
Total Net Ingredient 33718499 38062207 43909682 49641351
Costs (£m) (31141372)(34907700) (39516235) (44931572)
Indicative Prescribing 
Amount Scheme (£m)
(Annual Amount) ** •k ★ 40433584 44715871
(Cumul. Spend) ** ** 39882077 45357981
General Practitioner 
Fundholding Scheme(£m)
(Annual Amount) ** ** 4110906 4453908
(Cumul. Spend) ** * + 4027605 4283370
Total Number of Items 5838786 6106601 6428662 6818646
(5836145)(6071987) (6309756) (6609463)
Percentage of generic 32 38 37 37
prescribing (%) (38) (40) (43) (45)
Total number of FHSA 751918 753909 769231 772321
registered patients (515568) (513241) (516979) (519240)
Average NIC per 44.84 50.49(13%} 55.41(10%} 63.75(15%}
patient (£) (60.40) (68 . 01) (13%) (76. 44) {12%} (86. 53) (15%)
Table 7.3
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority
( ) represents FHSA average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
Summary
This chapter looked at three different Family Health Service 
Authorities to see whether the NHS reforms of 1991 were 
successful in getting FHSAs to spend within a cash limited 
budget. The data suggests that, in terms of overall spend 
the reforms appear to have done little to curb growth in drug 
expenditure at FHSA level. Only one FHSA was able to contain
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its expenditure on drugs within a limited budget. The other 
two FHSAs not only exceeded their drug budgets annually but 
also increased the amount by which they overspent. 
Disaggregated data however indicates that overspend at this 
level was essentially the result of the IPA Schemes exceeding 
their target budgets. GPF Schemes did overspend on their 
limited budgets but their margins of difference were closer 
to the financial boundaries.
The principle that direct incentives and cash limited budgets 
are more effective in achieving cost-containment was
supported. Where these are absent it is indicated GPs ' 
prescribing patterns remain very much as before. The next
chapter takes a more indepth look at the 'success* of the GPF
Scheme by examining the prescribing trends of eight GP
fundholding practices. It examines the strategies
implemented by these fundholders in an attempt to contain 
drug spend within a cash budget.
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Chapter 8
Results Part III 
General Practitioner Fundholding Practices
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Introduction
The findings of the last chapter provided evidence to support 
the principle that, cash-limited budgets and direct 
incentives can influence GPs' choice of drug therapy based on 
cost. This chapter looks behind the prescribing trends of 
eight GP fundholding practices to understand the process by 
which this level of prescribing was achieved. At the 
beginning of the study ten GP fundholding practices had 
agreed to take part. However, as the study progressed it 
became apparent that lack of data for three of the practices 
meant their total or part exclusion from the study. 
Consequently, two practices were completely excluded and the 
other practice only had data since the 1991 NHS reforms 
(Chapter 3) . Thus, a pre and post-reform comparison of this 
practice's spend was impossible. Nonetheless, it was still 
possible to include their account of what cost-containment 
policies they had implemented and whether these gave any 
indication they might prove successful.
This chapter begins by presenting a summary and discussion of 
the cost-containment policies implemented by the practices. 
This is followed by a review of the prescribing trends of 
these practices before and after fundholding. The
prescribing patterns of each practice is discussed separately 
in the light of the reforms and their cost-containment 
policies. An attempt is also made to determine how typical 
each is in relation to the FHSA average (^ ).
Policy Review
Table 8.1 summarizes the policies implemented by the eight GP 
fundholding practices in an attempt to contain drug spend, 
particularly in view of the 1991 NHS reforms. Most practices 
believed this could only be achieved by a combination of
 ^All figures represented by the FHSA average are based on the 
actual figures for the FHSA adjusted to reflect an average practice 
with the same number of prescribing units as the practice.
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strategies. There was a clear distinction between 'action' 
strategies which included those likely to directly influence 
prescribing choices such as : a practice formulary, policy of 
generic prescribing, a limited list etc. and, those which 
audited the progress of 'action' strategies.
Most practices had a vague and general policy of generic 
prescribing but, with the introduction of fundholding pursued 
generic prescribing much more rigorously and introduced a 
whole range of other strategies. Four practices used this in 
conjunction with the use of a practice formulary, diagnostic 
protocols and limited lists for specific drugs types. Two 
practices were already prescribing from a practice formulary 
and three others had discussed compiling their own but, time 
constraints had so far prohibited them from doing so. One of 
these practices had also looked at the possibility of drawing 
up a set of diagnostic protocols. Two other practices had 
compiled and were using a set of diagnostic protocols. Three 
practices had started to make use of a limited list of 
specific drug types but, only one practice had agreed to 
decrease the quantity of drugs prescribed per treatment.
As a prerequisite to fundholding all practices agreed they 
should conduct regular practice review meetings to feedback 
on drug management. However, only five practices did so, two 
of whom fed back using PACT information but only one enlisted 
the help of the FHSA's pharmaceutical adviser. One other 
practice regularly sought the advice from the FHSA's 
pharmaceutical adviser (Chapter 5). The question of a 
'shift' in hospital prescribing was raised in relation to the 
potential problems this presented for practice prescribing. 
Despite anxieties about this only two practices had, at this 
stage of the study, discussed the possibility of approaching 
hospital consultants with a view to drawing up specific 
contracts for discharge and outpatient prescribing 
responsibility (Table 8.1).
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SiJinmary table of practice policies 
adopted after becoming fundholders 
Fundholding Practices
Policies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Generic prescribing X X * X X X X X
Formulary X X X * X X X *
Diagnostic protocols X X X *
Limited list for 
specific drug types
X X X
Decrease quantities 
prescribed
X
Audit/regular practice 
meetings
X X X X X
Monitoring using PACT X
Negotiation with 
hospitals
X * X
Collaboration with FHSA X
Table 8.1
Sources : Practice data 
Note : (*) Have considered
The question therefore is to determine, as far as possible, 
to what extent these polices have managed to reduce drug 
spend and which, if any, have been particularly successful.
Prescribing within a cash-limited budget
The findings of Chapter 7 indicated that fundholding was 
largely more successful than non-fundholding in containing 
overall expenditure within a budget. This is not to say 
fundholding practices did not exceed their budgets they did, 
but their percentage overspend was less than that 
demonstrated by non-fundholding practices. Moreover,
fundholding practices also kept nearer to their budgets than 
non-fundholding practices. Only one practice in the study 
achieved a spend within its budget and only in the second 
year of the reforms. All other practices exceeded their
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first and second year drug budgets. The margins of overspend 
in the first year ranged from 3% to 16% and from 4% and 17% 
in the second year. In the two year post reform period four 
practices increased the amount by which they overspent, two 
other practices decreased their percentage overspend and one 
practice displayed the same percentage overspend.
Overall, no pattern emerged to relate practice overspend and 
the number, type or combination of cost-containment 
strategies implemented (Table 8.1). Practice 5 for example 
implemented the most strategies but was successful only in 
showing the same percentage overspend in both years since the 
reforms. Practice 4 on the other hand, implemented only two 
strategies but successfully contained its drug spend within 
the second year's budget. The chapter will now examine each 
practice's prescribing patterns separately in the light of 
the reforms and their cost-containment policies.
Practice 1
This practice is uncharacteristic of an inner city. Its 
young, affluent and cosmopolitan population displays a very
transient nature (Chapter 5) and since 1988, the actual size
of the population has fallen by 10% (Table 8.2). The 
practice described its prescribing as very conservative, 
particularly in terms of volume, compared with the FHSA
average although, it did have a tendency to prescribe newer
and more expensive drugs (Chapter 5). The practice's 
prescribing data supports these perceptions and reveals that 
over a five year period the practice spent 16% less but 
prescribed 32% fewer items overall than the FHSA average.
In addition, practice spend increased by 95% (real term 
growth was 50%) compared with an FHSA average overall 
expenditure of 65% (real term growth was 26%). Volume growth 
at 35% was however, more than double the FHSA average of 14%. 
This is perhaps not surprising given that since the reforms
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there has been an increase in the rate of volume growth. 
There was no evidence to support the practice's claims that 
it had attempted to artificially inflate its drug spend in 
the year immediately prior to the reforms (Chapter 5) . In 
fact, the annual rate of expenditure growth in 1990 was less 
than in the previous year. Moreover, the number of items 
prescribed was the lowest in the five year period.
In the first year of the reforms however, the number of items 
prescribed increased sharply from 5% (1990) to 16%. The
first indication of a rise in expenditure in five years 
occurred in the second year of the reforms. These annual 
patterns of growth were not however typical of the FHSA 
average. Whereas the annual rate of practice expenditure 
fell between 1989 and 1992, it rose in terms of the FHSA 
average. This reduction in the annual rate of expenditure 
contributed to the overall reduction in the average cost per 
patient over a period of three years. Moreover, in the two 
years since the reforms growth in the average cost per
patient stabilized at 19%. A reduction in growth in this 
area is important because, it not only reflects real levels 
of cost-containment but, also gives practices some leeway in 
overall drug spend when they are increasingly facing 
increases in the cost of hospital prescribing.
Chapter 5 provided evidence that hospitals are shifting their 
prescribing costs to general practice. Table 8.2 shows that 
in 1991/92 (ie. first reform year) the average cost per
patient per year was £28.36. In the same year the practice
was being asked to prescribe for over 21 patients who were
classified as 'expensive' and whose annual average cost was 
in excess of £380 in comparison. In other words, these 21 
patients represented only 0.2% of the practice's patient 
population but accounted for 14% of the practice spend.
Cost-containment policies introduced by the practice centred 
on a policy of generic prescribing and the use of diagnostic 
protocols for the management and treatment of specific
167
illnesses (Table 8.1) such as asthma, hypertension and 
diabetes. These protocols have proved relatively successful 
in reducing growth in drug spend. For example, the annual 
rate of increase for cardiovascular drugs (ie. asthma and 
hypertension) fell both in terms of value and volume of NICs 
post reforms. There was no indication however, of a long­
term reduction in the annual rate of growth in the 'all 
other' category which includes drugs for the treatment of 
diabetes. The possible effects of the use of this protocol 
are masked by the data for other treatments in this category.
Despite an overall reduction in the annual rate of increase 
in expenditure post reforms, the practice exceeded its first 
and second years' drug budgets. In addition, it was one of 
the four practices to increase the amount by which it 
overspent in successive years. In the first year of the 
reforms the practice exceeded its budget by 4%. It was 
awarded an additional 4% in the second year budget but 
nonetheless, displayed an end of year overspend of 17%.
Prescribing Data : Practice 1
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Budget(£) ** ** ** 247016 256542
Spend (£) 154312
(211025)
190382
(231228)
226388
(256709)
257482
(290572)
301420
(347678)
Volume (n) 24105
(38857)
25120
(39903)
26416
(40276)
30634
(41327)
32522
(44208)
Rate generic 42 43 46 43 48
prescribing(% ) (42) (46) (47) (49) (50)
Population 9984 9706 9481 9080 8959
Ave NIC/pat(£) 15.46 19. 61[27%]23. 88[22%] 28. 36[19%] 33.64[19%]
Table 8.2
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority, study data
( ) represents FHSA average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
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Practice 2
This is a small town semi-rural practice in West
Hertfordshire. Its population, which has remained fairly
static (Table 8.3), has a relatively high proportion of
elderly (ie. +12%). This group however has, according to the 
practice, not contributed any more than expected to practice 
drug spend. The practice data supports these claims and 
reveals no significant increases in either value or volume of 
NICs in those categories usually associated with illnesses of 
the elderly such as, cardiovascular, musculoskeletal and 
respiratory. Since the reforms the practice believed it had 
prescribed along historical lines and expected its
prescribing data to reflect this by showing a constant rate 
of increase in drug spend.
The practice claimed it was ’severely underfunded’ in its
first year fundholding drugs budget and this contributed 
significantly to its end of year overspend. This may be true 
but, without further information about the FHSA’s calculation 
of their budget it is difficult to determine the reality of
these claims within the scope of this study. However, it is
perhaps unfair and unsafe to blame the apparent
’underfunding’ solely for the practice’s overspend. The data 
for that year and indeed, for the second year of the reforms 
shows that contrary to the practice’s descriptions the annual 
rate of increase was faster post reforms. There was a marked 
increase in the value and volume of NICs prescribed in the 
first year of the reforms (Table 8.3). Moreover, despite a 
fall in the rate of increase in 1992/93, it was still higher 
than pre reform rates. This suggests the practice’s 
financial position at the end of the year was not simply a 
result of ’underfunding’.
This faster rate of increase post reforms appears to result 
from a combination of factors. Firstly there is evidence to 
support the practice’s claims of a shift in hospital
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prescribing (Chapter 5) . Although unable to give exact 
numbers of * expensive' patients registered with the practice 
they did cite the case of Zoladex (Chapter 5) at £125.40 per 
month (ie. £1,501.80 annually). In comparison in 1991/92 the 
average cost per patient per year was £44.00 (Table 8.3). 
Secondly, at least one of the practice's cost-containment 
strategies may have contributed directly to increases in drug 
spend. The practice had begun to make use of a local 
hospital formulary. However, hospitals enjoy special
concessions on drugs which general practices do not. Thus, 
drugs on the hospital formulary drugs are not necessarily 
cheaper to the community.
Nonetheless, some of the practice's cost-containment policies 
were successful containing drug spend to some degree. The 
use of a limited list for antibiotics resulted in spend, in 
two out of three years (ie. 1990 and 1992), falling below the 
previous year's total spend. However, this also coincided 
with a fall in the annual rate of growth in volume of NICs 
prescribed. One of the more successful strategies was its 
policy to prescribe more generic preparations. The practice 
not only had a history of prescribing above the FHSA average 
in terms of generic prescribing but achieved a greater rate 
of increase overall during a four year period (1989-92, Table 
8.3) .
The most significant increase occurred in the second year of 
the reforms (Table 3) when the rate of generic prescribing 
increased by 19 percentage points compared with an FHSA 
average increase of four percentage points. Prior to 1992 
the practice's annual rate of increase appeared to be more or 
less constant and reflected the FHSA average trend. This 
sharp increase in 1992 may help to explain the reduction in 
the rate of expenditure growth in year two of the reforms 
and, the practice's ability to reduce its percentage 
overspend in the second year drugs budgets by nearly half 
that of the first year (ie. from 16% (1991/2) to 9%
(1992/3)).
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1989 1990 1991 1992
Budget(£) ** ** 464055 536900
Spend (£) 403637
(433448)
441769
(484132)
539144
(565359)
627393
(635975)
Volume (n) 64326
(71968)
64540
(74069)
71942
(78977)
74092
(82398)
Rate generic 44 46 47 63
prescribing(% ) (43) (45) (47) (51)
Population 12380 12441 12252 12203
Ave NIC/pat (£) 32.60 35.51 [9%] 44. 00[24%] 48.11(9%]
Table 8.3
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority, study data
( ) represents FHSA average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
Practice 3
This small town, semi-rural practice borders on Bedfordshire 
and Buckinghamshire and is close to a new town and growing 
industrial area. It patient population has nonetheless 
remained fairly static (Table 8.4). The practice expected 
its prescribing data to be higher than the FHSA average 
because of its active disease management policy of the last 
ten years. This has not only led to the practice identifying 
a number of expensive patients (Chapter 5), but also to it 
expecting its data to reflect its apparent demise, showing it 
to becoming less efficient and less well managed. This 
insight into practice prescribing in relation to the local 
average appeared quite realistic.
The data shows that over a four year period (1989-92) the 
practice spent fractionally more than the FHSA average (ie. 
0.3%), although it did prescribe 15% fewer items. This 
suggest an overall practice tendency to prescribe relatively 
more expensive items than the FHSA average. Between 1989-92
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the practice achieved a reduction in the rate of increase in 
expenditure and, stabilized the rate of increase in volume in 
the two post reform years. This was contrary to the FHSA
average trend which displayed a much faster rate of increase 
in both spend and volume of NICs since 198 9. These
prescribing trends show that the practice has been able to
achieve a reduction in the average cost per patient over the
last four years. This is important in view of its need to
treat an increasing minority of the population who are
classified as expensive.
For example, the average cost per patient per year in 1991/92
was £50.30. This compared with £9, 000 plus annually for one
transplant patient needing drug therapy (2 patients). In
addition, there was £1,504.80 per patient annually for the
cancer treatment Zoladex (6 patients), and £6,528 per patient 
annually on another cancer treatment Estrocyte (1 patient). 
There were in addition to these, an unspecified number of
hypertensive patients requiring treatment. Although the 
practice can claim some of these costs back (anything in
excess of £2,000 (Chapter 4)) it is nevertheless, still
facing a large expenditure for only a few patients.
In 1987 the practice introduced its own drug formulary and
revised it in 1990. The introduction of this formulary may
help to explain the practice's ability to contain the annual
rate of expenditure growth in a number of drug categories at
a time when volume was increasing. For example, the practice 
identifed and subsequently treats a number of patients
suffering from hypertension however, expenditure growth on
cardiovascular drugs has been less than volume ie. 3% 
compared to 19% respectively. This pattern of growth was also 
contrary to the local average trend whereby, expenditure 
exceeded volume at 39% and 23% respectively.
Musculoskeletal drugs was the only other category to
demonstrate an ability to contain drug spend. Expenditure in 
this category fell by 16% in four years despite a 10%
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this category fell by 16% in four years despite a 10% 
increase in the number of items prescribed. This low growth 
in practice spend resulted from successive reductions in 
spend since the introduction of the practice formulary in 
1990. There was however, a general tendency in the area for 
musculoskeletal drugs to display better cost restraint. The 
FHSA average showed a rise in spend of 2% compared with an 
increase in volume of 5%. However, the practice data showed 
a greater capability to contain costs. This figures were 
even more surprising given the high proportion of elderly 
within the practice's patient population (ie. 15%).
Historically, the practice has displayed a lower than average 
rate of generic prescribing. In addition, it has one of the 
lowest rates in the study (Table 8.4). In the two years 
prior to the reforms this rate of prescribing remained 
constant and just over one-fifth of all prescriptions were 
for generic preparations (Table 8.4). However, since the 
reforms there has been a marked increase in the annual rate 
of generic prescribing which has also exceeded the local 
average growth, though it still remains less. This increase 
is somewhat surprising because of the practice's decision to 
reject a policy to prescribe more generics (Chapter 5).
Despite the practice's degree of achievement in containing 
growth in drug spend, they have been unsuccessful in keeping 
spend within a cash-limited budget. This is the second 
practice to demonstrate an increase in the percentage 
overspend in the first and second years of the Reforms. In 
the first two years of fundholding the practice exceeded its 
drugs budget. Not only that, it demonstrated an increase in 
the percentage overspend in the second year. Thus, in 1991/2 
practice overspend was 7%, this rose to 12% in the second 
year.
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Prescribing Data : Practice 3
1
1989 1990 1991 1992
Budget(£) ** ** 435568 448307
Spend (£) 396980
(374634)
420671
(411940)
464033
(462758)
503200
(530591)
Volume (n) 55422
(66004)
56212
(66653)
60211
(67812)
64384
(77927)
Rate generic 22 22 27 33
prescribing (%) (32) (31) (35) (38)
Population 9168 9186 9226 9381
Ave NIC/pat(£) 43.30 45.79[6%] 50.30[io%] 53.64 [7%]
Table 8.4
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority, study data
( ) represents FHSA average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
Practice 4
This outer London practice displays many of the 
characteristics of an inner city practice. It is in an 
area of high unemployment and increasing deprivation. Its 
patient population is predominantly Jewish and this has led 
the practice to agree to take part in a scheme offering 
surgery times to fit into religious worship (Chapter 5) . 
Consequently, the practice expected its prescribing data to 
reflect these changes by showing an increase in drug spend 
and number of items prescribed as demand increases. 
Unfortunately, the practice was unable to provide any data 
for the period prior to the 1991 NHS reforms. It was 
therefore not possible to compare pre reform prescribing 
with post Reform data. The following description therefore 
relates only to the prescribing trends since the reforms.
The evidence does not support practice claims of an 
increase in drug spend over the two years. In fact.
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expenditure fell by 2% in the second year of fundholding 
(Table 8.5) despite a 20% increase in volume. In contrast, 
the FHSA average recorded an increase of 10% in drug spend 
but only a 0.6% increase in volume. The practice therefore 
showed a greater ability to contain drug spend overall than 
the local average. Despite this however, it displayed a 3% 
increase in the average cost per patient (Table 8.5) and 
possibly confirms the practice's anxieties about a shift in 
hospital prescribing costs.
The practice has achieved this overall restraint in drug 
spend by encouraging patients to buy over the counter 
treatments where possible. It has also relied on its own 
form of limited list (Table 8.1; Chapter 5) which, because 
it is on computer, avails each GP with quick and easy 
access to the most frequent and economical treatments 
prescribed by the practice. In addition, the practice has 
tried to prescribe generic preparations where possible. 
Well over half of all its prescriptions in the two years 
since the reforms were for generic preparations (Table 8.5) 
and this was markedly higher than the FHSA average trend. 
Moreover, they also displayed a faster rate of growth than 
the FHSA average in these two years.
These policies appear to have been responsible not only in 
reducing the annual rate of expenditure but of also 
ultimately containing practice drug spend within a cash- 
limited budget. In the first year of the reforms practice 
spend exceeded the budget by 7%. However, in the second 
year of fundholding the practice successfully achieved a 
spend of 2% within its budget.
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Prescribing Data : Practice 4
PRACTICE 4
1
1991 1992
Budget(£) 341000 367000
Spend (£) 365357 358498
(547013) (601820)
Volume (n) 55904 67026
(102365) (102992)
Rate generic 60 62
prescribing(%) (45) (45)
Population 13526 12904
Ave NIC/pat(£) 27.01 27.78[3%)
Table 8.5
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority, study data
( ) represents FHSA average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
Practice 5
This is a small town/semi-rural practice in South East 
Hertfordshire. Its patient population is highly transient, 
a mix of young couples with small children, and an 
increasing proportion of elderly (Chapter 5). For a number 
of years the practice has implemented an active disease 
management policy which has subsequently led it to identify 
a number of patients who are classified as expensive. In 
addition, the practice expressed concerns about the effects 
on drug spend in response to the shift in hospital 
prescribing. It cited the cases of six 'expensive* 
patients with an average annual cost per patient of £9,250 
plus (1991/92) compared with an average cost per patient of 
£43.78 (Table 8.6). The practice estimated these six 
patients represented only 0.0034% of the patient population 
but account for 2% of the annual drug spend (Chapter 5) . 
This is particulary worrying because, as the practice
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continues with its disease management policy and meets the 
new contractual requirements set out by the reforms, it 
will identify more 'expensive' patients. It has already 
begun to show a faster rate of increase in average cost per 
patient since 1990 (Table 8.6) and does not bide well for 
future expenditure.
In the two years prior to the reforms the practice 
demonstrated a reduction in the annual rate of increase in 
drug spend which was contrary to the FHSA average. 
However, since the reforms this pattern has reversed and 
practice spend has increased at a faster rate than before.
Growth in the number of items prescribed meanwhile fell in 
the second year of the reforms but this pattern was similar 
to that of the two previous years (Table 8.6).
Despite its disease management policy practice prescribing 
over the last five years was fairly typical of the FHSA 
average. The practice spent only 6% more and prescribed 
fractionally fewer items (ie. 0.7%) than the FHSA average. 
It was however, more successful in containing its overall 
growth between 1988 and 1992, spending an additional 82% 
(real term growth was 39%) for 52% more items compared with 
an FHSA average spend of 105% (real term growth was 56%) 
and volume growth of 52%.
The practice's ability to restrain its overall growth in 
comparison to the FHSA average appears to result from the 
broad range of cost-containment policies it implemented 
(Table 8.1). These include a practice formulary, a policy 
on generic prescribing, the use of diagnostic protocols and 
so on. A 23% rise in patient population together with a 
number of other factors (Chapter 5) resulted in a large 
increase in volume of NICs of certain categories. 
Expenditure however did not rise accordingly. Drugs 
prescribed for cardiovascular and musculoskeletal 
illnesses, these are often associated with the elderly, 
displayed a higher overall growth in volume compared with
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expenditure. In fact, musculoskeletal drugs displayed a
volume growth nearly eight times greater than expenditure. 
Moreover, the annual rate of expenditure fell in post
reform years despite a constant annual rate of increase in
terms of volume. These patterns of growth did not reflect 
the FHSA average.
Traditionally, the practice has demonstrated a marginally 
higher annual rate of generic prescribing than the FHSA
average. In 1988 over one-third of all prescriptions were 
for generic preparations, this rate increased steadily on 
average by three percentage points. The first year of the 
reforms witnessed an increase of six percentage points in 
comparison in the annual rate of generic prescribing. By 
1992 the annual rate of generic prescribing had risen by 15 
percentage points and over one-half of all prescriptions 
written by the practice were for generic preparations.
Despite the broad range of policies aimed at restraining 
growth there are instances when these proved unsuccessful. 
The most striking example being drugs prescribed for the 
central nervous system which include anaesthetics and pain­
killers. The practice conducts its own minor surgery on 
site (Chapter 5 and Appendix A) and therefore has an 
increased need for anaesthetics and painkillers. Over a 
five year period this category displayed a 232% increase in 
expenditure and a 62% increase in volume. This category 
was by far the fastest growing both in terms of practice 
and FHSA average. Practice expenditure growth however, was 
higher than the FHSA average growth of 136% and the rate of 
increase in both value and volume of NICs rose faster post 
reforms.
Despite its range of policies the practice was unable to 
contain its drug spend within a cash-limited budget. 
However, it did manage to achieve a constant rate of 
overspend since the reforms (ie. 15%).
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Prescribing Data : Practice 5
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Budget(£) - ** ** 681575 806224
Spend (£) 507566
(444166)
584593
(521347)
665610
(619311)
781385
(769087)
926182
(911324)
Volume (n) 78482
(77843)
87103
(86548)
95377
(94729)
107159
(107373)
115869
(118058)
Rate generic 41 44 48 54 56
prescribing(%) (38) (41) (44) (46) (51)
Population 15133 15824 16879 17848 18613
Ave NIC/pat(£) 33.54 36. 94 [10%] 39.43 [g%] 43.78 [ii%] 49.7 6 [i4%]
Table 8.6
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority, study data
( ) represents FHSA average 
** missing data 
[ ] annual percentage increase
Practice 6
Practice 6 is a small thriving market town in East Anglia. 
The practice described its historical prescribing as being 
higher in terms of value and volume of NICs than the FHSA 
average. Although it believed it tended to prescribe 
cheaper items. The data however contradicts these 
descriptions and shows the practice did indeed spend and 
prescribed more items than the FHSA average (ie. 13% and 
13% respectively). Thus, its average cost per item tended 
to be about the same as the FHSA average, not cheaper as 
expected.
Over a four year period the practice was fairly typical of 
the FHSA average in terms of overall growth, both in value 
and volume of NICs prescribed. Since 1990 there has been 
an increase in the annual rate of expenditure, the largest 
increase occurring between the year immediately prior to
179
and, the first year of the reforms. This was also true of 
the FHSA average. The pattern of volume growth was however 
different from expenditure and showed only a slight 
increase in growth in the second year. In the two previous 
years there was a constant rate of increase. The same was 
again true of the FHSA average.
In 1990 the practice introduced its own formulary and a policy 
to prescribe more generic preparations (Table 8.1). However as 
the data illustrates, these proved unsuccessful in containing 
drug spend. Given the practice's difficulty in implementing its 
policy on generic prescribing (Chapter 5), it is not surprising 
it experienced difficulties in restraining expenditure growth. 
Nonetheless, despite these problems the practice displayed and 
maintained a significantly higher rate of generic prescribing
than the FHSA average (Table 8.7).
This practice did not contain its expenditure on drugs within a 
cash budget. Moreover, it is the third practice to show an
increase in its percentage end of year growth. In its first
year of fundholding the practice spent close to its budget 
(Table 8.7) displaying only a 3% overspend. However, in its 
second year its inability to contain costs resulted in an
overspend of 8%.
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Prescribing Data : Practice 6
1989 1990 1991 1992
Budget(£) ** ** 675601 758365
Spend (£) 537848 600166 698266 817418
(611193) (687063) (791657) (912714)
Volume (n) 121719 130757 139945 151077
(108253) (113425) (126203) (133464)
Rate generic 40 41 40 40
prescribing (%) (30) (31) (28) (28)
Population 13538 13587 13800 13825
Ave NIC/pat(£) 39.73 44.17[11%] 50.60(15%] 59. 13[17%]
Source
Table 8.7
Prescription Pricing Authority, study data
( ) represents FHSA average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
Practice 7
This outer London practice is typical of many inner city 
practices. There is high unemployment amongst its patient 
population and increasing deprivation in the area. The practice 
claimed these and other factors (Chapter 5) made its patients 
very high users of their services. This in turn placed greater 
pressure on the doctors to prescribe. Consequently, the 
practice expected its data to show a higher than average rate of 
volume prescribing. Although, because of its policy to 
prescribe^ cheaper alternatives, they expected expenditure data 
to reflect increases in response to greater volume output rather 
than, increases in the relative price per item prescribed. The 
data shows these perceptions are, to some extent, realistic.
Between 1989 and 1992 the practice prescribed 27% more items and 
spent 22% more than the FHSA average. Thus, their average cost
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per item prescribed was cheaper as expected. Moreover, growth 
in overall volume of NICs was greater than expenditure growth 
(ie. 25% and 18% respectively). These figures provide evidence 
to support the practice's claim that it has a policy of 
prescribing cheaper alternatives. Practice insight into
prescribing trends was again proved realistic when its overall 
growth figures were compared with the FHSA average. The FHSA's 
average expenditure growth was 33% and volume rose by 7% 
overall.
Since 1990 the annual rate of increase in practice spend has 
fallen and, after a rise of 22% in volume in 1990 its annual 
rate of increase feel sharply in the first year of the reforms 
to just 1% and remained constant in the following year. 
Consequently, since 1990 the practice has been able to achieve a 
reduction in the growth in the average cost per patient per 
year. Moreover, in the second year of the reforms the practice 
actually spent less per patient than in the previous year (Table 
8.8) .
This is quite an achievement given the demanding nature of its 
patient population and, also because it has implemented very few 
cost-containment policies (Table 8.1). The practice was
conscious of its potentially spiralling expenditure on drugs 
even before the reforms and had instituted a policy to prescribe 
cheaper alternatives. However, this did not necessarily mean 
prescribing only generic preparations and as Table 8.8 shows, 
the practice prescribed below the FHSA average in the two years 
prior to the reforms. However, with the implementation of 
fundholding and the need to contain spending within a budget, 
the practice moved towards a more rigorous policy of generic 
prescribing. This appears to have contributed significantly to 
the rapid increase in the overall rate of generic prescribing 
which did not reflect the FHSA average trend.
Despite a reduction in the rate of expenditure the practice was 
unable to contain its drug spend within either its first or 
second year budgets. It was however, one of the few practices
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in the study to reduce its percentage end of year spend in the 
second year to 4% over budget compared with an excess of 10% in 
the first year (Table 8.8).
Prescribing Data : Practice 7
1989 1990 1991 1992
Budget(£) ** * ★ 558006 613000
Spend (£) 537869 586722 615483 635324
(419566) (465342) (498619) (559542)
Volume (n) 87052 106286 107784 109006
(77954) (80216) (80613) (83490)
Rate generic 35 39 49 58
prescribing (%) (38) (40) (42) (43)
Population 15203 14180 12938 13382
Ave NIC/pat(£) 35.38 41.38(17%] 47. 57i5%] 47.48 [_o.2%]
Source
Table 8.8
Prescription Pricing Authority, study data
( ) FHSA average
** data not available
[ ] annual percentage increase
Practice 8
This small town partnership in the South East commuter belt was 
fairly typical of its FHSA average in terms of overall 
prescribing trends (ie. value and volume of NICs prescribed) and 
growth. Over recent years it has witnessed an increase in 
redundancy and unemployment amongst its patient population and 
has subsequently noticed an increase in the number of 
prescriptions for anti-depressants (central nervous system 
(CNS)). Moreover, its awareness of a multiple pathology 
particularly amongst its large elderly population (Chapter 5) 
led to it expecting the data to reflect a rise in anti­
inflammatories (musculoskeletal) prescribed. The practice also 
expressed concerns about the effects on its drug spend because 
of a shift in hospital prescribing costs. It had already
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identified at least six expensive patients (Chapter 5) whose 
average annual cost were in excess of £9,250 (1991/92) compared 
with an average patient cost of £52.52.
In the first year of fundholding the annual rate of increase 
rose both in terms of value and volume of NICs, but more so in 
terms of number of items prescribed. However, the practice was 
able to contain its growth compared to the FHSA average. 
Despite reducing its annual rate of growth in the second year of 
fundholding (ie. value and volume of NICs) this was less than 
the FHSA average. Practice expectations about an increase in 
drugs prescribed for musculoskeletal disorders were realistic in 
terms of volume prescribed. Between 1989 and 1992
musculoskeletal drugs were identified as the fastest growing in 
terms of volume although, the slowest in terms of expenditure. 
The majority of this growth however occurred pre reforms.
CNS drugs however displayed a reverse pattern of growth despite 
practice expectations. This category was the slowest growing in 
terms of number of items prescribed but the fastest growing in 
terms of spend. Post reform expenditure growth was more rapid 
compared to volume growth and unlike musculoskeletal drugs. 
However, caution must be observed when interpreting this data 
because, anti-inflammatories and anti-depressants are only two 
types of drugs in otherwise large drug categories. Other drugs 
prescribed from these categories may be responsible for 
prescribing trends but, without closer examination of the more 
detailed prescribing data (PACT level 3), it is impossible to 
determine the exact effects of single drugs on prescribing 
trends.
The practice's ability to restrain expenditure growth post 
reforms compared to the FHSA average is likely to reflect the 
practice's use of a limited list for certain drug types rather 
than its policy encouraging greater use of generic preparations. 
There is some doubt as to the practice's commitment to this last 
policy because of its below average annual rate of generic 
prescribing over a four year period (Table 8.9). It also had
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the lowest annual rate of generic prescribing in the study. 
There was however, something of a marked increase in the second 
year of the reforms compared to previous years.
Given its increase in spending in the first year of fundholding 
it is not surprising that the practice overspent on its first 
year budget (ie. 16%) . What was perhaps more surprising was
that it not only exceeded its second year drug budget but, also 
increased its percentage overspend to 17%. This was despite a 
fall in the year's annual growth rate.
Prescribing Data : Practice 8
1989 1990 1991 1992
Budget(£) ** ** 593508 664300
Spend (£) 561428 611829 690918 776284
(527799) (578886) (679736) (740438)
Volume (n) 89319 92463 97539 99740
(91076) (92258) (98219) (100039)
Rate generic 22 23 23 28
prescribing(%)
1
(31) (32) (32) (34)
1
Population 13683 13426 13155 13137
Ave NIC/pat(£) 41.03 45.57 [11%) 52.52 [15%] 59. 09[13%)
Table 8.9
Source : Prescription Pricing Authority, study data
( ) represents FHSA average 
** data not available 
[ ] annual percentage increase
Summary
This chapter examined the prescribing trends of eight GP 
fundholding practices and their attempts to contain drug spend 
within a cash limited budget. From the limited data available 
the study found that over a period of at least three years, four 
practices reduced their level of expenditure growth but, three
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practices appeared to increase their annual rate of expenditure. 
There was insufficient data on the remaining practice to make 
this kind of conclusion. It is however unsafe to look at cost- 
containment purely in terms of expenditure because, any changes 
may merely be a response to changes in volume rather than cost 
restraint.
A more realistic and reliable measure of cost-containment is 
average cost per patient. An examination of this data reveals 
that only two practices achieved a reduction in the annual rate 
of increase. One of these practices actually reduced its 
average spend per patient to below the previous year's. One 
practice increased its rate of growth, the remaining four 
practices displayed an increase in the first year of fundholding 
but this was followed by a reduction in the rate of growth in 
the second year. Thus it appears two practices rather than four 
were actually beginning to achieve some level of cost-restraint.
Most practices had introduced a range of cost-containment 
measures mostly after they became fundholders and, in many cases 
these were elaborate ones. Interviews with FHSA managers 
however, suggested this intensity of action was not to be found 
in non-fundholding practices. In combination, these measures 
seemed to have reduced the rate of expansion below that found in 
the FHSA as a whole. At this level of study it is difficult to 
determine which of these measures proved the more successful in 
helping to contain drug spend. In order to determine what the 
most effective strategy for GPs to follow as a mechanism to curb 
drug spend needs a much larger study with a matched control 
group of GPs. This would measure the differential effects of 
different strategies. Although this is an elaborate research 
design, it is one which this study thinks might be useful to 
conduct.
The data also confirmed practices' fears that hospitals were 
beginning to shift their prescribing costs over to general 
practice. This is obviously a very important consideration to
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practices trying to work within a cash limited budget and, to 
those setting the budgets. This subject is set to become even 
more of an issue in the next year or so because of the future 
changes in the policy regarding expensive patients. This will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. This chapter 
completes the review of the data and brings to a close the 
study's investigation into the effects of cash limited budgets 
and financial incentives on GP generated prescribing costs. All 
that remains now is, to review the findings and determine 
whether the study met its aims and objectives and to see what 
changes to expect in the future of fundholding.
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Chapter 9
A review of the past and a look to the future
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Reasons for controlling drug spending
Primary health care is one of the fastest growing elements of 
National Health Service (NHS) spending and until recently it 
was non cash limited, unlike hospital and community services.
Within primary health care, pharmaceutical costs were rising 
the fastest and between 1975 and 1992 drug expenditure rose 
by 978% (150% in real terms). Volume growth, taking account
of the rising price of drugs, rose by 40%. The rapid 
economic growth of the 1950s/60s and the level of health
spending made it possible to support a fast growing budget. 
However, the change in the economic climate of the 1970s/80s 
led the government to seek ways to cutback its rising
spending on public and social programmes, including health
care.
Reducing expenditure on pharmaceuticals was an attractive
target in political terms. Although labour costs in any 
health care system account for the largest proportion of 
spending, personnel are often well organized, very vocal and 
enjoy a high level of esteem. Pharmaceutical companies on 
the other hand, evoke quite different feelings. They are 
perceived as exploiting man's needs and indeed, his right to 
receive drug therapy and thus achieve optimum health. They 
are accused of profiteering from illness and disease and of 
manipulating the market to ensure monopoly and consequently 
high profits. Hence, to attack the drug budget appears a 
popular and easy solution to a persistent problem. This 
study investigated the impact of government attempts to 
contain expenditure growth on GP prescription drugs over the 
last seventeen years. Particular attention was focused on 
the effects of GP fundholding.
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The nature of the market and the difficulty of controlling it
The pharmaceutical market is unique. Demand is determined by 
patterns of illness, social and demographic factors and 
attitudes towards therapeutic delivery. Demand for
pharmaceuticals is very specific. Specific drugs are taken 
to treat specific conditions and, for every illness there 
must be a choice of alternative medicines. Consequently, the 
market is large and highly fragmented. Most of the 
industry's products are available only on a doctor's 
prescription. This denies the consumer demander his/her 
right of choice and thus sovereignty. Instead, doctors adopt 
the role of demander and so their beliefs and attitudes 
become of paramount importance.
The inclusion of a third party or monopsonist purchaser 
further complicates the demand model because it isolates both 
the primary and secondary consumer from the source of 
payment. Thus, any direct interest in either economy or the 
cost of their actions is removed from these demanders. The 
industry is therefore, relatively insensitive to price and 
the third party payer has little or no control over what is 
prescribed and at what cost. Thus, the purchaser is faced 
with problems of changing consumer attitudes towards 
prescriptions and prescribing and, regulating the prices 
charged by the industry if he/she desires to control 
expenditure.
Regulation of the industry
Regulation of industry prices, or more specifically industry 
profits, has been one of the most actively sustained measures 
of cost-containment adopted by the UK government. The 
decision to regulate profits arose because of the 
government's dual role in the pharmaceutical industry. On
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the one hand, as a monopsonist purchaser of a privately 
produced product it wanted to keep prices down. On the other 
hand, it was responsible for maintaining a lucrative UK 
export industry which required prices to be kept at a 
profitable level. Thus, by controlling the profitability of 
companies the government believed it could achieve these two 
aims. Each year a company must negotiate with the Department 
of Health (DoH) the permitted rate of return on capital based 
on their UK sales to the NHS in the previous year.
Provided the company adheres to this fixed rate it is given 
the freedom to set its own prices for new product entry into 
the market. The effects of government regulation of prices 
and profits in the industry brought about the most change in 
expenditure growth from the 1960s up to 1983.
Changing attitudes
The government turned next to changing the prescribing habits 
of GPs. Attitudes are however, the most difficult to change. 
Historically mechanisms of regulation were based on the use 
of deterrents as a way of influencing patient demand and 
prescriber's attitudes. In terms of professional regulation, 
GPs were 'educated and informed' about the benefits of more 
cost-effective prescribing. The underlying threat that 
'frivolous and/or excessive' prescribing would be punishable 
by financial penalties was nonetheless, never very far from 
this type of regulation. Control of the patient demander was 
however more instantaneous, more direct, it went straight for 
the wallet. Users were required to pay a prescription charge 
or copayment. This use of deterrents however lacked any real 
incentives or sanctions to change doctors' behaviour. Few 
GPs were ever penalised for their behaviour and, despite a 
policy of regular increases in prescription charges to 
patients, cost-sharing was essentially ineffectual because of
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the large number of prescriptions exempt from a charge. 
Prescription charges' ability to restrain volume demand for 
medicines therefore was severely limited.
Generics
A combination of industry, profession and consumer regulation 
succeeded in reducing the growth in expenditure at a time 
when the general rate of inflation was increasing. 1983 
marked the beginning of change. This was the year the 
government put a price freeze on medicines and the Greenfield 
Report recommended the greater use of generic preparations, 
local formularies and a restricted list of prescribable 
items. The effects were instantaneous. Growth in
expenditure was reduced to one of the lowest levels in years 
as a result of more generic prescribing. Two years later even 
stricter government measures were introduced which limited 
what doctors could prescribe and introduced price cuts to 
drugs sold to the NHS. These four measures further reduced 
expenditure as the rate of generic prescribing increased 
rapidly and, stabilized the share of NHS money devoted to 
prescription drugs. At the same time however, volume began 
to increase. As a consequence, the government attempted to 
influence the level of prescribing by direct action at the 
profession.
Direct incentives
It had been established that deterrents were ineffectual in 
influencing GPs' attitudes towards prescribing on a grand 
scale. GPs needed more of an incentive to change their 
behaviour. The subsequent decision to offer GPs financial 
incentives was based on the assumption that, if GPs were 
offered more freedom in the use of larger budgets they might 
be more likely to accept a cash limit on their whole
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allocation of funds including prescription drugs. Thus, for 
the first time the government sought to influence GP 
prescribing behaviour through cash limited budgets.
Fundholding and its impact
Under the new structure two types of general practice 
emerged, fundholding and non-fundholding. Fundholding
practices were given a cash limited budget comprising a 
hospital element, pharmaceutical (drug) element and, an 
amount to cover staff costs. This gave practices the freedom 
to use this combined budget flexibly and acted as a powerful 
incentive to save on one element of the budget and reinvest 
the money in other aspects of patient care. This scheme also 
carries a high and immediate price for failure to control 
spending. Any budget overspend requires immediate
compensation from another element of the practice budget.
Non-fundholding practices on the other hand, receive only a 
target budget (Indicative Prescribing Amount (IPA) ) which 
covers prescribing costs only, and rely on their District 
Health Authority to purchase hospital services on their 
behalf. Subsequently, little has changed for them in terms 
of purchasing services and paying for those services. Hence, 
they do not suffer the same worries about overspending as 
fundholders or the Family Health Service Authority (FHSA). 
Non-fundholding practices are nonetheless expected to stay 
within their target budget but, any overspend will be met out 
of the FHSA's firm budget. FHSAs constantly face the very 
real fears of overspending on their firm budget as a result 
of their non-fundholding practices continuing to prescribe 
along historical lines with little regard for costs. Their 
only real weapon is their contact with GPs and persuasion.
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Introducing incentives
These different incentive structures were illustrated in the 
study. Two out of three FHSAs overspent on their firm budgets 
in the first and second year of the reforms. More 
importantly, these overspends were essentially a direct 
result of non-fundholding practices exceeding their IPAs. 
Moreover, not only did they exceed their IPAs but increased 
their annual percentage overspend in the second year, thus 
further increasing the FHSAs' overspend in the second year of 
the reforms. However, it is wrong to assume that GP 
fundholders did not exceed their budgets too. They did, 
however their overspend was less than non-fundholders and 
they were successful in keeping nearer to their budgets than 
non-fundholding practices. Moreover, their overspend had to 
be financed by savings from elsewhere in their budgets.
This study and others (Bradlow & Coulter 1993; Burr, Walker & 
Stent 1992) clearly indicates fundholding was largely more 
successful than non-fundholding in containing drug 
expenditure. This resulted from fundholding practices 
implementing a range of cost-containment policies; an 
intensity of action not matched by non-fundholding practices. 
Both studies found that in combination these strategies were 
successful in reducing the rate of growth below the FHSA as a 
whole. Nonetheless the majority of fundholding practices in 
this study still overspent on their budgets. This however, 
contrasted with Bradlow and Coulter's study. Thus, this 
failure by both schemes to contain drug spend within a target 
amount raises the question of, whether or not budgets were 
set at the right at the right level in the first place.
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New formulae
In the first two years of the reforms the DoH forecast the 
annual national expenditure on prescription drugs. It then 
notified individual Regional Health Authorities (RHA) of
their likely spend and that of their FHSAs and allocated firm 
budgets accordingly. Each budget took into account the age 
structure of the FHSA population together with other 
demographic and social factors and the projected drug spend 
based on historical spending patterns. However, this formula 
was criticised for its failure to reflect accurately 
individual FHSA or practice needs. This led to one RHA
successfully challenging the Department's national formula.
This RHA forecast spending based on specific practice
expenditure data for designated time periods rather than the 
Department's average overall estimate of rising demand. The 
Region's formula incorporated individual practice variations 
in association with the FHSA as a whole. It combined a 
bottom-up strategy which attempted to reduce the level of 
variation between practices whilst, remaining responsive to 
individual practice needs. At the same time it kept within a 
uniform overall rate. The success of this formula was
graphically illustrated by one of its FHSA's end of year 
spend. It was the only FHSA in the study to successfully 
spend within its cash limited budget in the first year of the 
reforms. However, when the FHSA was forced to accept the 
Department's calculated budget in the second year of the 
Reforms, it exceeded its budget.
The failure of the national formula and in response to the 
many criticisms raised led the government to reconsider its 
method of calculation. This use of historic costs, adjusted 
for price and volume changes and local factors were designed 
to allow flexibility in setting amounts. However, they often
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resulted in considerable variations in allocations per head 
and, in the level of year on year increases for individual 
practices. Addressing this issue of equity the government 
has sought to make changes in the way the population is 
defined. Without this, practices with traditionally high 
prescribing costs will continue to be awarded higher amounts 
than low prescribers without any analysis of patients' needs.
The Future of GP fundholding : 
The new weighted capitation system
One of the major problems with the existing system has been 
trying to control a budget based on historic costs. This 
method of budget setting has served only to reward high 
spenders with a bigger budget each year. Consequently, early 
in the life of the reforms the DoH was determined to find a 
more satisfactory way of allocating money which is devoid of 
any adverse incentive to GPs to 'inflate' their prescribing 
costs. A revised formula for setting drug budgets and IPAs 
has now been defined by the Leeds University Prescribing 
Research Unit which calculates and allocates money to a 
practice based on the number of patients in a practice and 
the local average spending per patient.
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THE 1994/5 FORMULA
total regional 6.35% uplift for
drug costs 1992/3 X inflation =
total regional prescribing units
regional cost 
per PU
regional cost 
per PU
X PUs in practice = unadjusted 
practice PUs
__________t
xl/
unadjusted + or 
practice PUs
practice
prescribing
budget
historic spending 
local morbidity 
expensive patients 
list size/structure 
health promotion
Figure 9.1
Source : DoH
Reference : Prescriber 19 February 1993:24
The starting point for these new practice budgets, to be 
implemented in 1994/95, will be the regional average cost per 
prescribing unit adjusted for Age, Sex and Temporary Resident 
(ASTRO-PU (1)) times the number of prescribing units in each 
practice (Figure 9.1). The new system is a revision of the 
old capitation system and takes into account the varying 
prescription requirements and differential costs of males and 
females at different ages (Table 9.1). This new weighted 
capitation system is therefore more sensitive to differences 
in population structures between practices and is thus, more 
able to respond to those differences. For example, under the 
current system anyone aged under 65 years old is awarded a 
weight of one and counts as one prescribing unit, anyone over 
65 years old is awarded a weight of three and counts as three 
prescribing units.
 ^The 'O' was added for syntax purposes and has no value.
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The new ASTRO-PU differs because it has weightings for nine 
age bands for males, nine for females and one for temporary 
residents. As Table 9.1 shows, women start to become more 
'expensive' from aged 15 during their reproductive years. 
Men however, catch women up after the menopause. The ASTRO- 
PU also identifies the much greater needs of the elderly and 
distinguishes between the differential demands expressed 
within the elderly group. Neither of these considerations 
had previously been taken into account. Thus, the system 
should satisfy those doctors with a very high proportion of 
elderly patients who felt previous calculations were 
insufficient.
ASTRO PU
Age Group 
(years)
Men Women
0-4 1 1
5-14 1 1
15-24 1 2
25-34 1 2
35-44 2 3
45-54 3 4
55-64 6 6
65-74 10 10
75 + 10 10
Temporary
Residents
0.5 0.5
Table 9.1
Source : Leeds University Prescribing Research Unit 
Reference : Prescriber 19 February, 1993:24
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After the necessary calculations have been carried out the 
resulting figure provides an estimate of a practice's
prescribing budget. However, it does not take account of 
factors such as historically high spending, local morbidity 
and the inclusion of 'expensive' patients on individual
practice lists. These factors have to be considered
separately by the FHSA medical adviser who will then
determine how much the practice should get. His/her final 
estimate may be revised up or down and these revisions form 
the basis of discussion and negotiation between the practice 
and the medical adviser.
Criticism have however, already been expressed about the 
method of calculating the value of the regional prescribing 
unit. For example, the national figure calculated for the 
1993/94 ASTRO-PU was £18 and represented an average between 
the highest and lowest regional estimates of £21 and £15 
respectively. Under the new system all FHSAs, without 
exception, will receive £18 per ASTRO-PU. Consequently, 
there will be winners and losers. An FHSA which had 
historically been a £21 per PU FHSA will subsequently receive 
£1.5 million less in its budget. Somehow it has to 
distribute this budget which is less than previously, as 
adequately and fairly between its practices. As yet, there 
is no indication how FHSAs will distribute this fund.
Although this new system of budget setting was not due to be 
implemented until the 1994/95 financial year, practices 
received with their 1993/94 firm budgets and IPAs a record of 
another figure calculated under the ASTRO-PU system. This 
was intended to prepare GPs for the changes in 1994/95 by 
encouraging them to compare their current spending and 
progress throughout the year under the new system. However, 
during the term of this study all practice budgets and IPAs
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were calculated using the 'old' formula. It was brought to 
my attention however, that at least one FHSA with practices 
participating in this study, calculated and implemented 
practice budgets and IPAs under the new weighted capitation 
system in 1993/94, a year ahead of the government proposed 
implementation.
Changes to the allocation for e3q>ensive patients
One of the commonest anxieties expressed by GPs in the study 
and others (Chambers 1990; Chambers 1993; Bradlow & Coulter 
1993) was that hospitals would try to keep within their cash 
limited budgets by shifting their drug costs over general 
practice. This study found evidence to confirm these 
anxieties and became aware of the serious implications for 
general practice budgets. Under the 1992 reforms practices 
were protected from the potentially crippling costs of 
expensive patients. This was done either by individual one 
off agreements between FHSAs and individual practices 
regarding or, on a more formula based agreement. For 
example, a £2,000 ceiling for any patient's drug spend per 
year was set by one region. However, at the time of writing 
of this thesis there was evidence to suggest that the value 
of this allowance was set to change in the near future 
(Hertfordshire Family Health Service Authority 1993).
Northwest Thames Regional Health Authority for example, 
changed its policy with regard to reporting 'expensive 
patient' to 'expensive drug' in 1993/94. Practices were 
required to report to the FHSA expensive drugs 'ie. where the 
cost of prescribing a single item exceeds £2,000 per annum 
and not where the cost of a patient ' s treatment exceeds 
£2,000 per annum'. The implications of such changes are 
catastrophic not only in respect to the practice budget, 
especially in view of the shift in hospital prescribing costs
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to general practice, but also in respect to patient care. 
Surely this new system only serves to encourage GPs to 
operate a system of adverse selection and reject or remove 
from their list a patient who requires expensive treatments ?
Future changes to professional regulation and the 
implications for the industry and patient care
We have so far focused on future changes to the process of 
setting practice budgets and IPAs. These changes, however, 
will only be an indirect influence to GPs* behaviour. A 
number of other changes already implemented or proposed aim 
specifically to have a greater influence on GPs* prescribing 
choices with the ultimate aim of saving money. The first of 
these changes is the new incentive scheme for non-fundholding 
GPs. From 1994/95 non-fundholding GPs are, for the first 
time, being offered financial incentives by the DoH to cut 
their prescribing. These non-fundholding practices are being 
offered a cash (re) award (?) of up to £5,000 to reduce their 
prescribing costs. This scheme, unlike the 'old* scheme, 
does not assume GPs will behave altruistically. From the 
limited feedback of the GP fundholding scheme, the government 
has realised non-fundholding practices will only probably 
achieve savings if they too are given a cash incentive 
(Chapter 4).
Secondly, the NHS Management Executive has issued national 
targets for increasing generic prescribing and practice 
formulary levels (eg. 80% of all practices should operate a 
restricted drug formulary). Although the government views 
this as an attractive mechanism which will help to contain 
drug expenditure, it has serious implications for the 
industry. They argue (industry) that this measure does not 
give due regard to the inter-changeability of these products 
with the originator's product. Moreover, it is being
201
introduced without regard to the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme's (PPRS) negotiated levels of profits (and 
hence prices) . Subsequently, it strikes at the heart of the 
process of negotiation and is seen as an essentially 
unilateral move by the government.
More regulation and rationing
Finally, at the end of 1992 the government announced that it 
was considering extending to the Limited List and is 
currently reviewing 10 new categories. It is anticipated 
these extensions will be implemented in the mid 1990s. The 
extension of the Limited List will have a great impact on the 
industry but more importantly on the future of patient care. 
Many of these products will be banned from the NHS unless the 
companies agree to cut prices. However, these price cuts 
will be additional to the PPRS's overall 2.5% price cut of 
1993.
It is likely companies in the future will not introduce new 
products in the UK in these ten therapeutic categories 
because of fear of 'blacklisting' or arbitrary price 
controls. Patients will therefore loose the potential for 
the best treatment available. Since the introduction of the 
Limited List in 1985 no new major products have been 
introduced in the UK in the seven therapeutic areas covered 
by that original List. When all these measures have been 
taken into consideration there can be little doubt that they 
will have a profound impact on the UK pharmaceutical 
industry. More importantly, they will have a detrimental 
effect on the introduction of new products for NHS patients.
In an attempt to redress the balance between removing certain 
drugs from the prescribable list, the government has made 
available to patients more drugs which can be purchased over
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the counter and which were previously only under 
prescription. These include for example, Tagamet (a
treatment for ulcers and other gastric-acid conditions) at a 
cost of £17.80 for 120 tablets which would be the equivalent 
to one month’s treatment course. The length of treatment can 
last from between 1-2 months. Thus, the government is 
getting the patient to be responsible for more of the actual 
costs of his/her treatments.
Equity
In summary, this study has suggested that GPs have to be 
given financial incentives to keep down their prescribing 
costs. At the moment fundholding practices are at a 
disadvantage as they suffer penalties for over spending which 
non-fundholders do not have applied to them. To be fair and 
reduce prescribing the principle that individual practices 
will benefit from staying within a cash limit would have to 
be extended to all practices in order to eliminate the 
present inequalities of the system. At the moment there is a 
two-tier system which is unfair to fundholders because, they 
are kept within a cash limited budget whilst all other 
practices have effectively greater ’freedom’ to spend.
This issue of inequality must be addressed if fundholding is 
to stay. Otherwise, fundholders will begin to recognize a 
greater incentive in no longer being a fundholder. 
Subsequently, if fundholding was to discontinue the 
government would loose a large part of its capacity to 
regulate drug spend at GP level. Therefore, it is in their 
best interests to extend as far as possible the incentive 
scheme.
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To ration drug spending or not ?
Many people will be asking : 'should we be putting a cash
limit on drugs anyway and, what effects does this have on 
patient health ?'. Given that the rest of the NHS is so 
tightly controlled, it would be unfair not to place some form 
of control on pharmaceutical spend. Moreover, unless there 
is some form of control on drug expenditure at general 
practitioner level, then the drugs bill would just continue 
to run out of control. As yet no-one is really clear about 
what the effects of these controls are on patient health. 
However, the GPs in this study were convinced that the 
imposition of a cash limited budget for drugs has not in any 
way had an adverse effect on patient health. This study 
recognizes the need for a longitudinal randomized control 
trial to be conducted to investigate the effects of cash 
limited drug budgets on patient health. The study
acknowledges that such a study is beyond the relm of this 
research but believes it to be a worthwhile study for the 
future.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A Practice Profiles
Practice 1 (K&C)
The practice
Inner city prescribing practice in an affluent part of South 
West London. It has a catchment area encompassing approximately 
three and a half square miles.
Two of the three partners have been together since 1970, the 
third partner, appointed in 1987, spent a year as a GP trainee 
with the practice. The practice is accredited under the general 
practitioner training scheme.
The practice employs :
2 practice nurses 
1 practice manager
1 computer manager
4 secretaries/receptionists
2 health visitors
1 practice counsellor
District Health Authority contracted district nurses 
Accommodation :
entrance hall
reception area with computer desk and patient records 
secretarial room
administrator's office/4th consulting room 
small patient waiting area 
3 small consulting rooms
1 nurses'/treatment room 
kitchen/common room
2 WCs/bathrooms
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Service provision
Each partner conducts 9 surgeries a week. There are no weekend 
surgeries and no outside appointments are held
though, out of hours cover is provided by the partners in rota 
with two neighbouring practices. Night visits between 11.00 pm 
and 7.00 am are frequently carried out by a deputising service.
12 nursing sessions per week include : 
child surveillance 
childhood immunizations 
mother and child health
a full range of health promotion clinics
In addition there is advice and information in the following :
human behaviour obstetrics
stress management paediatrics
contraception/family planning gynaecology
sexually transmitted diseases minor surgery
manipulative medicine & psychiatry
small joint injection
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Practice 2 (LH)
The practice
Small town/semi-rural practice in West Hertfordshire established 
in 1912 and has two surgery sites. The practice has 5 GP 
partners, a GP retainer and one GP trainee.
The practice employs :
3 practice nurses
1 practice manager 
9 receptionists
2 full time medical secretaries
1 full time information technology officer 
1 part time clerical worker
1 full time reception supervisor
DMA contracted staff :
2.5 health visitors
3 district nurses
2 nursing auxiliaries 
1 midwife
1 midwife's helper.
Accommodation - main surgery is a modern two storey building 
with :
6 GP consulting rooms
2 examination rooms
1 nurses' room with separate examination room.
entrance lobby
small filing room
the manager's office
common room
kitchen
WCs
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Service provision :
Each partner conducts between 8-9 surgery sessions each per week 
and the GP retainer 2 sessions per week within the structure of 
10 weekly surgeries.
Clinics :
asthma
diabetic care
twice weekly well women clinics
regular antenatal
diabetic
skin
child development 
elderly services
External commitments include :
medical and occupational health advice to local 
industries/firms
a scheme for coordinating vocational training posts in 
hospital and general practice
a dermatology clinic at the local district hospital.
2 2 2
Practice 3 (A&W)
The practice
This combined prescribing and dispensing practice operating from 
three surgeries has a catchment area which spans two counties, 
Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire. The practice established 100 
years ago has 5 GPs, an assistant GP and a GP trainee. The 
practice employs :
3 nurses
2 health visitors
4 dispensers
1 practice manager 
7 receptionists
2 medical secretaries 
1 computer operator
1 clerical worker
Contracted staff :
1 counsellor who takes 4 sessions per week and
1 physiotherapist
Accommodation :
The main surgery is a modern purpose built bungalow design 
health centre with :
5 consulting rooms
2 nurses' rooms 
health visitors' office 
dispensary, office 
staff room
main area
The low design of the building and the proximity of a large car 
park allows wheelchair access freely.
Larger branch surgery is a traditional building with : 
a consulting room 
a waiting area
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an office which serves as the reception
nurses' treatment room
dispensary
Smaller branch surgery rents space from within a health 
authority owned health centre and has :
GP consulting room
health visitors' and nurses' treatment room 
waiting area.
Service provision :
Each GP conducts 8 surgery sessions per week and minor surgery 
procedures are also carried out at the end of ordinary surgery 
times if required by doctors. In addition, the following 
clinics are held regularly : 
antenatal care
additional monthly antenatal clinics attended by the local 
hospital consultant 
mother and baby
health education for the elderly
monthly health education & exercises conducted at warden
controlled accommodation
monthly carers' self support group
health checks for all new patients
diabetes
asthma
over 35 years 'MOTs' 
hypertension
we11-women cytology clinics 
counselling 4 sessions per week) 
physiotherapy (2 sessions per week)
Outside commitments of the partners include :
* diabetic clinic (1 morning session) - local city hospital
* rheumatology clinic (2 morning sessions per month) - local 
city hospital
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coordinating Oxford and Collaboration Health Check Trial, 
Department of Public Health and Primary Health Care, 
University of Oxford.
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Practice 4 (SH)
The practice :
This prescribing only practice was established in 1967 in an 
essentially very deprived area in north London. It moved to its 
present premises in 1984 and in 1992 underwent extensive 
building works to extend the space available. There are 5 GPs 
at practice and 2 GP trainees.
The practice employs : 
a rheumatologist
1 dietician
2 part-time counsellors 
2 full-time nurses
1 part-time nurse
2 health visitors 
1 general manager
1 fundholding manager 
8 receptionists
2 medical secretaries 
1 computer operator
1 clerical assistant
Accommodation :
Two storey conversion with :
7 consulting rooms 
a nurse consulting/treatment room 
small consulting room 
health visitors' consulting room
small consulting room for the health promotion nurse
practice manager's room
office
large meeting room 
consultant's and training room
reception and waiting area with play room for children.
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Service provision :
The practice conducts 55-57 surgery sessions per week and
clinics :
rheumatology
mother and baby
developmental check
The practice is currently piloting a scheme which offers early 
morning surgeries. It has also agreed to pilot a scheme to hold 
surgeries on Sunday mornings in place of the current Saturday 
morning surgery.
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Practice 5 (SL)
The practice
This small town/semi rural prescribing and dispensing practice 
in South East Hertfordshire established in 1981 operates from 
two surgery sites, has a preventive care unit and runs its own 
pharmacy and dental surgery on a site close to the main surgery 
premises. The practice has 9 partners, 2 of whom are founder 
members. The practice is also accredited under the general 
practitioner training scheme.
The practice employs :
3 practice nurses
1 nurse practitioner
4 health visitors 
1 practice manager 
10 receptionists
1 medical secretary 
3 part-time computer operators 
3 part-time clerical workers
Contracted to the practice are :
1 counsellor 
1 osteopath
3 orthopaedic surgeons (visiting)
1 consultant gynaecologist (visiting)
1 general medical consultant (visiting)
1 doctor specialising in asthma and hypertension
Accommodation :
Main surgery - modern duplex structure : 
main reception and waiting areas 
7 GP consulting rooms
2 consultants' rooms and separate waiting area 
nurses ' treatment rooms
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4 bedded operating theatre for minor surgery
self-contained operating suite capable of enabling the provision 
of day case local and general anaesthetic surgery seminar/common 
room 
WCs
Preventive Care Unit (separate site adjacent to the main surgery 
building). Two storey building with : 
waiting area
main consulting room/area accessed via a series of changing 
rooms
fund manager's office
office for the fundholding V.D.U. staff 
contracts negotiator's office 
Executive Partner's office
nurse practitioner's consulting room with separate waiting 
facilities
district nurses' office 
health visitors' office
Branch surgery (2 miles) was originally established in 1982 when 
two of the practice's doctors began conducting two sessions per 
week from the Methodist Church Hall. The facility rapidly
became popular and in 1984 a purpose built branch surgery was 
opened housing :
2 consulting rooms 
nurse's consulting room 
reception/office area 
waiting area 
WC
Service provision :
Each GP conducts 7 surgery sessions per week at the main surgery 
and 1 session per week at the branch surgery.
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Clinics : 
well-person 
post natal group 
cervical cytology 
well baby 
antenatal
paediatric immunization 
paediatric surveillance 
family planning 
elderly persons health circle
Additional expertise in :
general medicine
maternity
contraception
gynaecology and obstetrics
counselling
anaesthetics
asthma
diabetes
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Practice 6 (F)
The practice
This small, thriving market town practice in rural East Anglia 
is a combined prescribing and dispensing practice and operates 
from two surgery sites. The practice has 7 GPs, 2 part-time 
assistants and 1 GP trainee and is an accredited practice under 
the General Practitioner Training Scheme.. The practice also 
employs :
7 practice nurses 
3 district nurses 
2 midwives 
2 health visitors 
practice manager 
dispensing manager 
14 receptionists/dispensers
2 medical secretaries
3 computer operators/fundholding clerks 
bookkeeper
DHA contracted staff : 
physiotherapist
nurse practitioner specialising in asthma care 
Accommodation :
Main surgery is a modern single story building with
8 GP consulting rooms
2 additional consulting rooms
nurse practitioners' treatment room
physiotherapy room
reception/waiting area
dispensary
library
manager's office 
fundholding office 
staff room
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Branch surgery :
2 GP consulting rooms 
1 practice nurse's office 
treatment room 
office/reception room 
waiting area 
dispensary 
common room
Service provision :
The practice runs 57 surgery sessions per week and holds regular
clinics and offers advice in :
asthma
cardiovascular disease 
child & family health 
contraception 
diabetes
hormone replacement therapy 
hypertension
All GPs are members of the medical staff of the local hospital 
and belong to the Norfolk Accident Rescue Service. They also 
offer their services and expertise to local community projects 
ranging from organizing primary health care, occupational 
medicine, medical research to providing medical coverage at the 
local race course.
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Practice 7 (EH)
The Practice :
Large training partnership based on the outskirts of greater 
London. Established at the turn of the century by one of the 
present senior partner's great grandparents. The four sons of 
the founder also went onto become doctors and its has since been 
a tradition for a loosely affiliated partnership to grow and 
today, there are 6 GPs and a GP trainee.
The practice employs :
3 nurse practitioners
1 community psychiatric nurse
2 midwives
1 health visitor 
1 dietician 
1 phlebotomist 
1 psychologist
1 physiotherapist }attached to the practice.
1 chiropodist }attached to the practice.
1 practice manager 
1 deputy practice manager 
10 receptionists 
1 medical secretary 
1 computer operator
Accommodation :
In 1961 the practice moved to its present premises and extended 
these in 1984.
Main surgery - purpose-built two storey building :
Ground floor: Upper floor :
6 consulting rooms an office
1 treatment room a combined assistant manager's &
pathology room secretary's room
office fundholding & combined common room
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reception kitchen
waiting room WC
Branch surgery (3 miles). Converted residential accommodation:
2 consulting rooms 
2 nurses' treatment rooms 
waiting room/reception 
office
Service provision :
Each GP conducts 8 set surgery sessions a week and at least one
clinic. They also have a rota system for Saturday morning
surgeries and life insurance surgeries. Minor surgery is
carried out at the surgery when required. Over the last six
years the practice has developed a system of anticipatory care.
Clinics : Specialist services :
coronary care prevention diabetic clinic
contraception community nurse
counselling gynaecology
child health surveillance
antenatal care
women's clinic
menopause clinic
dermatology
paediatrics
hypnosis & chronic pain
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Practice 8 (T)
The Practice
This 6 doctor partnership, in the South East commuter belt, was 
established about 30 years ago. It is a small town prescribing 
and dispensing practice with two surgeries.
The practice employs :
3 practice nurses 
1 midwife
1 health visitor
2 physiotherapists 
1 dietician
1 counsellor 
1 practice manager 
9 receptionists 
1 medical secretary 
fundholding staff 
dispensing staff
The Accommodation :
Main surgery is a two storey converted residential property with
Ground floor :
6 GP consulting rooms 
dispensary
2 nurses’ treatment rooms 
minor ops room 
counsellor's room
3 offices 
reception 
interview room 
waiting areas 
porch for prams 
2 patient Wes.
First floor :
practice meeting room 
kitchen 
3 staff Wes
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The branch surgery (4 miles) opened October 1991 is a two storey 
conversion :
Ground floor : First floor :
GP's consulting room health visitor's room
nurse's treatment room hospice group room
interview room meeting room
secretary's office/dispensary GP consulting/midwife 
room
waiting area 
patient WC
Service provision :
Each GP conducts an average 9 surgery sessions per week in 
addition to a Saturday morning surgery where 2-3 of the doctors 
are in attendance.
Clinics :
baby
asthma
diabetes
hypertension
well person
diet
phys iotherapy 
anti-smoking
In addition, once every quarter an orthopaedic consultant 
conducts an outpatient clinic at the surgery and once a month on 
a Thursday, an anticoagulant nurse from the local hospital also 
visits the surgery to see patients.
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Appendix B
Interview Schedule I 
(Fundholding General Practice)
1 What have the changes in the funding of the NHS drugs bill 
meant to the practice in terms of management of spending 
on pharmaceuticals, policy decisions about prescribing
etc ?
2 Do you feel there are any pressures to change your (ie. 
the practice) prescribing behaviours ?
3 What factors in the resident population do you feel might 
influence your prescribing choices ?
4 Can you describe what strategies or policies, if any, the 
practice has adopted since fundholding to contain its drug 
spend (eg. introduction of formulary, generic prescribing, 
repeat prescribing; self audit review, procedures for 
’non-conformist’ prescribers, where to find help etc).
5 Do you have any arrangement/contract with hospital 
consultants about patient discharge prescriptions ?
6 Have you noticed any changes in hospital outpatient 
prescribing since the Reforms ?
7 If so, can you describe them ?
8 Can you describe any problems the practice may have 
experienced in implementing new prescribing
policies ?
8 Can you describe what decision processes were employed for
adopting these new prescribing 
policies ?
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9 What do you think the consequences of the new budgetary 
system might be in terms of patient care ?
10 How do you think the practice has fared since fundholding 
in terms of cost containment of drug spend ?
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Appendix C
Interview Schedule II 
(Family Health Service Authority)
1 What impact has the new budgetary system meant to the FHSA 
in terms of the management of drug spend ? (eg. the role 
of the medical/pharmaceutical adviser; new policies about 
prescribing certain types/ categories of drugs; monitoring 
the system etc ?)
2 How strict was the FHSA about following the DoH guidelines 
to the rule when setting practice budgets and IPAs ?
3 Were there any problems in setting budgets and 
IPAs ?
4 Can you describe any factors in the resident population 
which might influence prescribing trends ?
5 Can you describe what strategies or policies the FHSA has 
promoted amongst its practices to contain its drug spend 
(eg. introduction of formulary, generic prescribing, 
repeat prescribing; self audit ?)
6 Can you describe any problems the practice may have 
experienced in implementing new prescribing policies ?
7 What do you think the consequences of the new budgetary 
system might be in terms of patient care ? (eg. expensive 
patients ?)
8 Were there any other concerns about how the new budgetary 
system would affect FHSA firm budgets ?
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Appendix D
Calculating the percentage generic prescribing 
(prescribing and dispensing figures combined)
A combined generic percentage was calculated as follows
a) generic % (p) X overall number items (p)
+
generic % (d) X overall number items (d)
= total number of generic items
b) overall number items (p) + overall number items (d)
= total number of items (p+d)
c) total number of generic items
-----------------------------  X 100 = overall generic %
total number of items (p+d)
p = prescribing
d = dispensing
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Appendix E
Ranking practices according to their average cost 
per patient and average cost per prescribing unit
Table i
erage Cost Per Patient (£)
Y E A R Overall
Practice 1989 1990 1991 1992 Growth (%)
1 19.61 23.88 28.36 33.64 72
2 32.60 35.51 44.00 48.11 48
3 43.30 45.79 50.30 53.64 24
4 - - 27.01 27.78 3
5 36.94 39.43 43.78 49.76 35
6 39.73 44.17 50.60 59.13 49
7 35.38 41.38 47.57 47.48 34
8 41.03 45.57 52.52 59.09 44
Table ii
Average Cost Per Prescribing Unit (£
Y E A R Overall
Practice 1989 1990 1991 1992 Growth (%)
1 15.93 19.30 22.56 26.66 67
2 26.32 28.55 35.06 37.98 44
3 32. 90 34.79 38.09 40.75 24
4 - - 22.17 22.86 3
5 31.05 32.99 36.59 41.45 33
6 28.51 31.63 36.20 42.33 48
7 28.55 32.00 37.95 38.17 34
8 32.22 35.73 40.94 46.14 43
Table iii
Rank
Practice Ave Cost Ave Cost
Per Patient Prescribing
Unit
1 8 8
2 6 6
3 2 2
4 1 1
5 4 3
6 7 7
7 3 4
8 5 5
Note : 1 - smallest percentage growth 
8 - highest percentage growth
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Appendix F
ABPI
ASTRO-PU
BMA
Dispensing
Practice
DHA
DoH
DHSS
FHSA
Firm Budget 
GP
GPF Scheme 
Generic drugs 
I PA Scheme
Limited List
MA
MoH
NHI
NIC
OPCS
PACT
Glossary of Terms
Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry
New Prescribing Unit - each person in the 
population is given a weight based on Age, Sex 
and Temporary Resident (Chapter 9)
British Medical Association
Practice which also dispenses medicines 
this is where the patient lives more than 
one mile away from the nearest pharmacy
District Health Authority
Department of Health
Department of Health & Social Security
Family Health Service Authority (formerly 
Family Practitioner Committee)
Cash limited budget held at RHA and FHSA levels
General Practitioner
Cash limited budgets held by GPs
Non-proprietary (ie. non-brand named) drugs
Indicative Prescribing Amount Scheme (target 
budgets held by non-fundholding practices
'White' list of prescribable items
Medical Adviser (at FHSA and RHA level)
Ministry of Health
National Health Insurance (a form of 
nationalization of club and contract practice 
extending contract practice to all employed 
working men up to lower white collar, excluding 
their dependents and hospital care
Net Ingredient Costs - basic price of a drug 
exclusive of discounts, container costs, VAT 
etc.
Office of Population Census Statistics
Prescribing, Analysis, CosT 
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PPA
PPRS
Prescribing 
Only Practice
Prescription
Prescription Pricing Authority - special health 
authority responsible for authorizing payment 
to contractors for dispensing NHS prescriptions 
and drug information
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 
(formerly the VPRS) (scheme to regulate 
industry profits/prices)
Practice which can only prescribe drugs 
it cannot dispense them
Number of individual items (drugs) prescribed 
by GP
PU
RHA
VPRS
Prescribing Unit - a unit of weight given to a 
person. Person aged under 65 is given a weight 
of 1; 65 + are given a weight of 3.
Regional Health Authority
Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme (now PPRS) 
(scheme to regulate industry profits/prices)
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Appendix G
Data collection sources :
* Department of Health
* National Health Service Executive Management 
Committee
* Her Majesty's Stationery Office
* The London School of Economics Library
* The Westminster & Charing Cross Medical School
Library
* The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Library
* The Royal College of General Practitioners Library
* The British Medical Association Library
* The King's Fund Library
* The Associated British Pharmaceutical Industry
* The Office of Health Economics
* The Northwest Thames Regional Health Authority
* The University of Leeds Prescribing Research Unit
* Bedfordshire Family Health Service Authority
* Hertfordshire Family Health Service Authority
* Kensington & Chelsea Family Health Service Authority
* Norfolk Family Health Service Authority
* The University of Leeds Department of Economics
* The University of Aberdeen
* The Prescription Pricing Authority
* The Conservative Party Research Team
* The Labour Party Research Team
* The Liberal Democrats Research Team
* KPMG Peat Marwick
Journal articles, press releases, government papers, books.
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Appendix H
Interviewees and contacts :
* GP partner and practice manager of each of the eight GP 
fundholding practices participating in the study
* GP partner and practice manager of two GP fundholding 
practices who were eventually partially/totally excluded 
from the study
* Medical adviser Northwest Thames Regional Health Authority
* Medical/pharmaceutical adviser Befordshire Family Health 
Service Authority
* Medical/pharmaceutical adviser Hertfordshire Family Health 
Service Authority
* Medical adviser Kensington & Chelsea Family Health Service 
Authority
* Medical adviser Norfolk Family Health Service Authority
* Manager University of Leeds Prescribing Research Unit
* Information Officer Prescription Pricing Authority
* Partner (Management Consultancy Division) KPMG Peat 
Marwick
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